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Throughout the history of American education, the character and 
conduct of public school teachers have been of great concern to parents 
and the general public. Because of their daily contact with impres­
sionable young people, teachers are expected to abide by a strict moral 
code of conduct despite the liberalization of sexual mores that has 
occurred during the last two decades. 
The purpose of this study was to provide current information for 
practicing school officials faced with the decision to dismiss teachers 
for immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct. The questions answered 
by this study involved the status of immorality as a cause for dismis­
sal in both the state statutes and the judicial system; trends and 
patterns in judicial decisions; and guidelines for administrators and 
school board members to use in dismissal decisions. 
Based on the analysis of the data, the following conclusions were 
drawn: 
1. Teachers can be dismissed on charges of immorality in forty-two 
of the fifty states. 
2. Private sexual conduct can lead to dismissal if the school 
board has successfully established a nexus between the conduct 
and the teacher's performance in the classroom. 
3. Although there are contradictory opinions in dismissal cases 
involving homosexuality, dismissals based on private acts of 
homosexual conduct or on status as a homosexual are difficult 
to defend in court unless the school board has shown that the 
teacher's l ife style has had an adverse impact on classroom 
performance. Dismissals for public homosexual acts have gen­
erally been upheld. 
4. Teacher dismissals for heterosexual misconduct with other 
adults are not upheld by the judicial system unless the nexus 
requirement has been met by the school board. 
5. Unwed pregnancy is no longer considered prima facie evidence 
of immorality; there must be a showing of adverse impact on 
teaching performance for the dismissal to be upheld. 
6. Dismissal of a teacher for sexual misconduct with students 
generally results in a legally defensible dismissal if the 
teacher's constitutional rights are protected during the dis­
missal process. 
7. The recent Stoneking decision may result in successful civil 
rights actions against school districts when teachers engage 
in sexual abuse or harassment of students and when there is 
a pattern of failure by school officials to address student 
complaints. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
What constitutes immorality? Do teachers enjoy the right to 
privacy? Do school boards have the right to dismiss teachers for 
their conduct outside of the classroom? The answers to these and 
other questions will be revealed in this study of the legal aspects 
of the dismissal of teachers for immorality on grounds of sexual mis­
conduct. 
Since the beginning of public education in the United States, there 
has been an interest in the conduct of teachers. Perhaps as a reaction 
to the dubious moral character and conduct of the earliest public school 
teachers, modern teachers in many areas of America continue to be 
expected to serve as exemplars for the public school students. Richard 
Clay observed that 
A cornerstone of American public education has been the assumption 
that students, in order to become well-balanced human beings and 
stable members of the community, must be taught to discern moral 
values . . . the teacher must be sensitive to the morality of his 
own l ife because his behavior will be emulated by the students in 
his classroom.1 
On the concept of teachers as exemplars, Todd DeMitchell stated: 
In a nutshell, teachers are cast in the role of exemplars. For 
that reason, their private lives can affect their job security. 
Like all the rest of us, of course, teachers want the freedom to 
fashion private lives of their own choosing, yet a community wants 
^Richard Clay, "The Dismissal of Public School Teachers for 
Aberrant Behavior," Kentucky Law Journal 64 (1976): 911. 
2 
to protect its children by ensuring that teachers reflect prevail­
ing views and mores. Both interests are legitimate, but at times, 
they're mutually exclusive.2 
David Rubin summarized this issue with the following succinct statement: 
"Teachers have historically been held to a standard of conduct that might 
3 have suffocated Caesar's wife." 
The legislatures of more than half of the states have included 
immorality (or various causes such as "immoral conduct," "conduct unbecom­
ing a teacher," "unprofessional conduct," "moral turpitude," or "good 
and just cause") as a cause for dismissal of teachers. Few have 
attempted to define the term. Alaska is one of the few states that has 
included a definition of immorality in its statutes as "the commission 
4 of an act which constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude." 
Since most legislatures were remiss in defining the specific behav­
iors that would lead to dismissal for immorality, this task has been 
left to the courts. The interpretation of immorality has not been con­
sistent. However, a review of court decisions yields some consistency 
in definition of the term as applicable to teachers. The Supreme Court 
of Michigan made the following statement in a 1936 ruling: 
"Immorality" is not necessarily confined to matters sexual in 
their nature; it may be that which is contra bonos mores; or not 
moral, inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or good morals; con­
trary to conscience or moral law; wicked; vicious; licentious, as 
? 
Todd DeMitchell, "Matters of Morality: Back Seat Trysts are not 
School Problems," Executive Educator 6:1 (January 1981): 23. 
3 David Rubin, The Rights of Teachers: The Basic ACLU Handbook to 
a Teacher's Constitutional Rights (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1984), 140. 
^Alaska Statutes. Sec. 14.10.170 (2). 
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an immoral man or deed. Its synonyms are: Corrupt, indecent, 
depraved, dissolute; and its antonyms are: Decent, upright, good, 
right. That may be immoral which is not decent.5 
One of the most widely quoted definitions appeared in a 1939 deci­
sion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In its opinion, immorality 
was defined as "a course of conduct as offends the morals of the com­
munity and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is 
supposed to foster and to elevate."^ 
In a 1960 case in California, the Appeals Court provided another 
judicial definition: 
The term "immoral" has been defined generally as that which is 
hostile to the welfare of the general public and contrary to 
good morals. Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters 
but included conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative 
of corruption, indecency, depravity, dissoluteness; or as willful, 
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to the 
opinion of respectable members of the community, and as an 
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.7 
In a more recent case, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio labored 
over the meaning of immorality and concluded: 
Whatever else the term "immorality" may mean to many, i t is clear 
that when used in a statute it is inseparable from "conduct." 
Both counsel agree that this is so. But, it is not "immoral con­
duct" in the abstract. It must be considered in the context in 
which the Legislature considered it, as conduct which is hostile 
to the welfare of the general public; more specifically in this 
case, conduct which is hostile to the welfare of the school 
community.8 
^Schumann v. Pickert, 269 N.W. 152 (1936). 
^Horosko v. School District of Mount Pleasant, 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 
866 (1939). 
^Board of Education of San Francisco Unified School District v. 
Weiland, 4 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1960). 
8Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School District Board of 
Education, 233 N.E.(2d) 143 (1967). 
4 
Not only does review of the pertinent cases reveal some judicial 
consistency in definition, but it also reveals categories of conduct 
which may lead to dismissal. In their 1983 article, Landauer, Spangler, 
and Van Horn listed thirteen such categories: 
1. Heterosexual conduct with students 
2. Heterosexual conduct with nonstudents 
3. Homosexuality 
4. Nonsexual misconduct with students 
5. Physical abuse of students 
6. Classroom discussion or use of materials that are sexual in 
nature 
7. Use of profanity 
8. Misconduct involving drugs 
9. Misconduct involving alcohol 
10. Other criminal misconduct 
11. Misappropriation of funds 
12. Cheating 
13. LyingS 
Of these thirteen categories, this study focuses only on those that 
are sexual in nature because of the delicate matter of dismissing an 
employee for immorality based on grounds of sexual misconduct. As 
Thomas Fleming pointed out: "Without question, the most sensitive issue 
and the one most l ikely to generate intensive debate is teacher dis­
missal for moral cause and in particular for offense of a sex-related 
nature."^ He simplified study of this issue with three broad cate­
gories of sex-related causes for dismissal of teachers: "teacher homo­
sexuality; sexual misconduct of teachers with students; and sexual 
9 W. Lance Landauer, John Spangler, and Benjamin Van Horn, "Good 
Cause Basis for Dismissal of Education Employees," in Legal Issues in 
Public Employment (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappan, 1983), 155. 
^Thomas Fleming, "Teacher Dismissal for Cause: Public and Private 
Morality," Journal of Law and Education 7, no. 3 (July 1978): 423. 
5 
misconduct of teachers with other adults."** Edward C. Bolmeier shared 
the following: 
It is generally assumed that a school board has a legitimate 
interest in maintaining the integrity of the schools by protecting 
against potentially detrimental influences on impressionable pupils 
who may be affected by the conduct of their teachers outside the 
classroom. This assumption is shared by . . . the courts. There­
fore, questionable sexual behavior of teachers is scrutinized by 
the judiciary more closely than it is for persons outside the 
teaching profession. 
For a number of years teachers who were charged with immorality by 
their school board either resigned their position quietly or were 
allowed to transfer to another school system with no publicity. With 
the increased emphasis on individuality and the reduced emphasis on 
conformity over the last two decades, teachers faced with these charges 
are increasingly turning to the courts for relief as evidenced in the 
increased number of immorality cases litigated in the 1970's and 1980's. 
Immorality is the most frequently litigated cause for dismissal which 
is probably due in part to the subjectivity allowed to school boards by 
the lack of definition in most state statutes. 
Teachers have sought relief based on several constitutional issues: 
immorality is unconstitutionally vague; the First Amendment which, 
through extension, protects freedom of association; the Third Amendment 
which protects the privacy of the home; the Fifth Amendment which pro­
tects against self-incrimination; the Ninth Amendment which specifies 
that enumerated rights in the Constitution are not to be considered as 
11Ibid., 425. 
12 Edward C. Bolmeier, Sex Litigation and the Public Schools (Char­
lottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1975), 40. 
6 
denying the existence of other rights which are not enumerated; and the 
Fourteenth Amendment which makes all other amendments constitutional. 
Legal challenges have also invoked the Privacy Act of 1974 which refers 
to privacy as a personal and fundamental right that is protected by the 
Constitution. However, as Todd DeMitchell pointed out: 
Privacy, or as Justice Brandeis phrased it, "the right to be left 
alone," often is thought of as a freedom guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution. But fact is, it is not. Rather than a constitutional 
guarantee, the right to privacy has evolved through governmental 
action and judicial decis ions.*3 
Again, the confusion inherent in this area which has led teachers, admin­
istrators, and school boards to the courts for clarification is obvious. 
Statement of the Problem 
The moral fabric of American society has changed greatly since the 
1960's. Increased personal freedom has led many in the teaching pro­
fession to believe that their personal l ives are private based on con­
stitutional guarantees and are not subject to the scrutiny of their 
employer. This has resulted in an increase in litigation when teachers 
are dismissed for immorality based on sexual misconduct. 
Given the subjectivity allowed school boards by the lack of speci­
ficity of state statutes concerning immorality as a cause for dismissal 
and the reliance in many judicial definitions on the standards of the 
community, i t is easy to understand the problems facing many school 
boards who try to dismiss teachers for immoral conduct. This study will 
attempt to provide guidelines for both administrators and school board 
members who must wrestle with this dilemma. 
13DeMitchel1, 23. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was (1) to determine from current l itera­
ture the critical legal issues in the dismissal of teachers for immoral­
ity on grounds of sexual misconduct; (2) to review and analyze statutes 
from the fifty states to determine the status of immorality on grounds 
of sexual misconduct as a cause for dismissal; (3) to review and analyze 
case law related to these dismissals; and (4) to provide guidelines 
for practicing school administrators who must make the decision to dis­
miss teachers for immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct. This 
study was developed in a factual manner based on the legal issues 
involved and will not attempt to address the moral values inherent in 
charges of immorality. 
Questions To Be Answered 
This study will answer the following questions: 
1. What is revealed in current literature concerning dismissal 
of teachers for immoral conduct? 
2. What is the status of immorality as a cause for dismissal as 
outlined in state statutes of all fifty states? 
3. What is the status of dismissal for immorality as revealed in 
analysis of case law? 
4. Are there discernible patterns and trends that can be identi­
fied in judicial decisions? 
5. What legal guidelines can be set forth as a result of this 
research to aid administrators and school board members? 
8 
Methodology 
The methodology used for this study was that of legal research as 
14 defined by Hudgins and Vacca. This involves an analysis of judicial 
decisions from which legal principles are derived. The study of case 
law was supplemented with an analysis of state statutory law. 
Legal research begins with framing the problem as a legal issue: 
the legal aspects of teacher dismissal for immorality on grounds of 
sexual misconduct. State statutes that control this issue were investi­
gated. Subsequently, a bibliography of court decisions was built. Each 
decision was read and analyzed around three major areas: the facts of 
the case; the decision and rationale; and implications of the decision. 
Primary sources were state and federal court decisions and state 
statutes. Secondary sources such as legal encyclopedias, law reviews, 
education articles, and books were util ized to provide supplemental 
information. Included as resources were the Current Index to Journals 
in Education, Index to Legal Periodicals, Current Law Index, American 
Law Reports, and Resources in Education. 
Legal cases focusing on teacher dismissal for immorality on grounds 
of sexual misconduct were located utilizing the LEXIS computer search 
system. The actual cases were examined as reported in the National 
Reporter System which includes decisions rendered by the following 
courts: the United States Supreme Court, the United States District 
Courts, the United States Courts of Appeals, and state appellate courts. 
Other lower state court decisions were included when higher level 
14 H. C. Hudgins and Richard S. Vacca. Law and Education (Char­
l o t tesv i l l e ,  Va . :  The  M ich ie  Company ,  1985J ,  Z ' S - b Z .  
9 
decisions were not available for a given area of research. Cases were 
read and categorized according to the nature of the sexual misconduct 
involved. 
Legal cases were "shepardized" util izing Shepard's Citations which 
provides a history of reported court decisions and a treatment of that 
decision. This allowed the researcher to rely on the applicable court 
holding. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited to analysis of state statutes and state and 
federal court cases based on those statutes as applied to the dismissal 
of teachers for immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct using the 
time frame 1970-1990. The most recent study of immorality as a cause 
for dismissal was completed by Leonard H. Simmons as his doctoral disser­
tation in 1976. Much has changed in both the attitudes of society and 
the courts since that time. This study was designed to analyze both the 
literature and the legal cases since the early 1970's for the purpose 
of determining the current trends in the legal aspects of teacher dis­
missal for immorality specifically on grounds of sexual misconduct. 
Design of the Study 
Chapter I  includes an introduction, the statement of the problem, 
the purpose of the study, the questions to be answered, the methodology, 
the limitations of the study, the design of the study, and the defini­
tion of terms. 
Chapter II examines current articles from legal and educational 
resources to determine the status of and thoughts concerning immorality 
10 
on grounds of sexual misconduct as a cause for dismissal of teachers. 
Beginning with the early years of public education, the development 
of policies to regulate teacher conduct was traced. Attention was then 
focused on current trends in dealing with teacher dismissal for immoral­
ity on grounds of sexual misconduct, both judicially and educationally, 
as revealed in the current literature. 
Chapter III reviews the state statutes from all fifty states to 
determine which states include immorality or related terms as a cause 
for dismissal or revocation of teaching credentials. Attention was 
also given to definitions of immorality or limitations placed on its 
use as a cause for dismissal. 
Chapter IV examines pertinent legal cases in which dismissal of 
teachers for immorality on the grounds of sexual misconduct was l it i­
gated. While the focus of this examination was the cases from the 1970's 
and 1980's, landmark rulings from previous years were included as appro­
priate. Many of these rulings were from higher level state courts 
since the United States Supreme Court has ruled on very few cases in 
this area. Therefore, state courts have often relied on decisions from 
their own or other states for guidance in this area of teacher dis­
missal . 
Chapter V summarizes the findings of the research and provides 
guidelines for administrators and school board members to utilize when 
faced with a decision to dismiss for immoral conduct. Also included 
in this chapter are recommendations for further study. 
11 
Definition of Terms 
The following words and phrases are key terms which will be uti-
15 lized in this study. Unless noted otherwise, Black's Law Dictionary 
was the source of these definitions. 
Certiorari--A writ from a superior to an inferior court requiring 
the latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried 
therein. It is most commonly used to refer to the Supreme Court of 
the United States, which uses the writ of certiorari as a discretionary 
device to choose the cases it wishes to hear. 
Dismiss—To discharge; to cause to be removed temporarily or perm­
anently; to relieve from duty. 
Immoral--Contrary to good morals; inconsistent with the rules and 
principles of morality; inimical to public welfare according to the 
standards of a given community, as expressed in law or otherwise. 
Immorality--That which is against good morals. 
Indecent exposure—Exposure to sight of the private parts of the 
body in a lewd or indecent manner in a public place. 
Indecent 1iberties--Taking such l iberties as the common sense of 
society would regard as indecent and improper. According to some 
authorities, it involves an assault or attempt at sexual intercourse, 
but according to others, it is not necessary that the familiarities 
should have related to the private parts of the child. 
Moral turpitude--Act or behavior that gravely violates moral senti­
ment or accepted moral standards of the community and is a morally 
15Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publish­
ing Co., 1979). 
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culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as dis­
tinguished from others. 
Plea of nolo contendere--A plea in a criminal case which has a 
similar legal effect as pleading guilty. The principal difference 
between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere is that the 
latter may not be used against the defendant in a civil action based 
upon the same acts. 
Res judicata--Rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent 
action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. 
Respondeat superior theory—Let the master answer. This maxim 
means that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of 
his servant, and a principal for those of his agent. Under this doc­
trine master is responsible for want of care on servant's part toward 
those to whom master owes duty to use care, provided failure of servant 
to use such care occurred in course of his employment. As applied to 
education, this doctrine establishes the liability of the school district 
for the actions of its teachers. 
Solicitation—For the crime of solicitation to be completed, it is 
only necessary that the actor, with intent that another person commit a 
crime, has enticed, advised, incited, ordered or otherwise encouraged 
that person to commit a crime. The crime solicited need not be com­
mitted. 
Teacher--As used in this study, the term "teacher" encompasses all 
certified school employees below the rank of superintendent. 
13 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Historical Overview 
Before reviewing current literature related to the issue of dis­
missal of teachers for immorality, it is important to review the issue 
of teacher conduct historically. Throughout America's public education 
history, teachers have had a somewhat checkered past. 
Many of the earliest school teachers in America were indentured 
servants, convicted felons, or others of dubious character. Often they 
had little more education than their pupils. Frequently, servants were 
obtained to serve as teachers through advertisements much as skilled 
craftsmen were obtained at the time. It is interesting to note that 
teachers generally did not bring as high a price as did the skilled 
craftsmen. Edgar Knight describes the early teacher in his book History 
of Education in the United States as 
. . . shiftless, migratory, and itinerant, poorly paid and as 
poorly esteemed by the public. . . . Now and then, if the records 
are to be believed, he was given to loose living and was generally 
unwilling to assume social responsibilities. ... He was generally 
poor in spirit except when he was in a state of inebriety, a not 
uncommon condition of the teacher in the early days.1 
In 1791 Robert Coram observed that the teachers were "generally for­
eigners, shamefully deficient in every qualification necessary to convey 
2 instruction to youth, and not seldom addicted to gross vices." 
*Edgar W. Knight, Education in the United States (Boston: Ginn and 
Company, 1929), 348. 
2Ibid., 351. 
14 
In 1812, the concern about the moral character of teachers was 
obvious in an act which established common schools in New York. Each 
teacher was required by that act to hold a certificate signed by at 
least two local authorities to show that he was qualified to teach in 
a common school and was of good moral character. 
New York was not the only state to require "good moral character" 
certificates. Knight shared an account of a man who applied for the 
position of teacher in a common school in North Carolina during the 
middle of the 1800's: 
It was necessary then, as it had been earlier and is now, for the 
teacher to give evidence of good moral character. But this man, 
who was notorious for his bad habits, had difficulty until he 
found a friend who gave him a "certificate of good moral character 
during school hours." This satisfied the local requirements, and 
the man was employed.3 
In Public Education in the United States, Ell wood Cubberley 
described teachers in the early 1800's as "incompetent adventurers, 
migratory, odd in their ways, crude in their manners, and often ques-
4 tionable in their character." 
Joseph Caldwell, President of the University of North Carolina, 
noted in the early 1830's that 
. . . those who had wasted their property and had ended in debt 
through indiscretion or misconduct; those who had ruined themselves 
and corrupted others by dissipation, drinking, seduction, and a 
course of irregularities; those who had returned from prison, the 
destitute of character, the untrustworthy,--these and others as 
vulgar and ignorant conducted schoo ls .^  
3Ibid., 358. 
^Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), 325. 
5Knight, 353. 
15 
In 1843, a correspondent for a Virginia newspaper observed that 
many of the teachers were "invalids, some were slaves to drunkenness, 
some too lazy to work, most of them entirely ignorant of the art of 
teaching, and a terror to their pupils. There were a few . . . who 
g 
possessed culture, intelligence, morality, ability." The governor 
of South Carolina in the middle of the nineteenth century lamented: 
"With but few exceptions, they are very ignorant and possess a very 
easy morality. 
Cubberley also reported that contracts and rules in the 1840's 
often required that . . the teacher conduct himself properly and 
'refrain from all spirituous liquors while engaged in this school, and 
not to enter the school house while intoxicated, nor to lose time through 
O 
such intemperance.'" 
Having quickly reviewed the conduct of some of America's earliest 
teachers, it is clear that the public had reason to be concerned about 
the caliber of the individuals in the sensitive position of educating 
America's youth. A second factor which must have undoubtedly had an 
effect on the increase of regulations concerning teacher behavior was 
the increase in the number of women becoming teachers. As a result 
in the 1900's, clauses in teachers' contracts severely limited the 
freedoms of teachers. 
In School Law: Cases and Concepts, Michael LaMorte included the 
following Rules of Conduct for Teachers published in 1915 by a local West 
Virginia board of education in his discussion of the teacher as exemplar: 
6Ibid., 352. 7Ibid., 353. 8Cubberley, 326. 
1. You will not marry during the term of your contract. 
2. You are not to keep company with men. 
3. You must be home between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. 
unless attending a school function. 
4. You may not loiter downtown in ice cream stores. 
5. You may not travel beyond the city" limits unless you have the 
permission of the chairman of the board. 
6. You may not ride in a carriage or automobile with any man 
unless he is your father or brother. 
7. You may not smoke cigarettes. 
8. You may not dress in bright colors. 
9. You may under no circumstances dye your hair. 
10. You must wear at least two petticoats. 
11. Your dresses must not be any shorter than two inches above the 
ankle. 
12. To keep the school room neat and clean, you must sweep the 
floor at least once daily; scrub the floor at least once a 
week with hot, soapy, water; clean the blackboards at least 
once a day; and start the fire at 7:00 A.M. so the room will 
be warm by 8:00 A.M.9 
A teacher's contract from the Wilson City and County Public Schools 
in North Carolina in the 1920's included the following restrictions: 
I will take a vital interest in Church and Sunday School work, 
and other community activities: that I will not entertain com­
pany until late hours at night and thus render my school work the 
next day inefficient; that I will not attend sorry moving pictures 
and vaudeville shows; that I will not fall in love or become famil­
iar with high school pupils; that I will not attend card and dancing 
parties; that I will not fail to use good sense and discretion 
in the company I keep; that I will use my best endeavor during 
the year to improve my work as a teacher; and that I will do nothing 
to bring disrepute on the home in which I live or to cause right 
thinking people to speak disparagingly of me and of my work.^ 
In his book Education in the United States written in 1929, Edgar 
Knight shared some of what he considered to be queer requirements of 
that time. He included the following regulations in use in one of the 
Southern states: 
q 
Michael W. LaMorte, School Law: Cases and Concepts (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 216. 
^Teacher's contract, Wilson City and County Public Schools, 
Wilson, N.C., 1920. 
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I promise to take a vital interest in all phases of Sunday-school 
work, donating of my time, service, and money without stint for 
the uplift and benefit of the community. I promise to abstain 
from all dancing, immodest dressing, and any other conduct unbecom­
ing a teacher and a lady. I promise not to go out with any young 
men except in so far as it may be necessary to stimulate Sunday-
school work. I promise riot to fall in love, to become engaged 
or secretly married. I promise to remain in the dormitory or on 
the school grounds when not actively engaged in school or church 
work elsewhere. I promise not to encourage or tolerate the least 
familiarity on the part of any of my boy pupils. I promise to sleep 
at least eight hours a night, to eat carefully, and to take every 
precaution to keep in the best of health and spirits in order that 
I may be better able to render efficient service to my pupils.11 
Similar restraints continued even after the first World War. David 
Rubin reported that one Virginia contract signed in 1935 specified that 
teachers could not keep company with "sorry young men"; a Tennessee 
contract stipulated that the teacher was to refrain from all question­
able pastimes; and an Alabama contract required the teacher to promise 
not to have company or go riding in an automobile on Monday through 
12 Thursday nights. 
In his 1936 book on teacher freedom, Howard Beale reported many 
restrictions on the conduct of teachers. Much of his research involved 
letters from and interviews with classroom teachers throughout the 
United States. He reported that the ban on attending the theater was 
almost a thing of the past. However, activities such as drinking and 
smoking continued to be taboo in most areas of the country (although 
school boards in the Northeast and in large cities seemed to have a 
more relaxed standard about drinking). In his discussion of sex rela­
tions, he observed that "Sex immorality seems almost universally to 
UKnight, 360. 12Rubin, 141. 
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bring dismissal. . . . Where sex morality is involved, gossip is usually 
sufficient cause for dismissal of a teacher without any proof of the 
13 charges." 
Since Beale's book, much has changed in the dismissal of teachers 
for immorality. Unsubstantiated gossip alone is no longer sufficient 
cause for the dismissal of a teacher. However, the public continued 
to be concerned with the conduct of teachers. As Beale pointed out: 
Conduct is an important matter in a world gone topsy-turvy because 
of a sudclen breakdown of former inhibitions and traditional codes 
of don'ts. Conduct is important, too because of the great influence 
of example with children and because children do not heed much 
what the teacher tells them but are affected by imitation of what 
the teacher does. 
This is perhaps even more true today than it was in 1936 as evidenced 
by the number of authors who have addressed this issue in the literature 
since 1970. 
In his discussion of the teacher as exemplar in his 1982 book, 
Michael LaMorte commented that the teachers in the past knew what con­
stituted improper conduct which would lead to their dismissal. It was 
obvious to all that improper dress and grooming, public drunkenness, 
extramarital affairs, improper conduct by single teachers, divorce by 
female teachers, and homosexuality would lead to a loss of their position. 
He also observed: 
Changing life-styles and frequent lack of agreement regarding not 
necessarily exemplary, but merely "proper" conduct may make it 
difficult for a teacher to know when a norm is transgressed and 
exceeds school authorities' or a community's zone of acceptance. 
13 Howard K. Beale, Are American Teachers Free? (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1936), 381. 
14Ibid., 407. 
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This problem is further heightened by the fact that teacher con­
duct which may be tolerated in a metropolitan area may not be in 
a small town with a homogeneous population that considers itself 
conservative.15 
Thomas Fleming also made a similar observation in his article on 
teacher dismissal and the issue of public and private morality: 
Traditionally, American society has evidenced a firm conception 
of the teacher's role. It has been a consistently held conviction 
that the care of the young is as much a moral as an educational 
responsibility and, in this regard, teachers have been expected 
to function as exemplars in their professional and private lives. 
The educational history of the United States is replete with exam­
ples of stringent ordinances establishing high standards of conduct 
for those in charge of children. Since the formation of good char­
acter and citizenship have been historically the dominant goals 
of the schools, it has been a natural consequence to require moral 
excellence in those who staff them. ... A symbiotic relationship 
now exists between the public concern for the professional and 
moral qualities of school staff and an increasing public apprehen­
sion regarding the dramatic growth in successful litigation by all 
segments of society. . . . Nowhere has this issue of public and 
private morality been reduced more clearly to a question of institu­
tional responsibility versus individual freedom than in the nation's 
schools.1® 
Also on the subject of the teacher's influence on his pupils, John 
McCormick shared the following: 
The teacher cannot teach without conveying some of his or her 
attitudes on society, politics, and ethics. Because of this sensi­
tive role, the teacher has always been subject to the closest 
scrutiny regarding his or her fitness to teach. Traditionally, 
this scrutiny has included an examination of the teacher's private 
life as well as his or her classroom competency.17 
On the same topic, James H. Lowe pointed out a source of concern in 
retaining teachers whose lifestyle is nontraditional: 
When there has been no allegation of sexual misconduct directly 
involving students, the perceived harm to the educational 
15LaMorte, 216. 16Fleming, 423-24. 
*7John G. McCormick, "'Immorality' as a Basis for Dismissing a 
Teacher," School Law Builetin XVI, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 9. 
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community results from the unique trust reposed in teachers, upon 
whom an elevated standard of behavior is imposed. Thus, teachers' 
nonconforming sexual practices may compromise their role as moral 
exemplars to their pupils or undermine their statutory duty to 
teach moral principles. The fear has been expressed that retention 
of such teachers might be construed as adult approval of the offend­
ing behavior, might provide the opportunity for a recurrence actually 
involving a student, or might impair relationships with parents, 
fellow teachers, and administrators.18 
Finally, Samuel Francis and Charles Stacey stated that courts have 
traditionally dealt harshly with teachers who have been found guilty of 
acts of immoral conduct. They further stated that 
The rationale for insisting upon high standards of conduct in the 
school setting is simple. Teachers are constantly involved with 
young people whose minds are impressionable, and immoral acts on 
the part of the teacher might have traumatic and harmful effects 
upon the students in the school.19 
E. Edmund Reutter pointed out the difficulty administrators face 
in balancing the rights of teachers as citizens with the expectations 
for exemplary behavior: 
A teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a 
subtle but important influence over their perceptions and values. 
[Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)] The courts over the years 
have been in agreement with this 1979 statement of the Supreme Court, 
and have expected a teacher's character and conduct to be above 
those of the average person not working in so sensitive a relation­
ship as that of teacher and student. Nevertheless, there has been 
a discernible trend toward according teachers more freedom in 
their personal lives than was true in the more distant past. 
Obviously the line is difficult to draw between the rights of 
teachers as citizens, and the obligations imposed by the neces­
sity for effective instructors of youth to be more than subject-
matter and teaching-method specialists.^ 
1 Q  
James H. Lowe, "Homosexual Teacher Dismissal: A Deviant Deci­
sion," Washington Law Review 53, no. 499 (1978): 500. 
^Samuel Francis and Charles Stacey, "Law and the Sensual Teacher," 
Phi Delta Kappan (October 1977): 98. 
O f )  
E. Edmund Reutter, The Law of Public Education (Mineola, N.Y.: 
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1985), 593. 
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In determining whether to dismiss a teacher for sexual misconduct 
two issues surface that administrators must deal with: the right to 
individual privacy guaranteed through application of constitutional 
guarantees, and the due process rights guaranteed by both the Constitu­
tion and state statutes which provide tenure rights to teachers. 
Right to Privacy 
The first of these issues, which is an argument often utilized 
in a legal challenge of a dismissal for immorality, involves the right 
to privacy enjoyed by individual citizens in America. Since many behav­
iors which lead to dismissal occur in the privacy of one's home, many 
dismissed techers argue that the behaviors are protected by the United 
States Constitution. David Rubin pointed out that 
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly 
establishing a right of privacy, the Supreme Court has concluded 
that the Constitution nevertheless creates zones of protected 
privacy. . . . The constitutional right of privacy is far from 
fully defined. Some components of the right, however, have emerged 
from decisions of the Supreme Court. One, derived directly from 
the Fourth Amendment, is the freedom of an individual, in his pri­
vate affairs, from governmental surveillance and intrusion. A 
second is the right of an individual not to have personal matters 
disclosed by the government. A third is an individual's right 
to think as he chooses, free from governmental compulsion.2l 
Merri Schneider-Vogel also addressed the right of privacy in her 
article on constitutional issues surrounding dismissal of gay teachers: 
The right of privacy is a fundmental right. Unlike the rights 
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, however, privacy 
is a nebulous right with ill-defined parameters. The right has 
been said to have its source in various constitutional provisions 
including: the first amendment's freedoms of association and 
speech; the fourth amendment; the due process and equal protection 
21Rubin, 141. 
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clauses of the fourteenth amendment; the penumbra surrounding spe­
cific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights; and the unenu-
merated rights alluded to in the ninth amendment. Although the 
right to privacy has been recognized in respect to personal inti­
macies of the home, procreation, and marrige, whether it extends 
to private sexual conduct between consenting adults is an unsettled 
question.22 
In his discussion of the rights of teachers, Thomas Flygare cau­
tioned teachers against assuming that their private life was not a 
concern of their employers: 
[T]he days are surely gone when teacher contracts contained pro­
visions requiring the teacher to attend church and prohibiting 
the smoking of cigarettes or the drinking of alcoholic beverages. 
But one should not assume from recent events that school boards 
are now powerless to act against teachers on the basis of behavior 
off the school grounds.23 
In their book on teachers' rights, Stelzer and Banthin share the 
following definitions of the public vs. the private person. This is 
often an issue the courts must decide in dismissal cases. 
The public person is the individual as presented to others. The 
public person is the sum total of an individual's grooming, dress, 
style of dealing with others, public statements, and public 
actions. It is the manipulable self. The private person is the 
core person, with a unique combination of values, behavior, goals, 
relationships, and needs.24 
They continue their discussion to point out: "Sexual behavior, marriage, 
procreation, family life, child rearing, and religion fall within a 
'zone of privacy' . . . because they are the subject of intimate 
27 Merri Schneider-Vogel, "Gay Teachers in the Classroom: A Contin­
uing Constitutional Debate," Journal of Law and Education 15, no. 3 
(Summer, 1986): 290. 
Thomas J. Flygare, The Legal Rights of Teachers (Bloomington, 
Ind.: Phi Delta Kappan Educational Foundation, 1976), 25. 
04 
Leigh Stelzer and Joanna Banthin, Teachers Have Rights, Too 
(Boulder, Col.: ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 1980), 
139. 
23 
25 decision making and because they do not affect others adversely." The 
public person enjoys fewer protections. Because of the nature of the 
public person, it is more reasonable to expect conformity to the norms 
of society. Some aspects of the public person have little adverse 
effect on others so no effort is made to change them. However, as the 
authors pointed out: "a teacher's pattern of interaction with students, 
colleagues, and parents is both public and important. Similarly, public 
immorality and lawbreaking are both harmful and public and, therefore, 
nc  
are legitimate concerns of government." 
Stelzer and Banthin, as well as many other authors dealing with 
this subject, were quick to point out that when an individual goes 
public to crusade for his life style, flaunt a controversial l ife style, 
or focus attention on his private life through misbehavior or indiscre­
tion, he forfeits the right to privacy and cannot claim it as a defense. 
In the words of Landauer and his associates: 
The constitutional right to privacy cannot be claimed as a defense 
against dismissal if the conduct was of a public, bizarre, or 
flagrant nature. When the private conduct of a teacher becomes 
public knowledge or when the claim of privacy is applied to con­
duct that, in fact, is not private, the courts generally have held 
that the conduct is not protected from school board scrutiny by 
a right to privacy.27 
Richard Clay pointed out a problem that was inherent in the issue 
of privacy in his article in the Kentucky Law Review: 
The only safe statement that can be made as to whether the private 
sexual conduct of a teacher is protected against state regulation 
is that courts differ. Because privacy is still a hazy constitu­
tional principle, judges have enormous room to "value sculpt." 
They have the power to determine whether certain conduct is 
25Ibid. 26Ibid. 27Landauer, 158. 
24 
"fundamental" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 
and if they find that certain conduct is protected under those 
standards, they still have enormous discretion in designating 
state interests as "compel!ing."28 
Todd DeMitchell referred to the use of the right to privacy as 
a defense in immorality cases as "a murky legal area" and provided the 
following list of factors which should be taken into account in these 
cases: 
1. The right to privacy has been recognized by the judicial and 
legislative branches of government. 
2. When viewing teachers' out-of-school behavior, a nexus (or 
connection) between the behavior and a resulting negative 
effect on the school system must be established. 
3. Teachers have a right to privacy and a corresponding duty to 
keep their private behavior private. 
4. The public nature of a teacher's act probably will remove 
it from the sphere of protection. 
5. Sexual activity with a student and the destructive effect of 
notoriety both weigh heavily against a teacher. 
6. Firing teachers for alleged sexual misconduct is unconstitu­
tional .29 
Finally, Thomas Fleming provided an excellent summary for this 
issue in his article on public and private morality: 
In summary, recent court rulings and social climate suggest that 
despite radically changing public attitudes and practices in a 
variety of areas, the community and their appointed and elected 
officials continue to expect and demand that public school 
teachers observe historically approved standards of social 
decorum, and, wherever necessary, that they maintain a strict 
separation between their public and private lives. Given that 
this division is maintained, whether through a "double-life" or 
not, the teacher like other citizens is free to exercise his indi­
vidual rights to their limits.30 
Due Process Rights 
The second issue with which administrators must deal very care­
fully involves the due process rights of the dismissed teacher. The 
28Clay, 926. 29DeMitchel1, 24. 30Fleming, 430. 
following will serve as a summary and a reminder of the steps that must 
be followed for the dismissal to be upheld in court. 
A teacher is entitled to due process of law prior to dismissal when 
a property or liberty interest exists. A property interest is created 
through tenure, implied tenure, or contract. A liberty interest may 
arise if the dismissal action imposes a stigma or damages the teacher's 
reputation. 
At a minimum, due process requires that the teacher be provided 
with notice specifying reasons for the dismissal and an opportunity for 
a hearing at which he may present evidence and confront witnesses. In 
addition, all procedures specified by state statute or contract must 
be followed in the dismissal process. 
Current Literature on Teacher Dismissal for Immorality 
on Grounds of Sexual Misconduct 
This section of Chapter II reviews the current literature to deter­
mine the legal issues involved in the dismissal of teachers who are 
charged with immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct. The areas to 
be addressed in this dissertation are homosexuality, heterosexual mis­
conduct with other adults, unwed pregnancy, sexual misconduct with 
students, and unorthodox behavior. 
Little has been written that specifically addresses the legal 
issues involved with heterosexual misconduct with other adults and 
unorthodox conduct. However, there is case law which addresses these 
areas and which will be reviewed and discussed in Chapter IV of this 
study. One can assume from analysis of the general literature on dis­
missals for immorality that the courts would be reluctant to uphold the 
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dismissal of a teacher for private conduct with another consenting adult 
as discussed earlier based on the right to privacy. Also, a necessary 
factor for the dismissal to be upheld in the courts is the nexus issue. 
The school board would have to show that the behavior had an adverse 
impact on the teacher's performance. 
Homosexuality 
One of the most difficult issues that school boards have faced 
and will continue to face is the issue of homosexual teachers. Homo­
sexuals employed in public education are turning to the courts for 
protection against discrimination with increasing frequency. As a 
result, administrators must be thoroughly familiar with the legal aspects 
of dismissing a teacher for immorality based on homosexuality. When 
a teacher is an admitted homosexual, is that prima facie evidence of 
immorality? Does the teacher have a right to live quietly the life 
he chooses? Does commission of an act of moral turpitude automatically 
lead to dismissal for immorality? An examination of the literature 
combined with an analysis of case law will provide answers for school 
boards and administrators who must answer these questions. 
Joshua Dressier included the following in the introduction to his 
article on the likelihood of dismissal of homosexual teachers: 
A majority of Americans apparently believe that gay people should, 
as a class, be excluded from the teaching profession. Nonetheless, 
gay people do teach, and have presumably always taught, school 
children. Most such teachers even today, however, presumably hide 
their sexual orientation for fear that disclosure will jeopardize 
their status as teachers.-^ 
31 Joshua Dressier, "Survey of School Principals Regarding Alleged 
Homosexual Teachers in the Classroom: How Likely (Really) Is Discharge?" 
University of Dayton Law Review 10, no. 3 (1985): 599. 
27 
In the past, teachers who preferred to keep their sexual pref­
erences private had little difficulty. Generally, if the homosexuality 
became known, it was due to the actions of the individual. However, 
the new practice in the gay community in America referred to as "outing" 
is a recent development that has ramifications for the public schools. 
According to a recent television news program, "outing" is the practice 
of revealing gay individuals who are celebrities or famous in some 
respect in the hope that people will realize that there are gay and 
lesbian people who are famous and who are making positive contributions 
to society. It was referred to as "a tactic some gays are using to 
drag famous, successful supposed other gays out of the closet kicking 
and screaming if need be." Michelangelo Signorelli, a homosexual 
journalist, has been active in "outing" and predicted with certainty 
that the practice would gain momentum. In response to a question con­
cerning the possibility of "outing" being expanded from celebrities to 
regular poeple who do not want to be brought out of the closet, he 
32 responded that that may very well happen. If this practice does accel­
erate, homosexual teachers would be a natural target along with police 
officers, local politicians, and other high visibility individuals in 
the community. Therefore, school administrators must be ready to deal 
with the issue of homosexual teachers. 
Kenneth Brooks, Charles Faber, and Glenn Smith also pointed out 
the necessity of examining the issue of homosexuals in public education 
in the introduction to their article: 
"^Gay Bashing (New York: CBS Television, 1990). 
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The pliable fabric of today's society is woven of fluid threads 
of every imaginable sort. Conflict, confrontation, and change 
must occur as these threads cross. Three aspects of our society 
increasingly coming together with dynamic results are homosexual­
ity, the law, and public schooling. School administrators . . . 
need to understand homosexuality as a concept and as a legal issue 
in relation to public education. 
The issue of homosexuality is not unique to contemporary life in 
America. Brooks, Faber, and Smith shared the following historical 
information: 
The origins of writings on homosexuality can be traced rather 
directly to about the seventh century B.C. As part of an effort 
to distinguish themselves from surrounding nations, Jews first 
condemned homosexuality as a form of idolatry at about that time. 
Prior to the seventh century, homosexuality had been an accepted 
part of Jewish life and had been included in some forms of sexual 
worship. Within a fifty year period during and following the Baby­
lonian Exile, conservative Jewish factions reformulated many 
beliefs and insisted upon an ascetic philosophy. In addition to 
homosexuality, other forms of sexual expression were also con­
demned. Sex was viewed as acceptable solely for procreation. 
The condemnation was recorded as part of Talmudic law. Eventually, 
Hebraic attitudes were adopted into Christian codes.34 
Much of the current bias in America against homosexuals is rooted 
in the prohibition of homsexuality found in the Bible. In Leviticus, 
one finds the following in the ordinances that God gave Moses to deliver 
to the children of Israel: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with 
qc 
womankind: it is abomination." In The Epistle of Paul the Apostle 
to the Romans, Paul revealed the reasons for the wrath of God against 
the ungodliness and unrighteousness of men and included: 
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, 
burned in their lust toward another; men with men working that 
which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense 
33 
Kenneth W. Brooks, Charels F. Faber, and Glenn Smith, "Homosex­
uality, the Law, and Public Schools," in School Law Update (Topeka, 
Kan.: National Organization on Legal Problems in Education, 1977), 160. 
"^Ibic., 161. ^Leviticus 18:22. 
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of their error which was meet. . . . Who knowing the judgment of 
God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not 
only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.36 
Further, in I Corinthians one finds: "Know ye not that the unrighteous 
shall not inherit the kingdom of God? Be not deceived: neither forni­
cators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of 
37 themselves with mankind . . . shall inherit the kingdom of God." 
Finally, in I Timothy, the Apostle Paul observed that the law is not 
made for the righteous but for those who act contrary to the gospel of 
God. He included in that number ". . . them that defile themselves with 
•30 
mankind." LaMorte stated: "This Biblical prohibition has been given 
legal status in forty-two states and the District of Columbia, where 
39 
homosexual behavior between consenting adults is a crime." 
Since the law reflects the moral values of the people, it is easy to 
understand the legal status of homosexuality in America. Joshua Dress­
ier has observed that it was well documented that the law was no friend 
to gay people. Further, he stated: 
Legal rules mirror the deep anxiety felt by many persons in society, 
and even felt by judges who must interpret the law, toward homo­
sexual people. At no time, perhaps is such anxiety more explosively 
expressed than when the question is raised whether gay people should 
be permitted to serve as teachers in elementary and secondary 
schools.40 
Samuel Francis and Charles Stacey also addressed public concern 
about homosexuals in the classroom: 
36Romans 1:27, 32. 37I Corinthians 6:9. 38I Timothy 1:10. 
•3Q 
Michael W. LaMorte, "Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Homo­
sexuals in Public Education," Journal of Law and Education 4, no. 3 
(July 1975): 461. 
40 
Dressier, 599. 
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The controversy surrounding homosexuality pervades the public 
schools of the nation. Questions have been raised about the fit­
ness of homosexuals to be certificated to teach. The question 
arises as to whether or not homosexual acts are by their nature 
indications of immorality. School officials are concerned that 
homosexuals will take advantage of their contacts with students 
to perform perverse sex acts with them, or that the teacher's 
"unusual" sexual orientation will be internalized bv students and 
thus influence their subsequent sexual development. 
The last twenty-five years have been times of change in American 
values and attitudes brought about by the sexual revolution which began 
in the late 19601s. However, as Floyd Delon pointed out in 1982, the 
liberalized attitudes toward homosexuality in society have not carried 
over into the public school classrooms: 
Public attitude toward homosexuality is probably more tolerant 
today than it has ever been. Yet, those who would accept a homo­
sexual teacher as an appropriate role-model for pupils probably 
represent a small minority in most communities. Objectivity 
toward homosexual conduct is diminished by a widely-held belief 
that homosexuals actually represent a threat to the welfare of 
children.42 
With the recent public awareness of the AIDS epidemic which was 
first revealed in the homosexual community, this objectivity may dimin­
ish even further as the public perceives an actual threat to the health 
of children who are exposed to homosexual teachers. As a result, there 
has been an increase in what many in the news media have termed homo­
phobia. This will undoubtedly have an effect on the public schools. 
Michael LaMorte also discussed the fear of many, including judges, 
over the possible deleterious effect of homosexual teachers on the chil­
dren in public schools. He stated: 
41 
Francis and Stanley, 101. 
42 Floyd G. Delon, "Teacher Dismissal for Immoral and Illegal Con­
duct," in School Law Update (Topeka, Kan.: National Organization on 
Legal Problems in Education, 1982), 155. 
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Undoubtedly images of 1imp-wristed, effeminate, garishly-dressed 
men in makeup teaching school, or evil and sinister-looking men 
perpetrating evil deeds on unsuspecting and innocent children, 
lurk in the minds of many when the question of allowing a homo­
sexual to teach in a public school is raised.43 
He also included a reason that many administrators would fear disclosure 
of a homosexual teacher. "Others fear the possible disapproval of the 
school system by the public and parents, and the subsequent possibility 
44 of a rejection of bond and funding measures at election time." With 
the current budget constraints and shortfalls, this is a valid concern. 
However, it cannot override the legal rights of the teacher involved. 
There is no question that homosexuals in the classroom is an emo­
tionally charged issue as evidenced by the following from a 1977 Phi 
Delta Kappan article. At the time, Max Rafferty wrote a weekly educa­
tion column published in approximately one hundred newspapers in the 
United States and was Dean of the School of Education at Troy State 
University in Alabama. It was his opinion that 
It's a sorry commentary on contemporary manners and mores 
that we're even bothering to ask whether gays should teach school. 
Sodomy is against the law everywhere I've ever been or heard of, 
and its illegality alone should make the matter moot. . . . 
Try this syllogism on for size: 
Major premise: A criminal is one who commits an act that 
is forbidden by a public law. 
Minor premise: Sodomy is an act forbidden by a public law. 
Conclusion"": Therefore, a sodomite is a criminal. 
And considering our declining and falling posture in all 
opinion polls, fellow educators, we simply can't afford the luxury 
of urging the hard-pressed taxpayers to pay criminals to teach 
their children. 
Oh, it 's not that I want any American citizen denied his or 
her constitutional rights. But let's face it. Nobody has a 
constitutional right to be a school teacher.45 
44 
LaMorte, "Legal Rights and Responsibilities," 461. Ibid. 
^Max Rafferty, "Should Gays Teach School?" Phi Delta Kappan 59, 
no. 2 (October 1977): 91. 
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In the same issue, there was an article authored by a Florida school 
teacher who was a candidate for a Doctor of Education degree at a major 
Florida university. Citing the fear that he would lose his job if his 
sexual preferences were known, he preferred to remain anonymous. In 
his opinion: 
Homosexual teachers are not a danger to society any more than are 
heterosexual teachers. The vast majority lead useful, productive 
lives, practicing their personal sexual preference as privately 
as heterosexuals do theirs. The law should protect the gay teach­
er's privacy, just as it does that of the heterosexual. . . . 
Children should not grow up in a family where the word homosexual 
is whispered. They should not play on a playground and hear the 
words faggot and queer. They should not be forced, in church, 
to listen to bigoted preachers speak about the sin of sodomy. 
They are not gaining a useful education in colleges where they 
hear of homosexuality as an illness or in counseling centers that 
promise cures. All we gays ask is the right to choose our own 
life-style, with freedom from persecution and condemnation. . . . 
But for God's sake, if we're going to remove teachers from class­
rooms, let's remove the ineffective ones. ... We need to fight 
to keep those teachers who, regardless of sexual preference, daily 
challenge their fortunate students to learn, to create, to explore, 
and to make decisions.46 
Given the emotional nature of this issue, judicial involvement clarify­
ing the legal aspects of dismissal was inevitable. 
Michael LaMorte addressed the development of case law in this area 
which revealed lack of consistency on the part of the judiciary in 
addressing homosexual dismissal: 
A body of case law is developing as homosexuals in public educa­
tion increasingly employ the judiciary in an attempt to secure 
what they consider to be their constitutional rights. The hold­
ings in the reported cases dealing with homosexuals in public 
education to date do not reveal a clear direction. They do indi­
cate, however, that arbitrary policies or practices which withhold 
employment from homosexuals, which result in a nonrenewal of 
AC 
Anonymous, "A Homosexual Teacher's Argument and Plea," Phi 
Delta Kappan 59, no. 2 (October 1977): 93. 
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contract or dismissal when their "deviance" is discovered, or which 
result in revocation of a teaching certificate may be subject to 
successful court attack.47 
He continued his discussion of the rights and responsibilities of homo­
sexuals in public education to point out a number of societal forces 
which may influence the direction of case law dealing with homosexuals 
in the classroom: 
These include: changing attitudes toward homosexuals by certain 
ins-titutions; rapid changes in life-styles and mores, coupled with 
a greater willingness of homosexuals to surface; increased media 
attention toward the homosexual position which appears to be more 
sympathetic than hostile; related educational court cases where 
private but offensive actions of teachers, which historically have 
been grounds for dismissal and possible revocation of teaching 
certificates, have been upheld; and lastly,the increasing use of 
the judicial test of establishing a nexus between conduct and 
teaching performance.48 
After his review of pertinent legal cases, Thomas Flygare came to 
the following conclusion: 
Many of the cases upholding the decertification or dismissal of 
homosexual teachers have involved open acts of sexual conduct. 
In such cases, the courts' agreement that the teacher is unfit 
for the classroom appears to stem as much from the brazenness of 
the acts as from their homosexual nature. More difficult issues 
arise where there is no evidence of overt sexual conduct but where 
a school board wishes to take adverse action against a teacher 
merely for expressing a homosexual preference. . . . U.S. Courts 
of Appeals . . . have not given us a clear statement of law on 
whether a school board can flatly refuse to hire or retain homo­
sexual teachers.49 
When can a homosexual teacher be fired? In his 1974 article on 
the law and teacher dismissal, H. C. Hudgins, Jr., provided an answer 
as one of the ten legal commandments administrators must not break: 
47 
LaMorte, "Legal Rights and Responsibilities," 449. 
48Ibid., 462. 49Flygare, 26. 
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With greater openness about sex these days, this question 
is important, and the answer appears to depend in turn on two 
other questions. 
Has the teacher lost the ability to discipline children, i.e., 
is there a loss of respect which leads to a breakdown in dis­
cipline? 
Has the teacher's behavior resulted in a noticeable breakdown 
of the effectiveness of the educational program? 
If neither element is present, administrators will probably not 
win court sanction for removing the teacher.50 
His commandment on dismissal of homosexual teachers was: "Don't fire 
a teacher solely for being a homosexual unless his sexual inclination 
51 adversely affects teaching performance." 
Joshua Dressier conducted a survey of school principals in 1982 
to determine the likelihood of a homosexual teacher being dismissed 
in the United States. Utilizing a questionnaire format mailed to 
200 secondary school principals, he sought to determine the opinions 
of these principals regarding the legal rights of homosexual teachers 
to practice their profession and the experiences principals had in deal­
ing with teachers who they suspected or knew were homosexuals. The 
author selected principals from four schools in each state which could 
bias the study toward small states. Responses were received from 54% 
of the principals who were mailed questionnaires. After analysis of 
the data, Dressier drew the following conclusions: (1) a small, though 
significant minority of principals felt that a homosexual teacher should 
lose his license solely due to status; (2) principals seemed concerned 
about the criminality of homosexuality (more than one-half felt that 
50 H. C. Hudgins, Jr., "The Law and Teacher Dismissals: Ten Com­
mandments You Better Not Break," Nation's Schools 93, no. 3 (1974): 41. 
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conviction should lead to dismissal); (3) a substantial minority favored 
loss of license for participation in gay rights activist groups or 
for disclosing sexual preferences to students; (4) actual treatment 
of teachers has been much more lenient than the assertions of princi­
pals regarding hypothetical cases would suggest; (5) principals typ­
ically conclude that a teacher is homosexual based on rumor, stereotyp­
ical thinking, or guilt by association; and (6) teachers with poor 
teaching records are more likely to be disciplined than those who were 
perceived to be good teachers, even in cases of apparent misconduct. 
Dressier also observed that "rarely does the retention of a teacher 
publicly accused of being homosexual cause long-term problems for the 
52 administration of school activities. 
These conclusions have implications both for the courts and for 
school officials. Principals seemed more concerned about retaining 
a teacher who had broken the law than they were about retaining a homo­
sexual. Decriminalization of private homosexual acts would apparently 
lessen the inclination to dismiss these teachers regardless of their 
sexual persuasion. Also of interest is the finding that there was 
l ittle long-term disruption involved in the retention of a known homo­
sexual. Further, it must be disconcerting to those who fear sexual 
abuse of students by teachers to realize that even though allowed by 
educational statutes, discharge based on such misconduct is not usually 
a result. Rather, in some cases there was no attempt to even disci­
pline the teacher. 
^Dressier, 618-19. 
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Nexus frequently arises in cases involving dismissal for immoral­
ity. After reviewing relevant legal cases, James Lowe concluded: 
. . . the nexus between sexual conduct and unfitness to teach may 
be inferred when at least one of three possible aggravating cir­
cumstances is identifiable in the fact pattern: 
1) the sexual conduct occurred in public; 
2) the behavior is criminal and has been judicially recorded in a 
proceeding separate from the dismissal action, although con­
viction is not required; or 
3) the teacher has otherwise invited notoriety beyond the publicity 
which would reasonably attend such a dismissal. 
These situations have in common the fact that the activity 
has been flaunted sufficiently flagrantly to pierce the veil of 
privacy, exposing the deportment to the school board's rigid 
scrutiny. Conversely, when these aggravating circumstances have 
been absent, dismissals have been reversed.53 
This represents a change from the past when the behavior alone was ade­
quate for dismissal. However, in those cases in which the misconduct 
involves a minor or student, the behavior is sufficient cause. 
Michael LaMorte also addressed the issue of nexus as related to 
decisions in dismissal cases. In an earlier quote he included the nexus 
standard as one of the liberalizing forces affecting homosexual dismis­
sal cases. He has concluded that the courts are reluctant to bar conduct 
solely on the basis of historical opinion, community standards, or conven­
tional wisdom. They are leaning more toward requiring that the behavior 
be connected with the actual teaching performance. He stated: 
As this test continues to be employed by the judiciary, it will 
undoubtedly continue to affect many aspects of the case law in 
public education, including that dealing with homosexuals. Conse­
quently, it will become necessary to demonstrate that a person's 
homosexuality affects his teaching performance. An inability to 
establish this relationship may make it impossible to remove him 
from the classroom. The use of such a test will insure that a 
capable, effective teacher will not be dismissed merely because 
53Lowe, 504. 
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he stands accused of unorthodox sexual behavior. It will not, on 
the other hand, protect an incompetent homosexual teacher.54 
In conclusion, Merri Schneider-Vogel provided an excellent set 
of guidelines for administrators that were derived from her study of 
constitutional issues involved in cases of homosexuals who have been 
dismissed from their teaching positions. Included were the following: 
(1) minimal due process guarantees notice and a fair hearing before 
termination; (2) court have distinguished between terminating those 
homosexuals who engage in overt, frequent homosexual conduct and mere 
knowledge of the teacher's sexual preference; (3) teachers are more 
likely to be protected if the charges stem from speech and not sexual 
acts themselves; (4) discharges for public homosexual conduct are more 
likely to be upheld by the courts than those involving private conduct; 
(5) if courts do recognize that the right to privacy extends to homo­
sexuals, school boards will be limited in the degree to which they may 
inquire into the private lives of teachers believed to be homosexual; 
and (6) the primary concern of the school board in assessing the fitness 
of teachers must be the educational competence of the teacher and the 
possibility of actual harm to students resulting from the teacher's 
conduct. School boards must also be careful in assessing the source 
of notoriety to determine if their inquiry was the actual cause of the 
notoriety surrounding the conduct which led to dismissal. Finally, 
she cautioned that such dismissals must be based on "cause, teacher 
unfitness, or an unworkable disruption that the employment of the homo-
55 sexual individual causes." 
^LaMorte, "Legal Rights and Responsibilities," 467. ^Vogel, 316. 
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Unwed Pregnancy 
The pregnancy of a single female teacher is another cause included 
in dismissal for irmiorality on grounds of sexual misconduct. In this 
instance, the misconduct is implied by the pregnancy. 
In his book on teacher freedom, Beale pointed out that in the early 
19001s school districts often dismissed married techers. One of the 
reasons cited was the pregnancy that often followed the marriage. In 
1913, twelve married pregnant teachers in New York were dismissed and 
that dismissal was upheld by the court. The court ruled that teachers 
had a right to marry and a right to take leave for illness, but taking 
leave for pregnancy amounted to neglect of duty. Two years later, the 
state commissioner for education in that state reinstated the teachers. 
He further reported that, in 1936, many states did allow leave for child­
birth. However, some of these states limited the number of leaves that 
56 one teacher could take. 
Whereas the concern of school officials in the early part of this 
century was focused on the issue of married pregnant teachers, the 
current concern is focused on the pregnancy of single teachers. The 
liberalized societal attitude about unwed pregnancy is reflected in 
the legal aspects of this issue. Teachers who are dismissed for immo­
rality due to their status as unwed mothers are turning to the courts 
for relief. As Douglas Punger pointed out in his article: 
Not so long ago the unmarried teacher who became pregnant was sum­
marily dismissed, if she had not already quit and moved out of 
town before her principal, superintendent, or school board learned 
56Beale, 386. 
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of her condition. Today, many unwed teachers who become mothers 
are successfully challenging the efforts of superintendents and 
school boards to dismiss them.57 
One reason frequently employed for the dismissal of unwed pregnant 
teachers is the concern that these individuals serve as an "immoral" 
role model for their students. Recently, there has been an increase 
in national concern about the number of teenage females becoming preg­
nant and bearing illegitimate children. A 1981 article entitled "Black 
and White, Unwed All Over" discussed the issue of teenage pregnancy 
and provided interesting statistics. In 1979, 17% of all babies in 
the United States were born out of wedlock. Nationally, approximately 
33% of all babies born to white teenagers and 83% of babies born to 
black teenagers were out of wedlock. The number of these births has 
increased almost 50% since 1970 and has quadrupled since 1950. This 
article attributed the increase to "the steady decline of the social 
CO 
stigma against it." Those who believe that unwed pregnant teachers 
are unacceptable role models often cite the statistics as support for 
their position. Punger stated: 
Despite this apparent social problem, and even though the class­
room teacher has more personal contact with teenagers than any 
other professional, Congress and the courts have made it increas­
ingly difficult, if not legally impossible, to dismiss an unwed 
teacher who becomes pregnant.59 
^Douglas S. Punger, "Unwed Mothers As Teachers?" School Law 
Bulletin XIV, no. 1 (Januaryl983): 1. 
^"Black and White: Unwed All Over, Time 118, no. 19 (November 19, 
1981): 67. 
59 
Punger, 1. 
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Two constitutional issues typically arise in cases involving dismis­
sal for immorality based on pregnancy. Stelzer and Banthin pointed 
out in their discussion of life-style choices that 
Marriage and pregnancy, like other areas of personal and family 
life, are protected by the due-process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that because rules 
about marriage and pregnancy directly affect basic civil rights, 
due process requires that such rules must not needlessly, arbi­
trarily, or capriciously impinge upon peopla's l ives.60 
Nowhere is there a distinction made legally to remove unmarried women 
from the protection afforded women by this ruling. 
Julie K. Underwood advanced the argument that unwed pregnancy is 
constitutionally protected conduct in her article on the right to pri­
vacy and unwed pregnancy: "I contend that a person's decision to con­
ceive and bear a child is within the constitutionally protected zone 
of privacy. This is true even if the person is an unmarried teacher."®1 
In 1978 Congress passed legislation called the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act which was intended to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The purpose of the legislation was to clarify that the 
prohibition against sex discrimination included a prohibition against 
discrimination in employment on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions. Punger examined federal laws and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines and concluded: "An unwed 
teacher or any other unwed public employee who becomes pregnant and 
^Stelzer and Banthin, 14. 
Julie K. Underwood, "The right to Privacy and Unwed Pregnancy," 
Journal of Law and Education 18, no. 4 (Fall 1989): 537. 
6242 U.S.C. Section 2000 c(k)(1981), P.L. 55-555. 
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is dismissed can establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in 
violation of Title VII by alleging that she was dismissed because of 
C O  
her pregnancy." Punger then examined pertinent case law and reached 
the following conclusion regarding the dismissal of unwed pregnant 
teachers for immorality: 
School boards may dismiss an unwed teacher because she becomes 
pregnant only if they find as a fact that there is a nondiscrim­
inatory reason for dismissing her other than her pregnancy or that 
there is a legitimate business necessity for dismissing her that 
is connected to her job performance. Therefore, before recommend­
ing the dismissal of an unwed pregnant teacher on the grounds of 
immorality, a superintendent must be prepared to show by the testi­
mony of parents, school psychologists, psychiatrists, or others 
that the teacher's condition has had or will have adverse effects 
on her job performance.64 
In his discussion of the legal rights of teachers, Thomas Flygare 
stated: "Although marriage and parenthood have been given a modicum 
of legal protection in recent years, a school board can still impinge 
on these rights as long as the board has a legitimate objective and 
65 does not administer the policy in an unconstitutional manner." 
After his review of case law, Edward C. Bolmeier concluded that 
Pregnancies under normal conditions are legal for married as well 
as unwed females. (In fact they are essential for the perpetuation 
of society.) The pregnancy of an unmarried teacher, however, 
presents a situation which would be the subject of litigation, 
especially where right of tenure is concerned. But even here, 
the weight of judicial authority upholds the pregnant unwed teacher 
in the security of her teaching posit ion.66 
Two recent articles by professors in educational administration 
programs present opposite viewpoints on this issue. Donal M. Sacken 
^Punger, 3. ^Ibid., 5. ®5Flygare, 30. 
^Bolmeier, 98. 
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authored an article to take issue with the Eckmann v. Board of Education 
of Hawthorn School District^ decision. This case is unique in the 
case law dealing with dismissal for immorality based on unwed pregnancy 
in that the plaintiff was pregnant as the result of rape. This deci­
sion upheld a jury's verdict which overruled the school district's dis­
missal and awarded Eckmann compensatory damages of 3.3 million dollars. 
In his article Sacken expressed concern about the impact that this ver­
dict would have on other school boards. In his words: "While the out­
come in this case is both desirable and legally defensible, this 
general constitutional principle could work intolerable mischief for 
school boards and represents an unnecessary judicialization of a com­
plex social question, more appropriate to resolution in another govern-
mental forum." In his discussion of the outcome, he expressed con­
cern about another issue: 
The verdict ultimately turned on a quite problematic legal prop­
osition: that a teacher has a fundamentally protected constitu­
tional right "to conceive and raise her child out of wedlock 
without unwarranted state (school board) intrusion." That right 
was characterized by the court as contained within the constitu­
tional concept of substantive due process, and more specifically, 
as a component of the modern constitutional doctrine of privacy. 
Sacken also pointed out that this case embodies a potential paradox 
of the privacy concept: 
As a teacher appearing daily before her junior high school stu­
dents, Eckmann most likely could not preserve her pregnancy as 
67636 F. Supp. 1214 (ND. 111. 1986). 
fift 
Donal M. Sacken, "Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn School 
District: Bad Management Makes Bad Law," Journal of law and Education 17, 
no. 2 (Spring 1988): 281. 
69Ibid., 283. 
a "private" decision. The consequences of her horrendous experi­
ence, and of her subsequent decision to bear her child, would 
become evident. Unlike other teachers, her alleged "immoral" 
conduct could not be cabined within her private life.70 
Sacken also expressed concern that the virtually absolute protection 
this verdict gave unwed teachers would lead to these teachers modeling 
values and behaviors which were contrary to educational goals and social 
policy in many communities. He offered the opinion that "... the 
status of the unwed, pregnant teacher, much like that of the homosexual 
teacher, should remain legally fragile."''1 Sacken concluded his analysis 
of this decision with the following: 
. . . the manifest injustice done to this individual could have 
been rectified without the court concluding that all teachers 
enjoy a basic freedom to conceive out of wedlock. Perhaps the 
horrendous facts spurred the court to this doctrinal excess, but 
in any event, an egregious managerial judgment should not be met 
with parallel judicial misjudgment.72 
Julie K. Underwood wrote an article which is essentially a rebut­
tal of Sacken's assertions concerning the Eckmann decision. She stated: 
"I strongly disagree with the argument that the conception and birth 
of a child out of wedlock should be per se grounds for a teacher's dis­
missal for immorality, and that the right to privacy should not extend 
73 
to the decision to bear a child out of wedlock." Underwood proceeded 
to point out errors in Sacken's logic including: (1) Sacken's exten­
sion of this decision to all cases involving dismissal of unwed pregnant 
teachers dismissed previous judicial authority; (2) the opinion of the 
court never focused squarely on the constitutional right to privacy; 
70Ibid., 285. 71Ibid., 292. 72Ibid., 298. 
73 Julie K. Underwood, "The right to Privacy and Unwed Pregnancy," 
Journal of Law and Education 18, no. 4 (Fall 1989): 537. 
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and (3) the focus of this decision was the errors made by the defendants 
in the action. She also pointed out if unwed pregnancy was considered 
within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy that 
This would not prohibit a district from dismissing an unwed preg­
nant teacher, but would require evidence of immorality based on 
constitutionally acceptable criteria. In addition, the district 
must prove that the alleged immoral behavior has a negative impact 
on the person's effectivenesses a teacher.74 
After discussing the right to privacy, immorality, and the function of 
teachers as role models, Underwood reached the following conclusion: 
Granted, teenage prenancy is a problem in our society which should 
be addressed. However, it does not appear that dismissing public 
school teachers who are unwed and pregnant would be a rational 
solution to that problem. Teachers should act as role models for 
their students; however, there must remain a realm of private moral­
ity and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the 
law's business. 
In sum, it is my contention that a person's decision to conceive 
and bear a child out of wedlock is within those rights of privacy 
which have been afforded constitutional protection by the Supreme 
Court. School districts should be required to respect those 
rights of privacy even when exercised by a teacher.75 
Although administrators, parents, and the general public are con­
cerned about the problem of teenage pregnancy in the United States, 
this does not allow dismissal of unwed pregnant teachers for fear that 
their presence in the schools constitutes an immoral role model. 
School boards must show that the dismissal of the teacher was for 
reasons other than the illegitimate pregnancy. The presence of such 
a pregnancy does not imply immoral behavior according to the courts. 
Sexual Misconduct with Students 
There is more agreement in both court decisions and the literature 
concerning sexual misconduct with students as the basis for dismissal 
74Ibid. 751bid., 546. 
45 
of a teacher than in any other area discussed in this dissertation. As 
Landauer and associates pointed out in their discussion of the dismis­
sal of education employees for good cause: 
Sexual misconduct with students may not be engaged in by teachers, 
and such misconduct justifies removal of the teacher from the 
classroom. No other category of conduct used as a basis for immoral­
ity dismissals has generated such unanimous disapproval in court 
decisions as sexual misconduct by a teacher with students. 
Similarly, Richard D. Strahan and L. Charles Turner stated in their 
book, The Courts and the Schools, that "Some activities, such as sexual 
misconduct with students, are clearly grounds for an immorality dis­
missal . 
In his paper on the dismissal of public school teachers for immoral 
conduct, Floyd Delon observed that the volume of litigation dealing 
with sexual conduct with students has increased rapidly. He further 
stated: 
The reasons are no doubt very complex. Some of this reflects 
the general increase in sexual abuse of children, particularly 
when elementary school pupils are involved. There appears to be 
agreement, too, that secondary school students are more sexually 
aware and active than they were a generation or so ago. It is 
not difficult to understand how teachers might become involved 
with their students. The temptation could be especially great 
for the male teacher who may be only a few years older than his 
female pupils.78 
The most detailed examination of this issue is provided by Patricia 
L. Winks in an article entitled "Legal Implications of Sexual Conduct 
Between Teacher and Student." She began the article by pointing out: 
^Landauer, 155. 
^Richard D. Strahan and L. Charles Turner, The Courts and the 
Schools (New York: Longman, 1987), 153. 
78Delon, 21. 
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If there are teachers who, since 1907, have been sent to jail for 
seducing their students, their names do not appear in the case 
books. Two conclusions are possible: sexual misconduct between 
teacher and student does not occur—or students are reluctant to 
file charges. Anyone who has ever taught school knows that that 
first conclusion is erroneous . . . education journals are silent 
about sexual relationships between teachers and student. This 
unusual reticence is not attributable to ignorance. Among them­
selves, teachers are a repository of salacious anecdotes. Students, 
masking their disapproval with worldly wise cynicism, shrug off 
such behavior as just another variation of teacher's pet. Adminis­
trators avoid confrontation in the fervent hope that the parents 
remain uninformed. Students, teachers, administrators—all par­
t i c ipa te  in  the  consp i racy  o f  s i l e n c e . ' 9  
The reasons for the reluctance to report such incidents are based 
on a number of factors. Many of these reflect the stereotypical excuse 
of the greater sexual needs of the male and his "normal response" to 
attractive young women. A woman often remains silent for fear that 
her charges will not be believed, as is frequently the case in rape 
cases. Also, professional loyalty is often cited as an excuse for not 
reporting these incidents. Much of the recent recognition of the prob­
lem of sexual relations between professor and student on college campuses 
is due to the efforts of students to expose the problem and help vic­
tims of sexual harassment deal with the situation effectively. 
Winks pointed out that while most adult students who became 
involved sexually with professors may be said to have made a conscious 
decision to do so, most younger students may become involved because 
of psychological needs. She continued: 
Many high school teachers envision their role as both educational 
and therapeutic. They are often particularly effective counselors 
because of their daily classroom contact. . . . But the teacher 
79 Patricia L. Winks, "Legal Implications of Sexual Contact Between 
Teacher and Student," Journal of law and Education 11, no. 4 (October 
1982); 437. 
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who assumes a therapeutic role must assume a special responsibility 
as well. The relationship between a young female student and her 
male teacher imposes a stringent duty of care. ... A favorite 
teacher often fulfills the role of the true, the glamorous, the 
understanding parent, and becomes the center of the young student's 
fantasy life. The adolescent girl, reenacting her earliest unqual­
ified love, may transfer her feelings to the teacher. . . . The 
very fact that this idealized relationship is in essence a parent-
child relationship makes an erotic exchange altogether inappropri­
ate, bordering on the incestuous.80 
She quickly cautioned that 
To define a sexual relationship between teacher and student 
as simply a manifestation of the student's transference is to 
direct attention away from the teacher's initiation of that rela­
tionship. The teacher, after all, is in control and can set the 
tone. He is not absolved of responsibility when it is the student 
whose behavior is seductive. It is up to the teacher to maintain 
his role of parent and counselor, not abandon it for the role of 
lover and peer.81 
In the past, sexual contact between teacher and student was clearly 
grounds for dismissal for immorality. However, recent constitutional 
considerations may enable a teacher to argue effectively that his con­
duct was unrelated to his professional competence in the performance 
of his duties. In her discussion of this argument, Winks asserted: 
It is my contention that sexual relations between teacher and 
student, however discreet, have an adverse effect not only on the 
two principals but on other students and other teachers. A high 
school teacher who assumes that his involvement with a student 
is secret ignores at his peril the sexual hypersensitivity of ado­
lescents. Students are far more liable to imagine sexual involve­
ment where it does not exist than to miss the signals between two 
people who do have an ongoing relationship. . . . The teacher who 
engages in a sexual relationship with a student is imparting a 
message not only to that student, but to the student's peers.82 
Notoriety of the act is often a mitigating factor in the decision 
to dismiss a teacher for immoral conduct as it affects the effectiveness 
of the teacher's working relations or classroom performance. The court's 
80Ibid., 447. 81Ibid., 448. 82Ibid., 460. 
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decision to uphold the school board's decision to dismiss often hinges 
on the effect of publicity surrounding the act on the school's general 
welfare. Winks argued that notoriety should not enter into the deci­
sion to dismiss for sexual misconduct with a student: 
The teacher's behavior will not be notorious if the participants, 
students, and staff are all engaged in a conspiracy of silence. 
Nor will the parents who learn of a teacher's misconduct with their 
child want the incident publicized. They will, however, expect 
prompt action from the school district. Silence on all sides too 
often engenders indifference. It may be up to the victim to create 
the notoriety by litigation, if litigation is necessary in order 
to gain private redress and to direct public attention to a problem 
which must not be ignored.83 
Another important point which administrators and school boards should 
consider was brought out by Winks in this article: 
Although the chances of recurrence of sexual misconduct cannot be 
predicted, most successful cases against teachers have involved 
multiple victims. It is safe to generalize that the teacher who 
has taken advantage of a single student will be emboldened to try 
again if his behavior has been ignored and unpunished. While the 
likelihood of repetition in an individual case is entirely specula­
tive, that likelihood is bolstered where a pattern of sexual 
harassment has already been established. The board of education 
which does not act upon an individual complaint runs a greater 
risk of institutional 1iability in the event of a recurrence.84 
Courts have consistently imposed liability on school districts 
for physical injuries incurred by the acts or negligence of their 
staffs. Liability can also be imposed for emotional injury caused by 
sexual harassment of students. A recent United States Court of Appeals 
decision allowed a student to file suit against school employees who 
knew of the misconduct but did nothing to help the student. This opens 
a new avenue for students who wish to seek legal remedy for this mis­
conduct. 
83Ibid., 461. 84Ibid., 461. 
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Winks concluded the article with the following prediction which 
will have implications for school officials: 
Women need to recognize that silent coping will not defuse inci­
dents of sexual harassment. The only effective response is direct 
confrontation. Awareness of the legal implications of sexual mis­
conduct between teachers and students will lead women to assert 
their rights. As women learn to voice their complaints, and men 
learn to listen to those complaints, sexual pressures now regarded 
as inevitable concomitants of academic life will be recognized 
for what they are: barriers to women's equal educational oppor­
tunity.*^ 
Summary 
Historically, sexual misconduct with students led to quick, unchal­
lenged dismissals of teachers. In recent years, teachers have begun 
to challenge these dismissals requiring school officials to determine 
a nexus between their relationship with students and their effectiveness 
in the classroom. 
In tracing the history of teaching in the United States, concern 
over the character and conduct of teachers is a recurrent theme. As 
a result of these concerns, school officials have tried to require that 
teachers adhere to a higher moral standard than that required of other 
citizens. In recent years, attitudes have become more liberal and l iti­
gation concerning constitutional rights more frequent. Dismissals for 
immorality based on sexual misconduct are resulting in teachers appeal­
ing to the state and federal courts for clarification of these constitu­
tional issues. 
85Ibid., 475-477. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES REGARDING TEACHER DISMISSAL 
AND REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION FOR IMMORALITY 
State law regulates the certification and dismissal of teachers. 
There is a great deal of variation in the requirements of the fifty 
states. Some state statutes are very detailed and, therefore, provide 
specific causes for revocation of certificates and dismissal of tenured 
teachers. Other state statutes are more general in nature which allows 
local school districts more latitude in interpretation. The state 
statutes for all fifty states were analyzed to determine causes for 
the revocation of certificates as well as for dismissal procedures of 
tenured teachers since slightly more than half of the states allow cer­
tificates to be revoked upon substantiated charges of immorality. The 
leading causes for the dismissal of tenured teachers are summarized 
in Table 1. 
State statutes do not differentiate between the various actions 
that constitute immorality as a cause for dismissal or revocation. 
Therefore, immorality in general will be the subject of this analysis 
of state statutes. 
The Code of Alabama specifies that the state superintendent has 
the authority to revoke the teaching certificate of individuals who 
have been found guilty of immoral conduct or unbecoming or indecent 
behavior. It also allows cancellation of the teaching contract for 
any of the following reasons: incompetency; insubordination; neglect 
Table 1 
Most Frequently Cited Causes for Dismissal of Tenured Teachers 
State Imm. Cond. Incomp. Insub. Neal. Disabl. Ineff. Cause 
Alabama X X X X X 
Alaska X X X 
Arizona X 
Arkansas 
California X X X X X 
Colorado X X X X X X 
Connecticut 
Delaware X X X X X 
Florida 
Georgia X X X X X 
Hawaii X X X X 
Idaho 
Illinois X X X X 
Indiana X X X X X 
Iowa 
Kansas X X X X X X 
Kentucky X X X X X X X 
Louisiana X X X 
Maine X 
Maryland X X X X X 
Massachusetts X X X X X X 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X X X X X X X 
Mississippi X X X X 
Missouri X X X X X 
Montana X X X 
Nebraska X X X X X 
Nevada X X X X X X 
New Hampshire I X X X 
New Jersey X X X X 
New Mexico 
New York X X X X 
North Carolina X X X X X 
North Dakota X X X X X 
Oho X X X X 
Oklahoma X X X 
Oregon X X X X X X 
Pennsylvania X X X X 
Rhode Island X X X X 
South Carolina X X X 
South Dakota X X X 
Tennessee X X X X 
Texas X X X 
Utah 
Vermont X X X X 
Virginia X X X X X 
Washington 
West Virginia X X X X 
Wisconsin X X X X 
Wyoming X X X X X 
Total 33 13 32 30 22 16 14 19 
Percentage 79 31 76 71 52 38 33 45 
Kev to Abbreviations Used 
Imm. Immorality, indecent behavior 
Cond. Conduct unbecoming a professional (or teacher), unprofessional conduct, misconduct in 
office 
Incomp. Incompetency, inadequate performance 
Insub. Insubordination, noncompliance with reasonable rules and regulations 
Negl. Neglect of duty, negligence 
Disabl. Physical or mental disability or incapacity 
Ineff. Inefficiency 
Cause Cause, other good and just cause, due and sufficient cause, reasonable and just cause 
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of duty; immorality; justifiable decrease in the number of teaching 
positions; or other good or just cause with the exception of dismissals 
based on political or personal reasons.1 
Alaska statutes list four causes for revocation and suspension: 
incompetency; immorality; substantial noncompliance with the school 
laws of the state or the regulations of the department; or upon determi­
nation of the Professional Teaching Practices Commission that there 
has been a violation of ethical or professional standards or contractual 
obligations. Teachers may be dismissed for incompetency; immorality; 
or substantial noncompliance with the school laws of the state, regula­
tions or bylaws of the department, bylaws of the district, or written 
rules of the superintendent. As noted earlier, Alaska is one of the 
few states to define immorality. It is defined as the commission of 
? 
an act which constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Arizona statutes provide detailed procedures for the dismissal 
of tenured employees. However, the only cause for dismissal specified 
in the statutes is inadequacy of performance. Certificate revocation 
3 is not addressed in the statutes. 
The state board of education in Arkansas may revoke the license 
of a teacher for any cause, but only after a hearing before the school 
board. Termination of a teacher during the term of the contract is 
1Code of Alabama 16-23-5, 16-24-8 (1988). 
^Alaska Statutes 14.20.030, 14.20.140 (1987). 
^Arizona Revised Statutes 15-536 (1984). 
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allowed for any cause which is not arbitrary, capricious, or discrim-
4 matory. 
Although it does not address causes for the revocation of certif­
icates, the California Education Code lists the following causes for 
dismissal of permanent employees: immoral or unprofessional conduct; 
committing, aiding, or advocating acts of criminal syndicalism; dis­
honesty; incompetency; evident unfitness for service; physical or mental 
condition rendering him unfit to instruct or associate with children; 
persistent refusal to obey the school laws of the state or reasonable 
regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools; convic­
tion of a felony or any crime involving moral turpitude; knowing member­
ship in the Communist party; and alcoholism. Also included are lengthy 
5 provisions for the dismissal process. 
Grounds for revoking a certificate in Colorado are a determination 
of professional incompetence or unethical behavior. Dismissal of tenured 
teachers is allowed for the following causes: physical or mental dis­
ability; incompetency; neglect of duty; immorality; conviction of a 
felony or the acceptance of a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere 
to a felony; insubordination; or other good and just caused 
Connecticut statutes list five reasons for revocation of teaching 
certificates: the holder used fraud or misrepresentation to obtain 
the certificate; the holder has persistently neglected to perform the 
^Arkansas Statutes 6:80.1214, 6:80.1266.4 (1987). 
^California Education Code 44932 (1989). 
^Colorado Revised Statutes 22-60-110, 22-63-116 (1988). 
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duties for which certification was granted; the holder is professionally 
unfit to perform the duties for which certification was granted; the 
holder is convicted in a court of law of a crime involving moral turpi­
tude or of any other crime of such nature that in the opinion of the 
board would impair the standing of certificates issued if the holder 
was allowed to retain certification; or other due and sufficient cause. 
Lengthy procedures for termination of tenured employees are given. 
However, no specific causes for dismissal are included.^ 
In Delaware, revocation of professional status certificates may 
occur when the teacher is dismissed for immorality, misconduct in office, 
incompetency, willful neglect of duty, or disloyalty. The reasons for 
termination include the preceding five causes plus willful and persistent 
insubordination and reduction in the number of teachers required due 
Q  
to decreased enrollment or decrease in educational services. 
The Education Practices Commission in Florida has several options 
in the area of certificate suspension or revocation. The Commission 
can suspend the teacher's certificate for up to three years or revoke 
for either a period of up to ten years or permanently if the employee 
has used fraudulent means to obtain the certificate; has proven to be 
incompetent to teach or to perform the duties required as an employee 
of the public school system; has been guilty of gross immorality or 
an act involving moral turpitude; has had a certificate revoked in 
another state; has been convicted of a misdemeanor, felony, or other 
^Connecticut Revised Statutes Annotated 10-145, 10-151 (1986). 
^Delaware Code Annotated 14:1204, 14:1411 (1981). 
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criminal charge other than minor traffic violations; has been found 
guilty upon investigation of personal conduct which severely reduces 
that person's effectiveness as an employee of the school board; has 
breached a contract; or has otherwise violated the provisions of law or 
the rules of the State Board of Education. The statutes do not address 
g 
specific causes for dismissal of employees. 
Listed in the Official Code of Georgia are eight reasons for termi­
nating or suspending the contract of employment: incompetency; insub­
ordination; willful neglect of duties; immorality; inciting, encourag­
ing, or counseling students to violate any valid state law, municipal 
ordinance, or policy or rule of the local board of education; to reduce 
staff due to loss of students or cancellation of programs; failure to 
secure and maintain necessary educational training; or any other good 
and sufficient cause. The state board is authorized to provide pro­
cedures for revoking or denying a certificate for good cause but only 
after an investigation is held and the certificate holder has been 
provided notice and an opportunity for a hearing.^ 
Statutes for the state of Hawaii allow the department of education 
to revoke any certificate when satisfied that the holder does not 
possess the necessary qualifications for certification. Also listed 
are the following reasons for discharge or demotion of tenured teachers: 
inefficiency or immorality; willful violations of policies and regula­
tions of the department of education; decrease in the number of pupils; 
or any other good and just cause.^ 
^Florida Statutes Annotated 231.28 (1989). 
1Q0fficia1 Code of Georgia 20-2-200, 20-2-940 (1988). 
^Hawaii Revised Statutes 297-3, 297-11 (1986). 
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Idaho teachers may have their certificates suspended or revoked 
for gross neglect of duty; incompetency; breach of teaching contract; 
giving false information on the application for certification; revoca­
tion or denial of certification by another state for reasons which are 
grounds for revocation in Idaho; any reason which would have disqual­
ified the person from initial certification; or willful violation of 
professional codes or standards of ethics and conduct adopted by the 
state board. District superintendents are instructed to report to the 
office of certification the name of any educator who is dismissed or 
otherwise severed from employment for revocation or suspension of the 
teaching certificate. Statutes also give the procedure to be followed 
in the termination of employees but do not list specific causes for 
12 this action. 
In Illinois, any certificate may be suspended for a period not 
to exceed one year upon evidence of immorality, a condition of health 
detrimental to the welfare of pupils, incompetency, unprofessional con­
duct, neglect of any professional duty, willful failure to report 
suspected child abuse or neglect, or other just cause. Teachers may 
be dismissed for incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality or other 
sufficient cause. The statutes also allow for the dismissal of a 
teacher who has not satisfactorily completed a remediation plan or who, 
in the opinion of the officials of the school district, is not qual­
ified to teach. Provision is also made for the dismissal of an employee 
when the district officials feel the dismissal is in the best interest 
12Idaho Code 33-1208 (1979). 
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of the school. Dismissal for temporary mental or physical incapacity 
13 and for marriage are specifically excluded by these statutes. 
License revocation and suspension in Indiana is allowed for immo­
rality, misconduct in office, incompetency, or willful neglect of duty. 
Indefinite (tenure) contracts may be cancelled for immorality, insub­
ordination, neglect of duty, incompetency, justifiable decrease in the 
14 number of teaching positions, or other good and just cause. 
The Iowa Code Annotated spells out the dismissal process including 
request for hearing and appeals either to an adjudicator or the courts. 
No specific causes for revocation of credentials or dismissal of 
15 teachers are delineated. 
Kansas statutes allow the cancellation of the teacher's certificate 
on the grounds of immorality, gross neglect of duty, annulling written 
contracts with boards of education without the consent of the board, 
or for any cause which would have prevented receipt of a certificate 
initially. Causes for discharge include immoral character, conduct 
unbecoming an instructor, insubordination, failure to obey reasonable 
rules of the board of education, inefficiency, incompetence, physical 
unfitness or failure to comply with the reasonable requirements of the 
board of education as may be required to show normal improvement and 
1 fi 
evidence of professional training. 
^Illinois Annotated Statutes 122:21-23, 122:11-22.4 (1989). 
^Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated 20-6.1-3-7, 10-6.1-4-10 (1976). 
*5Iowa Code Annotated 279.15 (1979). 
^Kansas Revised Statutes 72-1383, 72-5406 (1988). 
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Statutes in the state of Kentucky permit revocation of teaching 
certificates on the written recommendations of the superintendent of 
public instruction in cases involving immorality, misconduct in office, 
incompetency, or willful neglect of duty. Certificates may also be 
revoked if it is determined that the certificate applicant presented 
false information to secure that certificate. Contracts of tenured 
teachers may be terminated for the following reasons: insubordination; 
immoral character or conduct unbecoming a teacher; physical or mental 
disability; inefficiency, incompetency, or neglect of duty.^ 
In the state of Louisiana a permanent teacher may not be removed 
from office except upon written and signed charges of willful neglect 
of duty, immorality, incompetency, dishonesty, or of being a member 
of any group, organization, movement or corporation that is by law pro­
hibited from operating in the state and then only if found guilty of 
the charges at a hearing by the local board of education. No causes 
18 
for revocation of certificates are given in the statutes. 
Maine statutes concerning education are very brief in comparison 
with those from other states. Grounds for revocation or suspension 
of a certificate are: evidence that a person has injured the health 
or welfare of a child through physical or sexual abuse or exploitation; 
and other grounds as may be established by the state board in its rules 
relating to criminal offenses. Dismissal is allowed when the school 
^Kentucky Revised Statutes 161.120, 161.790 (1985). 
^Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated 17.441, 17.443 (1982). 
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board decides, after investigation, that the teacher proves unfit to 
19 teach or that the teacher's services are unprofitable to the school. 
Maryland's state statutes permit the suspension or dismissal of 
public school employes for: immorality; misconduct in office, includ­
ing failure to report suspected child abuse; insubordination; incom­
petency; and willful neglect of duty. Revocation of certification is 
20 not addressed in the statutes. 
A teaching certificate from the state of Massachusetts may be 
revoked for cause pursuant to the procedures established by the rules 
and regulations of the State Board of Education. Discharge of teachers 
and superintendents may occur for the following: inefficiency, incom­
petency; incapacity; conduct unbecoming a teacher or superintendent; 
21 insubordination; or other good cause. 
Michigan statutes on discharge or demotion of teachers on contin­
uing contract cite only reasonable and just cause as cause for this 
22 action. No information is given on revocation of certificates. 
In Minnesota, a license to teach may be revoked or suspended for 
immoral character or conduct; failure to teach for the term of the con­
tract without justifiable cause; gross inefficiency or willful neglect 
of duty; failure to meet licensing requirements; or fraud or misrepresen­
tation in obtaining a license. Grounds for termination at the end of 
^Maine Revised Statutes Annotated 20-A sc. 13020 (1983). 
20 Annotated Code of Public General Laws of Maryland Education 
6-101, 6-202 (1989). 
21 Annotated Laws of Massachusetts Chapter 71, Sec. 38G and 42 
(1978). 
^Michigan Statutes Annotated 15.2001 (1984). 
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a contract year for employees on continuing contract include: ineffi­
ciency; neglect of duty or persistent violation of school laws, rules, 
regulations, or directives; conduct unbecoming a teacher which materially 
impairs the teacher's educational effectiveness; and other good and 
sufficient grounds rendering the teacher unfit to perform the required 
duties. The contract may not be terminated for any of these reasons 
unless the employee has been notified of the deficiency and has been 
given adequate time to remedy the problem. The statutes allow imme­
diate discharge for any of the following: immoral conduct, insubordina­
tion, or conviction of a felony; conduct unbecoming a teacher which 
requires immediate removal of the teacher from the classroom or other 
duties; failure to teach without first securing the written release 
of the school board; gross inefficiency which the teacher has failed 
to correct after reasonable written notice; willful neglect of duty; 
or continuing physical or mental disability subsequent to a twelve month 
23 leave of absence and inability to qualify for reinstatement. 
Certificated employees in Mississippi may be dismissed by the 
superintendent of schools for incompetence, neglect of duty, immoral 
conduct, intemperance, brutal treatment of pupils or other good cause. 
In the event that an employee is arrested, indicted, or otherwise charged 
with a felony, his presence is deemed to constitute a disruption of 
normal school operations and he can be removed immediately with a hear­
ing by the school board to take place within five to thirty days of the 
suspension or discharge. A teacher's certificate will be suspended 
^Minnesota Statutes Annotated 125.09, 125.12 (1966). 
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for a period of one year for breach of contract or abandoning his 
24 employment. 
The Missouri state board of education may refuse to issue, revoke, 
or suspend a license to teach upon satisfactory proof of incompetency, 
cruelty, immorality, drunkenness, neglect of duty, or the annulling 
of a written contract with the local board of education without the 
consent of the majority of the members of the board. Local school dis­
tricts may terminate a permanent teacher for physical or mental condi­
tion rendering him unfit to instruct or associate with children; 
immoral conduct; incompetency, inefficiency, or insubordination in the 
line of duty; willful or persistent violation of, or the failure to 
obey, the school laws of the state or the published regulations of the 
board of education of the employing school district; excessive or 
unreasonable absence from performance of duties; or conviction of a 
25 felony or a crime involving moral turpitude. 
In Montana, teaching certificates may be suspended or revoked for 
any of the following reasons: making any false statements of material 
fact in the application for a certificate; any reason which would have 
prevented initial certification if known at that time; incompetency; 
gross neglect of duty; conviction of, entry of a guilty verdict, a plea 
of guilty, or a plea of no contest to a criminal offense involving moral 
turpitude in this state or any other state; immoral conduct related 
to the teaching profession; substantial and material nonperformance 
^Mississippi Code Annotated 125.09, 125.12 (1966). 
^Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes 168.071, 168.114 (1965). 
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of the employment contract between the teacher and the trustees of the 
school district without good cause or written consent of the trustees; 
and the denial, revocation, suspension, or surrender of a teacher cer­
tificate in another state for any reason constituting grounds for sim­
ilar action in this state. The trustees of the school district may 
dismiss a teacher before the expiration of his employment contract for 
immorality, unfitness, incompetence, or violation of the adopted pol-
icies of the trustees of the district. 
The certificates of teachers and administrators in Nebraska may 
be revoked for incompetency, immorality, intemperance, cruelty, crime 
against the law of the state, neglect of duty, general neglect of the 
business of the school, unprofessional conduct, physical or mental 
incapacity, or breach of contract. Cancellation of an indefinite con­
tract may be made for the following causes: incompetency; physical 
disability or sickness of any type which interferes with the performance 
of duty; insubordination, which is defined as a willful refusal to obey 
the school laws of the state, rulings of the State Board of Education, 
or reasonable rules and regulations of the local district; immorality; 
failure to give evidence of professional growth; justifiable decrease 
in the number of teaching positions; or any other good and just cause 
27 that is not for political or personal reasons. 
Nevada's state board of education has the authority to suspend 
or revoke any state certificate of any teacher after notice and an 
26Montana Code Annotated 20-4-110, 20-4-207 (1979). 
27Revised Statutes of Nebraska 79-1234, 79-1260 (1987). 
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opportunity for a hearing for any of the following: immoral or unpro­
fessional conduct; evident unfitness for service; physical or mental 
incapacity which renders the teacher unfit for service; conviction of 
a felony or crime involving moral turpitude; conviction of a sex offense 
in which the victim is a student enrolled in any Nevada public school 
district; advocating overthrow of the state or national government by 
force, violence, or unlawful means; and persistent defiance of or refusal 
to obey the regulations of the state board of education or the superin­
tendent of public instruction which define and govern the duties of 
teachers. The statutes also cite the following reasons for the dis­
missal, suspension or nonrenewal of teachers and administrators: ineffi­
ciency; immorality; unprofessional conduct; neglect of duty; physical 
or mental incapacity; inadequate performance; and evident unfitness to 
teach.^ 
In New Hampshire, the school board may dismiss any teacher found 
by them to be immoral or incompetent, or one who will not conform to 
regulations prescribed by that body. The statutes require that the 
teacher be notified of the cause for dismissal and be granted a full 
and fair hearing. Any teacher who is convicted of a felony involving 
child pornography or felonious physical assault or any sexual assault 
29 will have his certificate revoked by the state board of education. 
New Jersey statutes do not allow the dismissal of tenured personnel 
except for inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just 
^Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated 391.330, 391.213 (1986). 
^New Hampshire Revised Statutes 189:14-c, 189:13 (1986). 
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cause, and then only after a hearing by the commissioner of education 
or his designee. Statutes do not specify causes for revocation of 
certificates."^ 
Statutes in New Mexico outline the dismissal process but do not 
provide specific causes that are allowed for dismissal. However, local 
school boards may not dismiss tenured staff if the decision is based 
upon grounds that are arbitrary, capricious, or legally impermissible. 
Certificates may be revoked or suspended for incompetency, immorality, 
31 or any good and just cause. 
Education laws in the state of New York allow a teacher to be 
removed during the term of a contract for neglect of duty, incapacity 
to teach, immoral conduct, or other reason which is held to be sufficient 
cause when appealed to the commissioner of education but do not specify 
32 causes for revocation of credentials to teach. 
North Carolina statutes provide a relatively detailed list of 
grounds for teacher dismissal: inadequate performance; immorality; 
insubordination; neglect of duty; physical or mental incapacity; habit­
ual or excessive use of alcohol or nonmedical use of a controlled sub­
stance; conviction of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude; 
advocating the overthrow of the government; failure to fulfill the 
duties and responsibilities imposed upon teachers by the statutes of 
the state; failure to comply with such reasonable requirements as the 
"^New Jersey Statutes Annotated 18A:6-10, 18A:6-38 (1989). 
^New Mexico Statutes Annotated 22-10-12 (1989). 
"^McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated 3004, 3020 
(1981). 
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board may prescribe; any cause which constitutes grounds for revocation 
of the teaching certificate (although the statutes do not address these 
grounds); justifiable decrease in the number of positions; failure to 
maintain the teaching certificate at the current status; and failure 
to pay money owed to the state. Revocation of certification is not 
33 included in the statutes. 
The superintendent of public instruction in the state of North 
Dakota has the right to suspend, revoke, or annul a teacher's certif­
icate for incompetency, immorality, intemperance, or cruelty. Imme­
diate dismissal is allowed when the following causes are involved: 
immoral conduct, insubordination, or conviction of a felony; conduct 
unbecoming a teacher which requires immediate removal from classroom 
duties; failure without justifiable cause to perforin contracted duties; 
gross inefficiency which the teacher has failed to correct after reason­
able written notice; or continuing physical or mental disability which 
34 
renders the teacher unfit or unable to perform his duties as a teacher. 
Ohio statutes state that a tenured teacher may not be terminated 
except for gross inefficiency or immorality; willful and persistent viola­
tions of reasonable regulations of the board of education; or other 
good and just cause. Revocation of certification is allowed in cases 
35 involving a finding of incompetence. 
"^General Statutes of North Carolina 115C-325 (1987). 
^North Dakota Century Code Annotated 15-36-15, 15-47-38 (1981). 
^Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated 3319.16, 3319.31 (1990). 
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Tenured teachers in Oklahoma may be dismissed or not reemployed 
for immorality; willful neglect of duty; cruelty; incompetency; teaching 
disloyalty to the American constitutional form of government; conviction 
of a felony; or any reason involving moral turpitude. Certificates 
may be revoked for the same causes. Statutes also allow dismissal for 
public homosexual conduct. 
Oregon state statutes allow the Teacher Standards and Practices 
Commission to revoke certificates upon complaint charging the teacher 
with gross neglect of duty or any gross unfitness to teach. Grounds 
for dismissal of permanent teachers cited are inefficiency; immorality; 
insubordination; neglect of duty; physical or mental incapacity; convic­
tion of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude; inadequate 
performance; failure to comply with such reasonable requirements as 
the board may prescribe to show normal improvement and evidence of pro­
fessional training and growth; or any cause which constitutes grounds 
37 for revocation of the teacher's certificate. 
Causes for termination of a teacher's contract in Pennsylvania 
include immorality; incompetency; intemperance; cruelty; persistent 
negligence; mental derangement; advocation of or participation in 
un-American or subversive doctrines; and willful violation of the school 
laws of Pennsylvania. The Superintendent of Public Instruction has 
the right to annul the certificate of individuals for incompetency, 
38 
cruelty, immorality, or intemperance. 
^Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 70-6-103 (1989). 
370regon Revised Statutes 342.175, 342.865 (1989). 
"^Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated 24:11-1122, 24:12-1211 
(1962). 
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The laws of the state of Rhode Island do not include reasons for 
the annulment of certificates. Rather, it is left to the commissioner 
of education to develop regulations for that process. The school com­
mittee of any town may dismiss any teacher for refusal to conform to 
regulations of that governing body, or for other just cause. Special 
rules for Woonsocket and Cumberland allow dismissal of a teacher by 
a two-thirds vote of the entire school committee for violation of law, 
flagrant or persistent violation of rules established by those school 
committees, inefficiency, incapacity, insubordination, conduct unbecom-
39 ing a teacher, or other just cause. 
The South Carolina State Board of Education has the authority to 
revoke or suspend the certificate of any person for just cause. Just 
cause is defined as any of the following: incompetence; willful neglect 
of duty; willful violation of the rules and regulations of the State 
Board of Education; unprofessional conduct; drunkenness; cruelty; crime 
against the law of this state or of the United States; immorality; any 
conduct involving moral turpitude; dishonesty; evident unfitness for 
the position for which employed; or sale or possession of narcotics. 
Any teacher may be dismissed for evident unfitness for teaching which 
may be manifested by conduct such as, but not limited to, the following: 
persistent neglect of duty; willful violation of the rules and regula­
tions of the district board of trustees; drunkenness; conviction of 
a violation of law; gross immorality; dishonesty; and the illegal use, 
40 sale, or possession of drugs or narcotics. 
^General Laws of Rhode Island 16-11-4, 16-12-6 (1988). 
40Code of Laws of South Carolina 59-25-160, 59-25-430 (1990). 
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South Dakota states grant the superintendent of elementary and 
secondary education the authority to revoke or suspend the certificate 
of a teacher for any cause which would have prevented its issue, or 
after dismissal for violation of contract, gross immorality, incompe­
tency, or flagrant neglect of duty. The local school boards may dismiss 
41 any teacher at any time for the same causes. 
Teachers in Tennessee may be dismissed for the following causes: 
incompetence; inefficiency; unprofessional conduct; and insubordination. 
Although the statutes do not address revocation of the certificate, 
no one can receive certification in the state unless he has good moral 
42 character and is not addicted to intoxicants or narcotics. 
In Texas, certificates to teach can be suspended or cancelled by 
the state commissioner of education under any of the following circum­
stances; on satisfactory evidence that the holder is conducting his 
school or teaching activities in violation of the laws of the state; 
on satisfactory evidence that the holder is a person unworthy to instruct 
youth; or on complaint made by the board of trustees that the holder 
has abandoned his written contract without good cause. Dismissal during 
the school year may result when the teacher failed to comply with 
official directives and established school board policy; failed to main­
tain routine classroom management and discipline; or had constant problems 
with students, teachers, parents, and administrative personnel as to 
41South Dakota Codified Law 13-42-9, 13-43-15 (1982). 
^Tennessee Annotated Code 49-5-511 (1983). 
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attitudes and methods. Also, a tenured teacher may be released from 
the teaching contract at the end of the year or returned to probationary 
status for incompetency; failure to comply with reasonable requirements 
for achieving professional growth and improvement; willful failure to 
pay debts; habitual use of addictive drugs; excessive use of alcoholic 
beverages; necessary reduction in personnel by the school district; 
failure to pass required certification examinations; or for good cause 
as determined by the local school board which includes failure of the 
43 teacher to meet accepted standards of conduct. 
Although Utah law specifies that certificates will be revoked or 
suspended for immoral, unprofessional, or incompetent conduct or evident 
unfitness for teaching, specific causes for dismissal of tenured teachers 
44 are not given in the guidelines for termination. 
Superintendents in Vermont may suspend a teacher under contract 
on the grounds of incompetence, conduct unbecoming a teacher, failure 
to attend to duties, or failure to carry out reasonable orders and 
directions of the superintendent and school board. After a hearing, 
the school board shall affirm or reverse the suspension or take other 
action which seems just including dismissal. Revocation of certifica-
45 tion is not addressed. 
Virginia statutes specify that a teacher may be dismissed or placed 
on probation for incompetency, immorality, noncompliance with school 
^Vernon's Texas Codes Annotated 13.046, 13/109 (1972). 
^Utah Code Annotated 53A-6-104, 53A-8-104 (1989). 
^Vermont Statutes Annotated 16:53-1752 (1982). 
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laws and regulations, disability as shown by competent medical evi­
dence, conviction of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude, or other 
good and just cause. Although the statutes include regulations govern-
46 ing certification, causes for revocation are not included. 
The statutes of Washington outline the procedures for notification 
of the employee of discharge and for hearings but do not give specific 
causes for either revocation of certificates or dismissal of tenured 
47 employees. 
Teaching certificates in the state of West Virginia may be revoked 
by the state superintendent after ten days' notice and upon proper evi­
dence for the following reasons: drunkenness; untruthfulness; immoral­
ity; any physical, mental, or moral defect which would render him unfit 
for the proper performance of his duties as a teacher; neglect of duty 
or refusal to perform same; using fraudulent, unapproved, or insuffi­
cient credit; or any other cause which would have justified the with­
holding of an initial certificate. Local boards of education have the 
authority to suspend or dismiss any teacher at any time for immorality, 
incompetency, cruelty, insubordination, intemperance, or willful neglect 
of duty.^® 
After providing written notice of the charges and of an opportun­
ity for defense, any certificate or license to teach issued by the state 
of Wisconsin may be revoked by the state superintendent for incompetency 
^Code of Virginia Annotated 22.1-298, 22.1-307 (1985). 
^West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated 28A.58.450 (1982). 
^West Virginia Code Annotated 18A-2-8, 18A-3-6 (1988). 
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or immoral conduct on the part of the holder. Further, teachers may 
be dismissed or refused employment for inefficiency, immorality, willful 
and persistent violation of reasonable regulations of the governing 
49 body of the school system or school, or other good cause. 
Finally, in Wyoming, teaching certificates may be revoked or sus­
pended for incompetency, immorality, other reprehensible conduct, or 
gross neglect of duty. Teachers may be dismissed or suspended for 
incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, insubordination, or any 
other good or just cause.^ 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the most frequently cited causes 
for the dismissal of tenured teachers in the United States are summarized 
in Table 1. Eight of the fifty states do not include specific causes 
for dismissal in their statutes and are, therefore, not included in 
the calculating of percentages. Of the remaining forty-two states, 
thirty-three (79%) permit the dismissal of tenured teachers for immoral­
ity. Thirty-two states (76%) permit dismissal for incompetency. Thirty 
states (71%) allow dismissal for insubordination. Neglect of duty is 
included in the statutes of twenty-two states (52%). Good and just 
cause, due and sufficient cause, and reasonable and just cause are cited 
in nineteen states (45%). The other leading causes and their frequency 
of inclusion in statutes are unprofessional conduct or misconduct in 
office, thirteen states (31%); physical or mental disability, sixteen 
states (38%); and inefficiency, fourteen states (33%). 
^West's Wisconsin Statutes Annotated 118.19, 118.23 (1973). 
^Wyoming Statutes Annotated 22-7-303, 21-7-110 (1987). 
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Table 2 summarizes state statutes regarding dismissal for immoral­
ity and related areas which are used for dismissal in instances of 
questionable conduct. Nine of the forty-two states which l ist specific 
causes for dismissal do not l ist immorality specifically as a cause 
for dismissal. Five of those states do allow dismissal for conduct 
unbecoming a professional or misconduct in office which could include 
immoral conduct of a sexual nature. Michigan is one of the remaining 
five states which cites specific causes not including immorality. How­
ever, the Michigan statutes authorize dismissal for reasonable and just 
cause which could be utilized to dismiss for immorality. Three states 
that do not l ist specific causes for dismissal do authorize revocation 
of teaching certificates for either immorality or moral turpitude. 
Since revocation of certification would lead to dismissal, immoral 
conduct would be the cause for that dismissal. Therefore, within this 
context, Table 2 indicates there are forty-five states with statutory 
authority to dismiss tenured teachers for immorality on grounds of sexual 
misconduct. It is also conceivable that similar dismissal would be 
allowed in some of the five states which do not contain specific provi­
sions for the dismissal of teachers on grounds of immorality. 
The leading causes for revocation of certificates are presented 
in Table 3. Thirty of the fifty states address specific causes for revok­
ing or suspending certification. Of these states, twenty-three (77%) 
revoke or suspend certification upon substantiated charges of immorality. 
The other leading causes are incompetency, twenty-four states (80%); 
unprofessional conduct and misconduct in office, eleven states (37%); 
neglect of duty, seventeen states (57%); and breach or violation of 
written contract, eleven states (37%). 
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Table 2 
Immorality and Related Causes for the Dismissal of Tenured Teachers 
State Immoral! tv Moral Turnltude Conduct Cau! 
Alabama X X 
Alaska X 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California X X X 
Colorado X X 
Connecticut 
Delaware X X 
Florida 
Georgia X X 
Hawaii X X 
Idaho 
Illinois X X 
Indiana X X 
Iowa 
Kansas X X 
Kentucky X X 
Louisiana X 
Maine 
Maryland X X 
Massachusetts X X 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X X X 
Mississippi X X 
Missouri X X 
Montana X 
Nebraska X X 
Nevada X X 
New Hampshire X 
New Jersey X X 
New Mexico 
New York X X 
North Carolina X X 
North Dakota X X 
Ohio X X 
Oklahoma X X 
Oregon X X 
Pennsylvania X 
Rhode Island X X 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota X 
Tennessee X 
Texas X 
Utah 
Vermont X 
Virginia X X X 
Washington 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X X 
Wyoming X X 
Total 33 6 13 19 
Key lo Terms 
Immorality Immorality, Indecent behavior 
Moral turpitude Conviction of a crime Involving moral turpitude 
Conduct Conduct unbecoming a professional (or teacher).unprofessional conduct, 
misconduct in office 
Cause Cause, other good and just cause, due and suffirientcause, reasonable and 
just cause 
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Table 3 
Moat Frequently Cited Cauaea lor Revocation of Certificate# 
State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connect icul 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Norlh Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Total 
Percentage 
Immoral. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
23 
77 
Key to Abbreviations and Terms Used 
Conflict 
x 
Income. Neolect Contract 
11 
37 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
24 
60 
X 
X 
X 
X 
17 
53 
X 
X 
11 
37 
Immoral Immorality, indecent behavior, moral turpitude 
Conduct Conduct unbecoming a professional (or teacher), unprofessional conduct, misconduct 
in office 
Incomp. Incompetency, inadequate performance, unfitness to teach 
Neglect Neglect of duty, negligence 
Contract Violation, breach, or abandonment of the written contract 
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Table 4 summarizes the statutes as to immorality and other related 
causes for revocation of certificates. Only seven states (out of the 
thirty which cite specific causes) do not l ist immorality as a cause. 
One of those states, Georgia, cites other cause (which could be used 
for revocation based on immoral conduct) as a reason for revocation 
or suspension of certificates. Therefore, certificates can be revoked 
or suspended for immorality or related charges in twenty-four of the 
fifty states. 
Summary 
Immorality is the most frequently cited cause for the dismissal 
of teachers and the second most frequently cited cause for the revoca­
tion of a teaching certificate. Of the forty-two states which l ist 
specific causes, thirty-three include immorality as a cause for dis­
missal. Dismissal could result on grounds of immorality and other 
related causes in forty-five of the fifty states. In twenty-three 
states, substantiated charges of immorality can lead to revocation or 
suspension of teaching credentials. Contrary to commonly held beliefs 
in the education arena, state statutes do allow teachers to be dismissed 
for immorality based on sexual misconduct. As Chapter IV will show, 
many of these dismissals are leading to litigation in both state and 
federal courts. 
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Table 4 
Immorality and Related Causes for Revocation of Certificates 
State Immorality Moral TurDltude Conduct 
Alabama X X 
Alaska X 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut X 
Delaware X X 
Florida X X X 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois X X 
Indiana X X 
Iowa 
Kansas X 
Kentucky X X 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota X 
Mississippi 
Missouri X X 
Montana X 
Nebraska X X 
Nevada X X x 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico X 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota X 
Ohio 
Oklahoma X X 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania X 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina X X X 
South Dakota X 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah X X 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X 
Wyoming X X 
Total 23 6 11 
Kev to Terms 
Immorality Immorality, indecent behavior 
Moral turoitude Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude 
Conduct Conduct unbecoming a professional (or teacher), unprofessional conduct, 
misconduct in office 
Cause Cause, other good and just cause, due and sufficient cause, reasonable and 
just cause 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TEACHER DISMISSAL FOR IMMORALITY 
ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
Teacher dismissals for immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct 
have frequently been appealed to the courts for clarification of both 
statutory and constitutional issues. Only a few of these cases have 
been heard by the United States Supreme Court which has resulted in 
a reliance on federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts for 
landmark rulings. The focus of this analysis of legal cases is the 
timespan from 1970-1990. 
The facts of each case are discussed and the decision of the court 
is presented. Also, implications of the case for both the courts and 
practicing education officials are included. 
The cases are divided into the following sections: homosexual 
conduct with adults; heterosexual misconduct with adults; unwed preg­
nancy; sexual misconduct with students; and unorthodox behavior. For 
the purpose of tracing judicial precedent in each area, the cases are 
arranged in chronological order. 
Homosexual Conduct with Other Adults 
Homosexual conduct by teachers has been one of the most emotionally 
charged issues in teacher dismissals for immorality on grounds of sexual 
misconduct in recent years. Although societal attitudes have become 
more tolerant in the past two decades, prejudice against these 
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individuals stil l continues. The issue is hotly debated when the indi­
vidual involved is a public school teacher. 
Before discussing the more recent cases dealing with the dismissal 
of teachers for immorality based on homosexuality, attention must be 
focused on two cases from the late 1960's: Sarac v. State Board of 
1 2 Education and Morrison v. State Board of Education. Both of these 
cases are frequently cited in other court decisions involving homo­
sexuality as well as being cited in decisions involving other types 
of sexual misconduct. 
Sarac v. State Board of Education involved the revocation of 
Thomas Sarac's teaching credentials by the state board of education 
after an incident involving public homosexual behavior. Sarac was 
arrested on July 28, 1962, in Long Beach, California, and charged with 
a violation of the state penal code for rubbing or fondling the private 
sexual parts of another male (who happened to be a police officer) with 
the intent to arouse sexual desires. The plaintiff admitted that he 
had had a homosexual problem for the last twenty years and was reported 
to have pled guilty to the charges against him. The state board of 
education conducted a hearing and revoked his credentials to teach in 
the California public school system. Sarac appealed this decision to 
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County which denied relief. Sarac 
again appealed to the Court of Appeals of California claiming that 
the section of the penal code under which he pled guilty was unconsti­
tutionally vague; that he had not pled guilty to the charges but had 
57Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967). 2461 P.2d 375 (1969). 
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merely refrained from contesting the charges; and that the state board 
of education had acted unconstitutionally in revoking his credentials 
which constituted cruel and unusual punishment as well as double pun­
ishment for the same offense. The Court of Appeals found that the 
testimony supported Sarac's conviction for committing a homosexual act 
on a public beach. Further, the court stated: 
Homosexual behavior has long been contrary and abhorrent to the 
social mores and moral standards of the people of California as it 
has been since antiquity to those of many other peoples. It is 
clearly, therefore, immoral conduct within the meaning of the Edu­
cation Code. It may also constitute unprofessional conduct 
within the meaning of that same statute as such conduct is not 
limited to classroom misconduct or misconduct with children. . . . 
It certainly constitutes evident unfitness for service in the pub­
l ic school system.3 
In affirming the judgment of the lower court that the revocation of 
Sarac's credentials was correct, the court stated: 
In view of appellant's . . . necessarily close association with 
children in the discharge of his professional duties as a teacher, 
there is to our minds an obvious rational connection between his 
homosexual conduct on the beach and the consequent action of 
respondent in revoking his secondary teaching credential on the 
statutory grounds of immoral and unprofessional conduct and evi­
dent unfitness for service in the public school system. . .. We 
find no abuse of discretion by respondent in the penalty it here 
imposed on appellant, nor any constitutional questions whatsoever 
with respect to such action on its part. 
Thus, the Sarac case supported the use of a conviction for a public 
homosexual act as grounds for the revocation of teaching credentials 
for immorality (thus preventing the individual from teaching in that 
state). It has also been cited frequently in other court cases involv­
ing homosexual conduct to justify the courts' decisions to affirm the 
3Sarac, 72. 4Ibid., 73. 
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revocation of credentials and/or dismissal of these individuals. This 
case has provided precedent for school officials in the dismissal of 
homosexuals and others for public acts of sexual misconduct. 
The Morrison case was decided by the Supreme Court of California 
in 1969. Many experts consider it to be the landmark case in the area 
of teacher dismissal for immorality based on private homosexual conduct. 
After a number of years with an unblemished record as a teacher, Marc 
Morrison was involved in a limited physical relationship with another 
man. This relationship lasted one week and was the only time that 
Morrison had ever engaged in a homosexual act although he admitted that 
he had had an undefined homosexual problem at the age of thirteen. 
The other participant, Mr. Schneringer, reported the incident to the 
superintendent of the Lowell Joint School District almost two years 
after it occurred. After a hearing, the board of education revoked 
Morrison's teaching credentials for immoral, unprofessional conduct 
and for committing an act which involved moral turpitude. Morrison 
appealed this decision to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to 
no avail. The revocation was upheld. He then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of California. In a lengthy decision, the court examined all 
relevant legal cases and concluded that 
. . .  a  m a l e  t e a c h e r  w h o  e n g a g e d  w i t h  a  f e l l o w  m a l e  i n  l i m i t e d  
noncriminal physical relationship of homosexual nature in first 
teacher's apartment on four separate occasions in a one-week period 
was not subject to disciplinary action under statute authorizing 
revocation of a teacher's l ife diplomas for immoral conduct, unpro­
fessional conduct, and acts involving moral turpitude, in absence 
of any evidence that first teacher's conduct indicated his unfit­
ness to teach. . . .5 
^Morrison, 376. 
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The court concluded that the board of education could not characterize 
this conduct as immoral unless the conduct indicated that Morrison was 
unfit to teach. Therefore, the lower court decision upholding the 
revocation was reversed and remanded. However, the court pointed out 
that this decision did not mean that homosexuals must be permitted to 
teach, only that relevant statutes and applicable principles of consti­
tutional law required the board to find that the individual was not 
f it to continue in the teaching profession. 
The importance of this case to other courts and to school offi­
cials wrestling with the immorality question is the l ist of factors 
set forth in this decision which should be considered in deciding 
whether an individual is unfit to teach as a result of his conduct: 
. . . the likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected 
students or fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity antici­
pated, the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct, the 
type of teaching certificate held by the party involved, the exten­
uating or aggravating circumstances, if any surrounding the con­
duct, the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives 
resulting in the conduct, and the extent to which disciplinary 
action may inflict an adverse impact or chill ing effect upon the 
constitutional rights of the teacher involved or other teachers. 
These factors are relevant to the extent that they assist the board 
in determining a teacher's fitness to teach, i.e., in determining 
whether the teacher's future classroom performance and overall 
impact on his students are likely to meet the board's standards.6 
In another California case decided in 1972, Moser v. State Board 
of Education,7 Moser petitioned the court for a writ of mandate to 
require the state board of education to rescind its revocation of the 
plaintiff 's teaching credentials. Moser was convicted of a violation 
of the penal code for masturbating in public view in a public restroom 
in Long Beach and then touching the private parts of another male. 
6Ibid., 386. 7App., 101 Cal. Rotr. 86 (1972). 
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As a result, the state board of education found that the plaintiff had 
engaged in immoral conduct which established unfitness to teach and which 
warranted revocation of his certificate. He appealed the decision to 
Superior Court which upheld the decision of the board. On appeal to 
the Court of Appeal, Second District, of California, Moser argued that 
his conduct did not warrant revocation citing the Morrison decision 
as support for his argument. The court disagreed with his contention 
because the conduct in that case was private. Moser's was both public 
and criminal in nature and, therefore, constituted sufficient evidence 
of unfitness to teach. The decisions of the state board of education 
and the superior court were affirmed. 
This case clarified the application of the Morrison criteria for 
measuring unfitness to teach. These factors were used to determine 
the effect of private sexual conduct on the individual's effectiveness 
in the classroom. They were not intended to be universally applied 
to all inappropriate conduct. 
Q 
Although Burton v. Cascade School District Union High School No. 5 
dealt with a nontenured teacher, it is important to this study because 
the United States District Court in Oregon found that the statute per­
mitting dismissal for immorality was unconstitutionally vague. The 
court held that the statute failed to give fair warning of what conduct 
was prohibited and allowed erratic and prejudiced exercise of the right 
to dismiss teachers. In addition, the court stated that the statute 
8353 F. Supp. 255 (1973), 512 F.2d 850 (1975). 
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also presented other serious constitutional problems by not requiring a 
nexus between conduct and classroom performance. 
The principal of Peggy Burton's school was informed of her homo­
sexuality by the mother of a student. She acknowledged this fact when 
questioned and was dismissed. When she brought a civil rights action 
against the school, the district court ruled in her favor and awarded 
damages and attorney's fes. However, the court did not order reinstate­
ment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the monetary award 
for damages. The court also ruled that the refusal to order reinstate­
ment was not an abuse of discretion since the damage award amounted 
to the balance of her salary for the year in question plus one-half 
of her salary for the following year. 
Governing Board of the Mountain View School District of Los Angeles 
9 County v. Metcalf, which also dealt with a probationary teacher and 
a public act, reinforced the precedent that public acts of sexual miscon­
duct are accepted by the courts as evidence of unfitness to teach. 
Metcalf was convicted of engaging in an act of prostitution when he 
was discovered performing an act of oral copulation in a doorless toilet 
stall in a public restroom of a downtown department store. The Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County had entered judgment that the school board 
had sufficient cause to place the defendant on compulsory leave of 
absence and to dismiss him on grounds of immoral conduct and evident 
unfitness to teach at a later date. When Metcalf appealed, the Cali­
fornia Court of Appeals found that this act ". . . indicated a serious 
9App., I l l Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974). 
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defect of moral character, normal prudence, and good common sense and 
therefore evinced an unfitness to teach.The ruling of the lower 
court was affirmed. 
Marcus Calderon was a probationary teacher who was arrested on 
a local college campus and charged with having engaged in an act of 
oral copulation with another man. Although acquitted of the charges, 
Calderon was dismissed from his teaching position. When the superior 
court judge found that Calderon's conduct was immoral, that he was not 
entitled to recover any back pay, and that the school board acted within 
its authority when it dismissed him, Calderon appealed. In his 
appeal, Board of Education of the El Monte School District of Los 
Angeles County v. Calderon,*1 the Court of Appeal held that the acquittal 
for the sex offense did not prevent the board of education from dismiss­
ing him on the theory that his acquittal barred subsequent judgment 
by the school board under the doctrine of res judicata. 
This case is important to school officials wrestling with the 
decision to dismiss a teacher who has been acquitted of charges for 
sexual offenses. Criminal acquittal does not prevent a dismissal 
action nor does it prevent that dismissal from being upheld if chal­
lenged in the judicial system. 
12 The case Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery County 
involved the plaintiff 's freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. While in college, Joseph 
UApp., 110 Cal . Rptr. 916 (1974). 
12359 F. Supp. 843 (1974), 491 F.2d 498 (1974). 
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Acanfora had joined a group called the Homophiles which had as its 
purpose promoting public understanding of homosexuality. His public 
acknowledgment of his homosexuality led to his suspension from a stu­
dent teaching assignment which was overturned by a state court. When 
he applied for certification, the college officials forwarded his appli­
cation to the Pennsylvania Secreatry of Education without recommenda­
tion. 
Acanfora was hired as a junior high school teacher by Montgomery 
County (Maryland) school officials who were not aware of his homosex­
uality. Several weeks later, officials learned of his sexual preference 
due to a widely publicized press conference in which the Secretary of 
Education of Pennsylvania announced favorable action on Acanfora's 
application for certification. The deputy superintendent of Montgomery 
County schools transferred Acanfora from teaching to an administrative 
position with no pupil contact. Following this transfer, Acanfora con­
sented to several interviews including newspapers, television, and 
radio. 
When school officials refused to return Acanfora to the classroom, 
he appealed to the courts for relief. The United States District Court 
for Maryland ruled that the refusal by school officials to reinstate 
Acanfora was neither arbitrary nor capricious and denied relief. 
Acanfora appealed to the Fourth Circuit of the United States Court 
of Appeals. Although the court held that Acanfora's public statements 
were protected by the First Amendment and did not justify the action 
taken by the school system or the district court, the focus of its 
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decision was the deliberate withholding of information on Acanfora's 
application for certification. 
Acanfora wrongfully certified that his application was accurate 
to the best of his knowledge when he knew that it contained a 
significant omission. . . . Acanfora purposely misled the school 
officials so he could circumvent, not challenge, what he consid­
ers to be their unconstitutional employment practices. He cannot 
now invoke the process of the court to obtain a ruling on an issue 
that he practiced deception to avoid.13 
On the basis of that reasoning, the court affirmed the lower court 
decision. 
The following case addressed an individual's status as a known 
homosexual rather than any overt act on the part of that individual. 
The Supreme Court of Washington first decided Gaylord v. Tacoma School 
District No. lO1^ in 1975. James Gaylord had been employed for a number 
of years at Wilson High School and had received satisfactory evaluations 
each year. 
In 1972, the school principal was approached by a former student 
who provided a written statement that he suspected Gaylord of being 
homosexual. When confronted with the accusation, Gaylord admitted that 
he was a homosexual. As a result, Gaylord received a letter from the 
school board stating that probable cause had been found for his dis­
charge. The letter stated: "The specific probable cause for your dis­
charge is that you have admitted occupying a public status that is incom­
patible with the conduct required of teachers in this district. Specif-
15 ically, that you have admitted being a publicly known homosexual." 
13Ibid., 504. 14Wash., 535 P.2d 804 (1975). 
151bid., 807. 
87 
Gaylord then requested a hearing before the board of directors which, 
after hearing the evidence, upheld the dismissal. 
After the Superior Court of Pierce County upheld the dismissal, 
Gaylord appealed to the Supreme Court in Washington. The court remanded 
the case to superior court after ruling that the school district bore 
the burden of proving sufficient cause for Gaylord's dismissal. The 
superior court again upheld the dismissal and its decision was appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Washington heard the case again in 1977.16 The 
decision included the following statement: 
It is important to remember that Gaylord's homosexual conduct 
must be considered in the context of his position of teaching 
high school students. Such students could treat the retention 
of the high school teacher by the school board as indicating adult 
approval of his homosexuality. It would be unreasonable to assume 
as a matter of law a teacher's ability to perform as a teacher 
required to teach principles of morality is not impaired and 
creates no danger of encouraging expression of approval and of 
imitation. Likewise to say that school directors must wait for 
prior specific overt expression of homosexual conduct before they 
act to prevent harm from one who chooses to remain 'erotically 
attracted to a notable degree toward persons of his own sex and 
is psychologically, if not actually disposed to engage in sexual 
activity prompted by this attraction' is to ask the school direc­
tors to take an unacceptable risk in discharging their fiduciary 
responsibility of managing the affairs of the school district.1' 
This time the court concluded that there was substantial evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion that Gaylord was guilty of immo­
rality and that, as a known homosexual, his fitness to continue as a 
high school teacher was impaired. It, therefore, affirmed the lower 
court decision. Gaylord fi led a writ of certiorari which was denied 
18 by the United States Supreme Court in 1977. 
16Wash., 559 P.2d 1340 (1977). 17Ibid., 1347. 
18434 U.S. 879 (1977). 
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The Gaylord decision is significant to the educational community 
because it involved his status as a homosexual rather than any overt 
acts of homosexual conduct. School boards may dismiss a teacher based 
on his status as a homosexual i f there is sufficient evidence to sub­
stantiate unfitness to perform classroom duties. 
19 An elementary teacher referred to in this case as Jack M. was 
known as a teacher of fitness, ability, and unimpeached moral charac­
ter. He was arrested for a violation of the penal code. A police offi­
cer entered a department store restroom with doorless stalls and occu­
pied the stall furthest from the door. Jack M. entered the adjoining 
stall, bent over, and looked up at the officer from under the parti­
tion. The officer dressed and upon leaving his stall observed Jack M. 
masturbating. He allegedly beckoned to the officer and said: "Come 
?n 
here. You will l ike this.1 The defendant testified that he had not 
engaged in the behaviors with which he was charged. Immediately after 
his arrest, he reported the incident to his principal. When the board 
learned of the incident, it filed suit in superior court against Jack M. 
to establish its right to discharge him from his tenured position. 
During the trial, the principal of the defendant's school expressed 
her concern that she was not willing to take a chance on this behavior 
occurring again and, therefore, did not consider Jack M. f it to teach. 
An experienced principal who did not know the defendant but who testi­
fied as an expert on teaching qualifications, also expressed concern 
19 
Board of Ed. of Long Beach Unified School District of Los 
Angeles County v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602 (1977). 
20 
Ibid., 603. 
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about the effect of this conduct on the defendant's relationships with 
students, parents, and other staff. Testifying on behalf of Jack M., 
a psychiatrist who was experienced in treating sexual deviates stated 
that he had examined the defendant and concluded: 
. . . that defendant was not a homosexual, that if the arresting 
officer's version were true, this account would suggest . .. an 
isolated act of aggressive behavior by one of an otherwise pas­
sive sexual disposition precipitated by an unusual accumulation 
of pressure and stress stemming from his mother's serious il lness; 
that it would be most unusual for an individual with a predisposi­
tion to aggressive homosexual behavior to reach middle age without 
some prior antisocial conduct reflected in a police record . . . 
and that even if the incident happened, he believed there was no 
danger of recurrence because of the trauma to defendant from this 
arrest and the trial . . . there was no danger to pupils or asso­
ciates, and no possibility of recurrence. . . .21 
The trial court resolved the conflicting testimony on the issue 
of fitness in favor of the defendant and ordered his reinstatement with 
back pay. The school board appealed to the Supreme Court of California 
which affirmed the lower court decision since there was not sufficient 
evidence to establish that Jack M. was unfit to teach. 
Again, the importance of relating sexual misconduct to effective­
ness as a tsacher is obvious. Had the school board or lower court made 
this determination, the dismissal might have been upheld. 
22 Ross v. Springfield School District No. 19 involved an elemen­
tary school l ibrarian. During a police investigation of the Adult 
World Bookstore, which sold sexually explicit materials and operated 
a movie arcade, Frank Ross was observed entering one of the movie booths 
which was occupied by another person and closing the door. By standing 
21Ibid., 604. 220r. App., 641 P.2d 600 (1982). 
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on the shoulders of a fellow officer, a police officer observed the 
plaintiff watching a movie and engaging in anal intercourse with the 
other person. 
Although Ross was not charged in this incident, he was called to 
testify in the court case that was brought alleging that the Adult 
World Bookstore was a nuisance. Ross did not actually testify in court. 
Even though he was not named in the extensive newspaper coverage of 
this case, information about his involvement quickly spread throughout 
the communities in which he taught. 
The district superintendent informed him that he would be trans­
ferred on February 29, 1979, to a position which did not involve con­
tact with students and proceeded to seek the revocation of Ross' 
teaching credentials. Ross was reassigned to his library post on 
June 4. 
However, the principal began to receive calls and letters from 
parents who wanted Ross removed from his position. Therefore, he was 
reassigned to the nonteaching position on August 28 and was informed 
that the superintendent intended to recommend his dismissal for immo­
rality, inefficiency, and gross unfitness. The dismissal was imple­
mented on Janaury 14, 1980. 
Ross appealed his dismissal to the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board 
(FDAB). The FDAB found that the facts on which the school district 
relied were true and substantiated, and that those facts supported the 
charges of immorality and gross unfitness, but not the charge of ineffi­
ciency. 
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Ross then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Oregon on the follow­
ing constitutional issues: (1) the FDAB order deprived him of due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution because the vagueness of the standards of immorality and gross 
unfitness failed to give adequate warning to teachers as to what con­
duct is prohibited; and (2) his dismissal violated his right to privacy 
and equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. The 
court quickly concluded that Ross1 conduct was "not of the character 
23 afforded protection." Further, the court stated: 
We do not decide whether petitioner's conduct was "immoral" or 
rendered him "grossly unfit" to teach. That is not our function. 
Rather, we decide only that petitioner's dismissal on either or 
both grounds was within the authority delegated by the legislature 
to the local school boards and that the FDAB order is supported 
by substantial evidence. 
The court affirmed the FDAB decision to uphold Ross1 dismissal. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Oregon, this decision was 
reversed and remanded in 1982. The Court held that "Because there is 
no rationale to support the conclusion that petitioner's conduct was 
immoral dismissal on this ground is remanded to the FDAB for a determina­
tion of whether the facts as to immorality are adequate to justify the 
25 statutory grounds." 
In 1984, this case returned to the Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
The FDAB had provided its interpretation of immorality as used in 
teacher dismissal statutes and found that Ross' conduct was immoral 
2 3 I b i d . ,  6 0 8 .  2 4 I b i d .  
2^Ross V. Springfield School District, Or., 657 P.2d 188 (1982). 
2^Ross V. Springfield School District, Or. App., 657 P.2d 509 (1984). 
92 
under that standard. Ross appealed. The court found that the Board's 
interpretation of immorality to include engaging in sexual intercourse 
publicly was not erroneous, and the teacher engaged in a public sexual 
intercourse contrary to this interpretation of immorality. 
Once again the Supreme Court of Oregon heard the case and reversed 
and remanded the decision. The court held that the Fair Dismissal 
Appeals Board was not to determine whether teacher's conduct was 
immoral merely by reference to alleged factual content of community 
moral standards but was to exercise its own interpretive judgment. 
As stated in the conclusion: 
The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining FDAB's assumption that 
its task was to find "community moral standards" as a fact, and 
that the fact in this case needed no evidence. Because the court 
and FDAB were satisfied that the outcome in this case could not 
be in doubt, they did not stop to consider the implications of 
that approach when "community moral standards" are in doubt. 
"Easy" cases make bad law.27 
The final Ross decision has clear implications for administrators. 
Community standards for moral conduct are difficult to measure and sub­
stantiate in the courtroom. Reliance on this type of standard without 
evidence to support i t may result in the dismissal being overturned 
in the judicial system. 
The National Gay Task Force, representing homosexual interests, 
brought action in district court to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Oklahoma statute that permitted dismissal of teachers for public 
homosexual conduct. As used in the statute, public homosexual conduct 
referred to an act which was . . committed with a person of the same 
^7Ross V. Springfield School District, 716 P.2d 724 (Or. 1986). 
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sex, and indiscreet and not practiced in private." Included in this 
classification of conduct were . . advocating, soliciting, imposing, 
encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a 
manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to 
29 
the attention of school children or school employees." The statute 
also included the following factors to be considered in the determina­
tion of whether the public homosexual conduct rendered the teacher unfit 
to teach: the likelihood of adverse effect on students or school 
employees; the proximity in both time and place to the teacher's offi­
cial duties; any extenuating or aggravating circumstances; and whether 
the conduct is of a continuing nature which would tend to encourage 
children toward similar conduct. The judge upheld the constitutionality 
of the statute and the organization appealed. 
National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of the City of Okla-
on 
homa City was heard in the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth 
Circuit in 1984. The court found the portion of the statute which 
dealt with advocacy was unconstitutionally overbroad. The court stated: 
"We also hold that the unconstitutional portion is severable from the 
part of the statute that proscribes 'homosexual activity,1 and we find 
01 
that portion constitutional." Therefore, the district court judgment 
was reversed. 
The National Gay Task Force pursued this case with an appeal to 
op 
the United States Supreme Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
^Oklahoma Statutes 70:6-103.15. ^Ibid. "^729 F.2d 1270 (1984). 
31 Ibid. 32105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985). 
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was affirmed by an equally divided Court with Justice Powell taking 
no part in the decision. 
This case had major implications for the educational community. 
The Supreme Court decision validated the constitutionality of state 
statutes which allow dismissal for acts of homosexual misconduct. 
The next case involved a nontenured guidance counselor whose con­
tract was not renewed. Marjorie Rowland was hired as a vocational 
guidance counselor at Stebbins High School in Montgomery County, Ohio, 
in August, 1974. Later that fall, she confided in a secretary that she 
was a bisexual and had a female lover. 
In December, the principal met with Ms. Rowland and suggested that 
she resign. She refused and then told several other teachers that she 
was asked to resign because she was a bisexual. A second meeting was 
held in which she was again asked to resign. After she refused, she 
was suspended with full pay for the remainder of the contract year. 
Ms. Rowland fi led suit in district court alleging that the defen­
dants had violated her due process rights by suspending her without 
a hearing. This contention was not upheld. In a second action, she 
alleged that her right to privacy had been violated because her suspen­
sion was solely due to her status as a bisexual. The district court 
dismissed all the claims and Rowland appealed. The district court 
33 
decision was remanded by the Sixth Circuit of the Court of Appeals. 
Both parties agreed to a jury trial before a magistrate and the 
entry of the final judgment by that individual. The magistrate found 
33 Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery County, 
Ohio, 615 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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that the school district had suspended Ms. Rowland in violation of her 
rights to equal protection and free speech. The jury then awarded 
$13,500 in damages for personal humiliation and mental anguish and 
$26,947 in damages for loss of earnings. 
The school district appealed this decision to the United States 
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. The court concluded: 
The district court awarded damages against the school dis­
trict on two theories: (1) That the school district violated 
plaintiff 's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the 
law by suspending her because she is bisexual or homosexual; and 
(2) That the school district violated plaintiff 's First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech by not renewing her one-year contract 
because she told Mrs. Monnel, the secretary, Mr. Goheen, the assis­
tant principal, and other teachers of her bisexuality. We conclude 
that the record does not support a finding that plaintiff estab­
lished either constitutional violation.34 
Having reached this conclusion, the court reversed the appeal with 
directions to the district court to enter judgment for the school dis­
trict. 
Ms. Rowland's writ of certiorari was denied by the United States 
35 Supreme Court in February, 1985. Justice Brennan fi led a dissenting 
opinion with which Justice Marshall concurred: 
This case raises important constitutional questions regard­
ing the rights of public employees to maintain and express their 
private sexual preferences. . . . Because determination of the 
appropriate constitutional analysis to apply in such a case con­
tinues to puzzle lower courts and because this Court has never 
addressed the issues presented, I  would grant certiorari. . . . 
Because petitioner's case raises serious questions relating to 
this issue of national importance, an issue that cannot any longer 
be ignored, I  respectfully dissent from the decision to deny this 
petition for a writ of certiorari.36 
^Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444 (1984). 
•^Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 84 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1985). 
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Although this case involved a nontenured teacher, it was important 
to this discussion because it provided an opportunity for the justices 
of the Supreme Court to voice their belief that it was time for the 
Court to address the constitutional issues involved with the dismissal 
of public employees for homosexuality. This is an issue which is 
crying out for clarification from the Supreme Court to establish clear 
constitutional guidelines. 
Lyle Stephens was terminated as a teacher in Pierce County, 
Nebraska, for unprofessional conduct and immorality. The charges arose 
in part from an incident between Stephens and a visiting salesman. 
Gerald Zimmerman, a typewriter salesman, arrived for a meeting with 
the high school principal who was unavailable when Zimmerman arrived. 
Stephens invited Zimmerman to the teacher's lounge for a cup of coffee 
while he waited for the principal. During their conversation, Stephens 
made several sexually oriented remarks which were out of context. Dur­
ing these periods in the conversation Stephens appeared restless, 
moving in his chair, and at one point rubbing his own genital area. 
Later in the conversation, while discussing materials to use for seats 
for bar stools Zimmerman was building, Stephens suggested that he use 
a foam cushion that would conform to his buttocks. While making this 
comment, Stephens placed his hand on Zimmerman's genital area and made 
several fondling motions. 
Del Beaudette, the husband of the school secretary, also testified 
at the hearing about an incident that occurred when he attended a school 
staff Christmas party. While Beaudette was washing his hands in the 
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restroom, Stephens grabbed Beaudette in the genital area and on the 
37 
buttocks after "playing with himself," "flipping his penis." Stephens 
denied that he had ever engaged in such conduct with anyone. 
Following the hearing in which the board terminated Stephens' 
teaching contract, he appealed to district court which ruled that the 
dismissal was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Stephens then appealed 
38 
to the Supreme Court of Nebraska. The court affirmed the district 
court decision and held that the school board had complied with stat­
utory procedure in the termination proceedings; Stephens' aggressive 
and uncontrollable sexual assault gave rise to the reasonable inference 
of his unfitness to teach; and there was sufficient evidence to uphold 
the school board's decision to terminate Stephens' contract. 
Lack of direction from the United States Supreme Court has led 
to contradictory opinions in lower courts which are trying to resolve 
the constitutional issues involved in the dismissal of teachers for 
homosexual conduct. In general, dismissals resulting from public acts 
of homosexual conduct will be upheld by the courts. Dismissals based 
on status as a homosexual must show that there is a detrimental effect 
on the teacher's classroom effectiveness for courts to affirm the dis­
missal. Until the Supreme Court grants certiorari and rules on the 
pertinent issues, this confusion will continue. 
Heterosexual Misconduct with Adults 
Teachers dismissed for heterosexual conduct with other consent­
ing adults have also turned to the courts for relief. These cases 
"^Stephens v. Board of Education of School District No. 5, 429 N.W. 
2d 722 (Neb. 1988). 
38Ibid. 
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have involved charges of immorality based on co-habitation and 
adultery. 
In 1972, the United States District Court of Nebraska heard the 
39 case Fisher v. Snyder. Frances Fisher, a divorcee, lived alone in a 
one bedroom apartment. Her contract was terminated at the close of 
the school term for conduct unbecoming a teacher. The evidence pre­
sented at the school board hearing indicated that from time to time 
Mrs. Fisher had overnight guests in her one bedroom apartment. The 
charges of conduct unbecoming a teacher arose from the overnight visits 
of Cliff Rowan, whom Mrs. Fisher described as her second son. He vis­
ited during his vacations from college as well as staying in her apart­
ment while observing classes for one of his college courses. 
The only evidence of possible impropriety was offered by Mrs. Brady, 
an Avon lady and wife of a local minister. She visited Mrs. Fisher 
early on a Saturday morning and observed Rowan emerging from the bed­
room of the apartment. She testified that she could not see any bed­
ding on the sofa in the living room although she admitted that she did 
not go all the way into the living room. 
The district court found that the school board had merely shown 
association with no inference of immorality. The judge concluded that 
". . . the association of persons within one's own home is an activity 
40 constitutionally protected within the meaning of privacy." He further 
stated: 
39346 F. Supp. 396 (1972). 
40Ibid., 400. 
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When viewed most favorably from the position of the board of edu­
cation and taking every permissible inference from the testimony 
elicited at the hearing, there is simply no proof of impropriety 
in Mrs. Fisher's conduct which affected her classroom performance, 
her relationship with students under her care, or otherwise had 
any bearing on any interest possessed by the board of education. 
At most, the evidence may be said to raise a question of Mrs. 
Fisher's good judgment in her personal affairs, when measured 
against an undefined standard which someone could suppose exists 
in a small town in Nebraska. I  am constrained to hold that that 
was not enough to justify termination of the contract. 41 
The court ordered that the termination be voided and that Mrs. Fisher 
be reinstated to her teaching position. 
Questionable judgment in one's personal relationships is not 
enough to form the basis for the dismissal of a tenured teacher. 
School officials must show that the conduct had an adverse impact on the 
effectiveness of the teacher to perform the duties for which he was 
hi red. 
42 Erb v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction was an appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Iowa resulting from the Polk District Court's 
annulment of a writ of certiorari fi led by Erb to challenge the revoca­
tion of his teaching certificate. Richard Erb was employed at Nishna 
Valley School. The complaint against him was made by Robert Johnson 
whose wife, Margaret, taught home economics at the same school. 
Margaret planned to quit teaching and open a boutique. Erb agreed 
to assist her in designing the store and they saw each other often. 
Johnson became suspicious that they were having an affair and hid in 
the trunk of the Johnson automobile one night to attempt to confirm 
his suspicions. On this particular night, Margaret and Erb drove to 
a secluded area and engaged in sexual intercourse while Johnson remained 
41Ibid., 398. 42216 N.W.2d 339 (1974). 
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hidden in the trunk. Johnson did not make his presence known but rather 
consulted an attorney the following day to fi le for a divorce from 
Margaret. The attorney advised that Johnson needed witnesses in order 
to strengthen his case 
Therefore, Johnson and a group of his friends began to follow 
Margaret and Erb. After several fruitless attempts, they succeeded 
in locating the couple parked in a secluded area and took photographs 
of them partially disrobed in the back seat of the car. Johnson told 
Margaret not to come home and that all further communication would be 
through their attorneys. Erb told his wife about the affair after it 
had been terminated. 
Johnson reported the adulterous liaison to the school board for 
the purpose of having Erb fired. He expressed that he had no desire 
to have Erb's teaching certificate revoked. However, after a hearing, 
the board voted to revoke in spite of the fact that there were numerous 
witnesses who vouched for Erb's character and fitness to teach. 
When the district court annulled the writ of certiorari, Erb 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa. He alleged that the board had 
acted il legally by denying his right to cross examine witnesses; by 
limiting the number of witnesses he could call; by failing to make find­
ings; and by revoking his teaching certificate without substantial evi­
dence that he was morally unfit to teach. 
The court would not hear arguments concerning the first allegation 
since Erb had not raised an objection during the hearing before the 
board nor before the trial court. The court also ruled that the board 
had acted il legally in failing to make findings of fact in the case. 
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Although the board contended that the adultery was sufficient for 
a finding of unfitness to teach, the court disagreed and quoted the 
Morrison case: "Surely incidents of extramarital heterosexual conduct 
against a background of years of satisfactory teaching would not consti 
tute 'immoral conduct1 sufficient to justify revocation . . . without 
43 any showing of an adverse effect on fitness to teach." The court 
then used the Morrison criteria and determined that there was no evi­
dence of adverse effect on Erb's fitness to teach. The court concluded 
There was no evidence than that Erb's misconduct was an isolated 
occurrence in an otherwise unblemished past and is not l ikely to 
recur. The conduct itself was not an open or public affront to 
community mores; it became public only because it was discovered 
with considerable effort and made public by others.44 
The court ruled that the board had acted il legally in revoking his cer­
tificate and that the trial court had erred in annulling the writ of 
certiorari. 
Again, the court supported the precedent that private sexual con­
duct does not indicate unfitness to teach without supporting evidence 
to that effect. School officials must clearly indicate an adverse 
effect on the individual's effectiveness for the dismissal to be upheld 
when the conduct is private and involves two consenting adults. 
45 
Sullian v. Meade County Independent School District No. 101 
involved the dismissal of a single female teacher who was l iving with 
a male whom she referred to as her boyfriend. Kathleen Sullivan began 
teaching in Union Center in the fall of 1974 and resided in a mobile 
home provided by the school district. In October Donald Dragon moved 
43Morrison, 383. 44Erb, 344. 45387 F. Supp. 1237 (1975). 
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into the mobile home with Miss Sullivan. She freely admitted that she 
was l iving with Mr. Dragon when asked by members of the community. 
Since many of her students had visited in her home, they were aware 
of Miss Sullivan's living arrangements. The parent of one of these 
students complained to the principal of her school. In a conference, 
the principal informed Miss Sullivan that there was a great possibility 
that she would lose her job if she did not discontinue living with 
Mr. Dragon. She responded that she had no intention of terminating 
her arrangement with him. 
The original notice of the school board hearing advised Miss Sul­
livan that the superintendent would recommend that she be dismissed 
from her teaching duties on grounds of gross immorality. Subsequent 
notice included incompetence as a reason for dismissal. The school board 
made thirty-six determinations from the evidence presented and voted 
to dismiss Miss Sullivan after she was given several opportunities 
to agree to change her l iving arrangements with Mr. Dragon. The board 
voted to pay her full compensation for services rendered to the school 
district. 
She appealed to United States District Court in South Dakota 
alleging that her dismissal was arbitrary, capricious, and a violation 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and her constitu­
tional right of freedom of association and right to privacy. In the 
decision the court stated: 
. . . there must be a nexus between the conduct to be proscribed 
and the workings of the educational system. In seeking to justify 
dismissal in this case, the school board found that the plaintiff 's 
conduct was an affront to the moral standard of the Union Center 
103 
community, and that its continuance sets a bad example for the 
young impressionable people that she is teaching. This Court 
. . . cannot say that the reasons for the plaintiff 's discharge 
were unrelated to the education process or the working relation­
ship within the educational institution. ... It would seem 
reasonable for the school board to conclude that the controversy 
between the plaintiff and the parents and the community members 
of this locale would make it difficult for Miss Sullivan to main­
tain the proper education setting in her classroom. Thus, this 
is not a case where a teacher is dismissed for past conduct which 
has no relationship to her fitness to teach, since the school 
board gave Miss Sullivan every opportunity to discontinue her 
l iving arrangement with Mr. Dragon, and complete the remainder 
of the 1974-75 school year.46 
The court ruled that although board members could be sued, the school 
district was not a person within the Civil Rights Act and, therefore, 
could not be sued under that act; that the dismissal of the teacher 
due to her conduct in living with her boyfriend without benefit of matri­
mony was not unrelated to proper functioning of the educational system 
and did not deny due process; and that the South Dakota statute setting 
forth grounds for dismissal of teachers did not deny due process due 
to vagueness. Therefore, Miss Sullivan was not entitled to damages 
and the case was dismissed. 
Miss Sullivan appealed to the Eighth Circuit of the United States 
Court of Appeals.^ The court affirmed the lower court decision. 
However, the decision included the following: 
. . .  w e  r e m a n d  t h i s  c a s e  t o  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  w i t h  d i r e c t i o n s  
to modify its judgment to reflect a dismissal of the action for 
failure of Ms. Sullivan to establish a claim for damages. . . . 
Such modification of the judgment may serve to avoid or lessen 
any stiqma which might otherwise attach to Ms. Sullivan's teaching 
record. *+8 
In this case and the one which follows, the conduct which resulted 
in dismissal was shown to have an adverse effect on the performance 
46Ibid., 1246. 47530 F. 2d 799 (1976). 48Ibid., 808. 
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of the duties required by the job. In Sullivan, the conduct was well 
known by both parents and students. Miss Sullivan was also given 
numerous opportunities to remedy the situation which she refused to 
do. In the following case, there was the clear indication that the 
plaintiff 's performance of his job responsibilities was affected by 
the adulterous affair in which he was involved. Therefore, since there 
was evidence to support a decline in effectiveness as a result of the 
immoral conduct, both dismissals were upheld by the courts. 
In 1976, the United States District Court in Delaware heard the 
49 case Sedule v. Capital School District. Joseph Sedule, an assistant 
superintendent of the school district, was charged with immorality, 
misconduct in office, incompetency, and neglect of duty as a result 
of an adulterous relationship with Joyce Naftzinger. The relationship 
began in January of 1971. 
Until June of 1972 when Mr. and Mrs. Naftzinger moved to Georgia, 
Sedule met Joyce three or four times a week during normal working hours. 
His subordinates noted his extended absences from his office and 
observed that he seemed less attentive to his professional responsibil­
ities. Although the plaintiff 's duties required him to leave his 
office, the court concluded that it was clear that many of his unex­
plained absences were due to his amorous relationship with Joyce Naft­
zinger. Joyce accompanied Sedule to a professional convention in 1971. 
As a result he spent l ittle more than one hour at the convention. While 
the Naftzingers resided in Georgia, Sedule made lengthy telephone calls 
49425 F. Supp. 552 (1976). 
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to her during normal working hours. When sent to a convention in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, in February, 1973, he missed one entire day 
of the convention because he had driven to Reading, Pennsylvania, where 
the Naftzingers were l iving at the time. In June of 1973, Sedule rented 
an apartment in Dover and persuaded Joyce to leave her husband. 
Sedule also had on several occasions taken nude or partially nude 
photographs of Joyce which he sent to Mr. Naftzinger. He threatened 
to send copies of the photographs to Mr. Naftzinger1s employers as a 
means of inducing Mr. Naftzinger to allow Joyce to stay in Dover when 
he was transferred to Georgia. Sedule also sent photographs to Naft­
zinger in Georgia in an attempt to persuade him to allow Joyce to return to 
Dover. When the Naftzingers moved to Reading, Sedule again sent a nude 
photograph of Joyce to Mr. Naftzinger with the message: "Please don't 
50 make trouble, just go." The court observed: "In sum, it is likely 
that this conduct alone would have supplied an adequate reason for dis-
51 missal." However, the board chose to base its immorality charges 
solely on the adulterous relationship. 
Beginning in the summer of 1971, Mr. Naftzinger complained to the 
board about Sedule's involvement with his wife. The board initially 
took no action except to send two of the members to encourage Sedule 
to break off his relationship with Joyce Naftzinger before it became 
a matter of embarrassment to the board. In late October, 1973, both 
of the Naftzingers petitioned the board for assistance and fi led a com­
plaint in writing. Following a November board meeting, Sedule was sent 
50Ibid., 557. 51Ibid. 
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a notice of his dismissal which contained three pages of specific 
charges. After a hearing was held on the charges in December, the 
board voted to dismiss Sedule. 
Sedule appealed to district court on the basis that his dismissal 
(1) was arbitrary and capricious because the charges lacked a rational 
nexus to his duties as a school administrator; (2) should be overruled 
because he was not given adequate warning that his conduct would lead 
to his dismissal; and (3) invaded his constitutionally sanctioned right 
to privacy. Sedule also claimed that the hearing held by the board 
was biased and that board members had prejudged him before the hearing. 
The court concluded: . . the plaintiff has failed to persuade the 
court by a preponderance of evidence that his discharge was defective 
in any material way, and judgment will be entered in accordance with 
52 
this opinion." Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. 
Diane Thompson had been an elementary teacher in a rural Missouri 
school district for eleven years. In the spring of 1979 she met and 
began dating Cal Thompson. During June of that year Cal's ex-wife went 
to Diane's house in a drunken state and violently confronted Diane and 
Cal. The sheriff was called to remove her from the premises. A few 
days later the principal of Diane's elementary school, Mr. Timmons, 
visited her at her home to express his concern about this incident and 
her relationship with Cal. Cal's ex-wife had called him to complain 
that Diane and Cal were l iving together. Mr. Timmons was especially 
52Ibid., 565. 
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concerned because Cal's ex-wife lived in the district and had school-
aged children. He later noticed Cal's car in front of Diane's house 
both late at night and early in the morning. 
During the following fall, Mr. Timmons had further discussions 
with Diane to express his concern. Diane informed him that she and 
Cal planned to marry soon. At a meeting with Mr. Timmons and the dis­
trict superintendent on November 15, she was offered a chance to resign. 
They offered to recommend her for employment elsewhere, based on her 
consistently satisfactory performance evaluations. Mr. Timmons and 
a substantial segment of the local community felt that Diane's conduct 
was immoral. Diane married Cal on November 19. However, she was sus­
pended with pay from her job on November 20 after a unanimous school 
board vote charging her with immoral conduct. 
53 Thompson v. Southwest School District was heard by the United 
States District Court of Missouri in 1980. The basis for this case 
was Diane's allegation that her dismissal constituted a violation of 
her constitutional rights. She claimed that the statute allowing dis­
missal for immorality was unconstitutionally vague, that she had been 
denied due process, and that her dismissal was a violation of her consti­
tutional rights to privacy and freedom of association. Entering judgment 
for the plaintiff, the court held that the Missouri statute permitting 
the termination of employment of permanent teachers for engaging in 
immoral conduct would be interpreted to apply only to immoral conduct 
which adversely affected a teacher's performance. In this case, the 
53483 F. Supp. 1170 (1980). 
108 
court found no evidence to show that the alleged immoral conduct had 
affected Miss Thompson's teaching performance. Further, the court held 
that Miss Thompson had presented a sufficiently serious question on 
her claim of denial of substantive due process to make the issue a fair 
one for litigation. Having dealt with the vagueness and due process 
issues, the court chose not to address the privacy issue in this deci­
sion. 
The Thompson decision is important in that the court combined 
criteria from several prior decisions, including Morrison and Weissman, 
to provide the following list of factors to be used in determining if 
alleged immoral conduct renders the teacher unfit to teach. These 
include (1) the age and maturity of the students of the teacher 
involved; (2) the likelihood that the teacher's conduct will have 
adversely affected students or other teachers; (3) the degree of the 
anticipated adversity; (4) the proximity or remoteness in time of the 
conduct; (5) extenuating or aggravating circumstances surrounding the 
conduct; (6) the likelihood that the conduct may be repeated; (7) the 
motives underlying the conduct; and (8) whether the conduct will have 
a chill ing effect on the rights of the teachers involved or of other 
54 teachers. 
Tim Yanzick was a tenured teacher employed to teach math and 
science at Poison Middle School in Lake County, Montana. In 1976, prob­
lems arose from Yanzick's l iving arrangements with Sharon Scott, a 
fellow teacher, and from several events taking place both in and out 
54Ibid., 1182. 
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of the classroom. A year prior to the current controversy surrounding 
Yanzick, he was observed by the school superintendent on several occa­
sions crossing a bridge coming to work early in the morning with Miss 
Scott and was warned to be more discreet about his living arrangements. 
In January of 1977, the superintendent and the principal of Poison 
Middle School met with Yanzick and questioned him as to why he had moved 
Miss Scott into his home in the city of Poison and had openly admitted 
that they were l iving together when he had earlier been cautioned about 
his lack of discretion. In this meeting, Yanzick acknowledged that 
his living arrangements were common knowledge among his students. 
The Board of Trustees notified Yanzick in March that it had 
decided not to renew his contract for the 1977-78 school term. A letter 
followed this notification and outlined the specific reasons for his 
nonrenewal. These included: 
. . . you have demonstrated a lack of fitness for teaching . . . 
as indicated in all statements made to your class of junior high 
school students . . . with the effect that your "girlfriend" had 
to move out of your home because some people did not l ike your 
l iving arrangements . . . you have further demonstrated a lack 
of fitness ... by reason of your introduction of the subject 
of abortion in your classroom, wherein you inquired of the boys 
in your class, ages 11 to 14, "How many of you boys would have 
your girlfriend get an abortion if she were pregnant?" . . . you 
have also demonstrated a lack of fitness . . . by a serious lack 
of good judgment in permitting the use in your classroom of human 
fetuses brought by one of your students . . . you have demon­
strated a lack of moral values by openly and notoriously cohab-
itating with a female teacher, not your wife, within the relatively 
small community . . . the knowledge of which fact among your stu­
dents has adversely affected your performance. 
Yanzick requested a hearing before the board of trustees. His 
request was denied and l itigation followed which culminated in an order 
^Yanzick v. School District No. 23, Mont., 641 P.2d 431 (1982). 
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from the Montana Supreme Court requiring the board of trustees to hold 
a hearing and reconsider their decision. This hearing was held August 9, 
1978, and the board affirmed its original decision. Yanzick appealed 
this decision to the county superintendent of schools who upheld the 
decision of the board. He then appealed the decision to the state super­
intendent of schools who also upheld the Board's decision to dismiss. 
Yanzick appealed to the First Judicial District Court which reversed 
the decision. 
56 The school district then appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana. 
The district court had relied on the Morrison criteria to determine 
Yanzick's fitness to teach. The Supreme Court disagreed: 
The facts of the Morrison case and its holding are not applicable 
here. . . . Yanzick's conduct was not some form of private conduct 
unknown to the community, but . . . was conduct broadly known 
throughout the community . . . which the Board of Trustees found 
adversely affected Yanzick's performance as a teacher.57 
The court held that both the county and state superintendents had 
properly heard and decided the case as presented to them. After finding 
that these decisions were supported by reliable and substantive evi­
dence, the court stated: "We further conclude that the record is suffi­
cient to support the administrative conclusion that Mr. Yanzick demon­
strated a lack of fitness as a teacher, and to establish good cause 
CO 
for the decision by the board of trustees not to renew his contract." 
The court reversed the district court decision and reinstated the deci­
sions of the state superintendent and the county superintendent. 
561bid., 434. 571bid., 431. 58Ibid., 441. 
I l l  
Board of Education of Alamogordo Public Schools District No. 1 v. 
59 Jennings was heard by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico in 1982. The 
local board of education appealed the decision of the state board of 
education which reversed the dismissal of Lyman Jennings for having 
an extramarital affair with a school secretary. 
The romance began in late 1979 and ended the following spring. 
The secretary then filed a complaint with the local board accusing Jen­
nings of sexual harassment. 
At the hearing the secretary testified that she and Jennings had 
frequently had intercourse, usually at her apartment but once in the 
home economics classroom when school was not in session. Love notes 
were also introduced into evidence. There were also numerous rumors 
about the affair which were fueled by Jennings' suspension and the sec­
retary's pregnancy. Jennings presented evidence that the secretary 
had twice been convicted for shoplifting and that there were two out­
standing bench warrants for her failure to appear on two other undis­
closed criminal charges. The local board presented a polygraph examiner 
who testified that the secretary was telling the truth when she revealed 
the details of the affair. Jennings countered with a psychologist who 
testified that polygraph tests are not reliable and that the secretary 
appeared to be a sociopathic personality type who would l ie to suit 
her subjective emotional needs. 
As a result of the hearing, Jennings' employment was terminated 
on the following grounds: "1. Sexual harassment and immoral conduct 
59N.M. App., 651 P.2d 1037 (1982). 
112 
(the extramarital affair); 2. Gross inefficiency (sexual harassment of 
other secretaries); 3. Gross inefficiency (knowledge of the above had 
reached others, adversely affecting Jennings' ability to do his job)."®® 
This decision was appealed and a hearing officer was appointed by the 
state board of education. 
The hearing officer concluded that Jennings' ability to do his 
job was affected by the affair. However, he set aside the sexual 
harassment charge since the procedure requiring work conferences had 
not been followed. The state board reversed the local school board's 
decision to fire Jennings and the local school board appealed. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the state board could reject the 
findings and conclusions of its hearing officer without conducting 
further hearings. It ruled that it could not find that the decision 
by the state board to reinstate Jennings was unreasonable or was not 
supported by substantial evidence. The decision of the state board 
was affirmed because the local board had failed to show good cause for 
the dismissal. 
The final case discussed in this section was heard by a Florida 
court in 1984. Sherburne v. School Board of Suwannee County^ involved 
a teacher who was terminated on the grounds that she lacked good moral 
character. The Board's notice of hearing charged that Pamela Sherburne 
had cohabitated with an adult male to whom she was not married or 
related and that she had permitted him to visit her classroom during 
times when she should have been teaching. The notice also stated that 
60Ibid., 1039. 61455 SO. 2d 1057 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1984). 
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she had been warned about her behavior and had persisted to demonstrate 
an absence of good moral character by continuing to live with this man. 
Finally, it stated that knowledge of this relationship was so well 
known within the community that there had been complaints to the school 
principal about the example she was setting for her students. 
The evidence in the case disclosed that Miss Sherburne had lived 
with Mr. Palmer for a period of one month while her trailer was being 
repaired. Although at the time of the hearing Miss Sherburne was again 
residing in her own trailer, she did testify that she occasionally 
spent the night at Mr. Palmer's trailer or that he spent the night at 
her trailer. There was no direct evidence to suggest an improper 
sexual relationship between the couple. There was also no evidence 
to support the charge that Miss Sherburne had been warned about her 
behavior. Her principal testified that there were no discipline prob­
lems in her classes, that he had received no complaints from students 
concerning this relationship, and that he considered her to be an excel­
lent teacher. The court also found that the board had presented no 
proof that the relationship was common knowledge before the news of 
Sherburne's dismissal was reported in the local newspaper. The court 
ruled: 
. . .  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s p e c i f i c ,  v a l i d ,  s t a t u t o r y  d i r e c t i v e s ,  
the appropriate standard to be applied is that private, off-campus 
conduct ostensibly involving a consensual sexual relationship 
between a teacher and an adult of the opposite sex cannot, in and 
of itself, provide "good cause" for a school board's rejection 
of a teacher nominated for employment by the superintendent unless 
it is shown that such conduct adversely affects the ability to 
teach. . . . Since the evidence here does not meet this standard, 
the order must be set aside. 
62Ibid., 1062. 
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The cases presented in this section show that the courts will not 
uphold the dismissal of teachers for immorality based on heterosexual 
conduct with other consenting adults unless there is substantive proof 
that this conduct has had an adverse effect on the performance of the 
teachers involved. The dismissal will not be upheld, even if the nexus 
standard is met, if the school district has failed to follow proper 
procedures in handling the dismissal process. 
Unwed Pregnancy 
Teachers dismissed for immorality on grounds of unwed pregnancy 
have also turned to the courts for relief. These challenges have been 
brought on a variety of constitutional issues. 
Ilena Drake received a letter in April, 1973, notifying her that 
the Board of Education in Covington County, Alabama, intended to cancel 
her employment contract for immorality. The board had received a phy­
sician's certificate which stated that she became pregnant during the 
current school year while she was single. Miss Drake appealed to the 
Alabama State Tenure Commission which sustained the validity of the 
63 
dismissal. She then appealed to the United States District Court 
alleging that the state statute which allowed dismissal for immorality 
was unconstitutionally vague and that her dismissal resulted from a 
violation of her constitutional right to privacy. The decision of the 
court focused on the privacy issue. 
^Drake v. Covington County Board of Education, 371 F. Supp. 974 
(1974). 
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Murray King, superintendent of the Covington County school system, 
heard a rumor in March that Miss Drake was pregnant and was hospital­
ized. Mr. King called the administrator of the hospital, Dr. Evers, 
to confirm the rumor. Dr. Evers confirmed that Miss Drake was in the 
hospital and had asked that he perform an abortion since she feared 
she would lose her job if she had the baby. Mr. King then visited Miss 
Drake in the hospital and informed her that his knowledge of her condi­
tion would be submitted to the board regardless of her decision on the 
abortion. During the hearing before the board, Mr. King entered a cer­
tificate from Dr. Evers as evidence. There was no evidence to show 
that Miss Drake had consented for her doctor to disclose this informa­
tion to the board. Therefore, the court concluded: 
The Board made no finding that Drake's claimed immorality had 
affected her competency or fitness as a teacher, and no such nexus 
was developed in the evidence. No "compelling interest" as to 
the cancellation of Drake's contract of employment was established 
by the evidence which would justify the invasion of Drake's consti­
tutional right of privacy. 4 
The court ordered that Miss Drake be reinstated to her teaching posi­
tion. 
65 Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District was fi led 
by two teachers' aides to challenge a rule established by the superin­
tendent of the school district which declared that unwed mothers were 
ineligible for employment with the school system. The school district 
offered three reasons to support the use of this rule for the purpose 
of creating a proper moral environment: 
64Ibid., 979. 65507 F.2d 611 (1975). 
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(1) unwed parenthood is prima facie proof of immorality; (2) unwed 
parents are improper communal role models, after whom students 
may pattern their lives; (3) employment of an unwed parent in a 
scholastic environment materially contributes to the problem of 
school-girl pregnancies.66 
The Court of Appeals was not convinced by this argument and held that 
the rule had no rational relation to the objectives of the school dis­
trict and that it was . . fraught with invidious discrimination and 
thus constitutionally defective both as denial of equal protection and 
of due process. 
In 1976, the United States District Court in Nebraska heard the 
CQ 
case Brown v. Bathke which involved a probationary teacher who was 
dismissed because she was pregnant and not married. On March 26, 1973, 
the Board had voted not to renew her contract because the administration 
had not received her college transcript. Miss Brown provided the 
transcript on March 28, but no further action was taken by the board. 
In early April, Dr. Bathke, principal of Monroe Junior High School 
where the plaintiff was employed, learned that Miss Brown was pregnant. 
He contacted her and urged her to resign. She requested additional 
time to consider submitting her resignation. On May 7, 1973, the board 
voted to terminate her contract based on her status as unwed and preg­
nant. 
Miss Brown did not request a hearing but fi led a sex discrimination 
complaint with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission. The Commis­
sion held a public hearing and found that there had been discrimination 
on the basis of sex. 
66Ibid., 614. 671bid., 611. 68416 F. Supp. 1194 (1976). 
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When first heard by district court, the case was remanded with 
directions to the board to conduct a hearing as required by law. In 
the second appeal to the district court, Chief Judge Urbom held that 
the 1975 hearing (as ordered by the court) afforded the plaintiff due 
process; that Miss Brown had no expectancy of continued employment 
beyond that school year; that the board's action in terminating a 
teacher for being pregnant while unwed bore a rational relationship 
to the board's legitimate educational function; that the termination 
did not violate the teacher's rights of privacy or association; and 
that the teacher was not entitled to damages from individual board mem­
bers . 
This case provides an. interesting contradiction of the previous 
decision in Drake. While Miss Drake's dismissal was overturned because 
of the failure of the school board to show a relationship between her 
status as an unwed pregnant female and her classroom performance, the 
court in this case held that that relationship was implied. 
69 
New Mexico State Board of Education v. Stoudt involved the dis­
missal of Katherine Stoudt for the following reasons: 
(1) she was pregnant and unmarried; (2) her conduct was deemed 
immoral in the Taos community; and (3) her continued presence in 
the classroom would have a potentially adverse effect upon her 
teaching effectiveness in the classroom and as a coach, and upon 
the moral climate at Taos High School .70 
Miss Stoudt was recommended for reemployment for the 1976-77 
school term and signed her contract in July 1976 in spite of the fact 
that her pregnancy had been made known to the superintendent in May. 
69571 P.2d 1186 (1977). 70Ibid. 
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On August 19, 1976, a special Taos board meeting was held and resulted 
in a motion being passed to ask Miss Stoudt to resign. Miss Stoudt 
responded in writing that she would not resign. Further, she requested 
maternity leave. It is interesting to note that at the time of the 
board's action against Miss Stoudt there were five other unwed mothers 
employed in Taos schools against whom no action had been taken. 
The board conducted a hearing in September and confirmed its 
earlier decision to dismiss her. On January 20, 1977, the state board 
of education held a hearing and affirmed the decision of the Taos Board 
to dismiss Miss Stoudt. She appealed to the Court of Appeals7* which 
reversed the decision of the state board and ordered her reinstatement 
with back pay. When the state board appealed to the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico, it held that . . her dismissal for being unmarried and 
pregnant was arbitrary, unreasonable, and not supported by substantial 
72 evidence." Therefore, the decision of the state board of education 
upholding Miss Stoudt's dismissal was vacated. 
The case Cochran v. Chidester School District of Ouachita County, 
73 Arkansas, was fi led in United States District Court by June Cochran 
who alleged that the termination of her contract was in violation of 
her constitutional rights. June Nelson's pregnancy out of wedlock came 
to the attention of school officials in April of 1976. On April 6, 
a special meeting of the school board was held which resulted in the 
decision that the school superintendent would speak with Miss Nelson 
7191 N.M. 183 (1977). 72571 P.2d 1186 (1977). 
73456 F. Supp. 390 (1978). 
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and ask for her resignation. If Miss Nelson failed to resign, she would 
be fired effective April 14, 1976. Miss Nelson alleged that she was 
verbally informed that her dismissal was due to the fact that she had 
become pregnant out of wedlock. Miss Nelson was married on April 10 
and the subsequent birth of her child was legitimate. The plaintiff 
was not afforded any written standards concerning sexual relations or 
pregnancy nor was she notified about the April 6 special meeting of 
the school board. The Chidester school officials had been required 
by the court as a result of Moore v. Board of Education of Chidester 
74 School District to develop and use objective nondiscriminatory stan­
dards in the employment, assignment, and dismissal of teachers. The 
district had failed to do this. As a result of these factors, the judge 
of the district court held that 
(1) since teacher's employment history, showing that her contract 
and teaching duties had been terminated prior to end of school 
year, even without communication of derogatory reasons therefore, 
might clearly be expected to have adverse effect upon her future 
employment opportunities and would carry a professional stigma, 
teacher was deprived of her l iberty interest by lack of a pre-
termination hearing; (2) Arkansas statute, insofar as it purports 
to permit and establish as sufficient a posttermination hearing 
to school teacher, and then only upon request of teacher, does not 
meet due process standards required for termination of existing 
contract by school district, and (3) teacher was entitled to award 
of damages under contract with district and to $7,500 damages for 
stigma and impact of constitutional deprivation upon her profes­
sional future.75 
The Cochran decision emphasized the importance of following due 
process procedures, including notice and a predetermination hearing, in 
any dismissal case. 
74448 F.2d 709 (1971). 75456 F. Supp. 390 (1978). 
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Jean Avery taught remedial reading in Homewood City, Alabama, for 
five years before being dismissed by the Board of Education. Miss 
Avery notified her principal in November of 1976 that she was pregnant 
and due to deliver in late December. The principal commented that she 
had violated the written school district policy requiring that teachers 
who became pregnant must inform the superintendent no later than the 
fourth month of pregnancy. When Miss Avery met with the superintendent, 
Dr. French, to discuss that situation, he urged her to resign due to 
the moral issue of conception out of wedlock. 
Dr. French notified Miss Avery in writing on December 15, 1976, 
that the board would meet to determine whether to cancel her contract 
for insubordination, neglect of duty, and immorality. "As Dr. French 
testified, both 'insubordination' and 'neglect of duty' referred to 
Avery's violation of the notice rule, and 'immorality' referred to her 
pregnancy out of wedlock."^ On February 8, 1977, the board voted to 
terminate Avery's employment immediately. Avery sued the board, Dr. 
French, and the individual board members alleging deprivation of her 
rights as guaranteed by the equal protection and due process clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
When Avery v. Homewood City Board of Education77 was heard by the 
United States District Court, i t held that although one of the grounds, 
immorality, for the plaintiff 's discharge was arguably impermissible, 
the presence of another permissible ground rendered the termination 
lawful. 
7^Avery v. Homewood City Board of Education, 674 F.2d 337 (1982). 
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Avery then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth 
Circuit. Utilizing the framework of proof established by the United 
States Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Edu-
78 cation v. Doyle, the court stated: 
The burden was initially on Avery to show that her conduct was 
constitutionally protected and was a substantial or a motivating 
factor in the Board's decision to discharge her. We assume . . . 
that Avery's out of wedlock pregnancy was constitutionally pro­
tected. The district court found that the pregnancy was one of 
the reasons for Avery's discharge. . . . Having found that Avery 
had carried her initial burden, the district court should have 
gone on to determine whether the appeal had proven by a prepon­
derance of the evidence that they would have discharged Avery even 
in the absence of her out of wedlock pregnancy. 
Therefore the court ruled that Avery's discharge was in violation of 
her rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and declined to rule on the other claims. The case was remanded to 
the district court to determine the relief to which Miss Avery was 
entitled. 
The final case involving unwed pregnancy, Eckmann v. Board of Edu-
on 
cation of Hawthorn School District, was reviewed briefly in the sec­
tion on unwed pregnancy in Chapter II. This case involved the dismis­
sal of an unwed pregnant teacher who was pregnant as a result of rape 
and who had decided to raise her child alone. After a jury verdict 
in favor of the teacher and an award of two million dollars in compen­
satory damages, the school board appealed. In addition to the compen­
satory damages, punitive damages totaling $1,310,000 were assessed 
against the individual members of the school board. The case was heard 
7850 L. Ed.2d 471 (1977). 79Avery, 340. 
80636 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. 111. 1986). 
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by United States District Court in Ill inois in 1986. In deciding the 
teacher's constitutional claim, the Court relied on the reasoning of 
the Mount Healthy decision: 
. . . there are three burdens in a case of this sort. The teacher 
must f irst show some constitutionally protected conduct. Once 
this is established, the teacher carries the burden of showing 
that the protected conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" 
factor behind the school board's conduct. Once the teacher car­
ries these two burdens the school board must then show by a prepon­
derance of the evidence that it would have taken its action even 
if the teacher had not engaged in the constitutionally protected 
conduct.81 
The court further stated that the fact that the school board could have 
reached the same decision is not enough. The school board must prove 
that it would have reached the same decision' without considering the 
protected conduct. The court concluded that the constitutionally pro­
tected conduct which allegedly motivated the school board to fire Eck-
mann was her out-of-wedlock pregnancy coupled with her decision to raise 
her child as a single parent. Although the court found that the plain­
tiff 's conduct was not protected by a specifically enumerated constitu­
tional right, it considered the conduct to be covered by substantive 
due process. 
The court also cited two United States Supreme Court decisions, 
82 83 
Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Made, as precedents in this case: 
Supreme Court precedent thus clearly shows that the individual's 
decisions regarding marriage and child bearing are constitutionally 
protected from improper state infringement. . . . Under the over­
whelming weight of this authority, it is beyond question that 
plaintiff had a substantive due process right to conceive and raise 
her child out of wedlock without unwarranted state (School Board) 
intrusion.84 
81Ibid. 82405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
83410 U.S. 113 (1973). 84Eckmann, 1218. 
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The district court concluded that the evidence supported the find­
ing that the school board's motivation in its dismissal of Miss Eckmann 
was her constitutionally protected decision to remain pregnant and to 
raise her son as a single mother; that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the two million dollars in compensatory damages; and that 
dismissing school board members as defendants in civil rights actions 
did not preclude the award of punitive damages against the individual 
members. The compensatory damage award was changed to $750,000. 
As was pointed out in the discussion of Donal Sackman's article 
in Chapter II of this study, this case could have major implications 
for school officials if it is interpreted as establishing the precedent 
that unwed pregnancy is constitutionally protected in all circumstances. 
This was probably not the intent of the court. Unwed pregnancy which 
has an adverse impact on classroom performance might not be afforded 
the same degree of constitutional protection as was provided in this 
case. 
School officials must consider the effect of the individual's 
pregnancy on classroom performance as part of the decision to dismiss 
for unwed pregnancy. Clearly, the courts will not support dismissal 
decisions unless this test has been met with a preponderance of the 
evidence. Violation of the personal moral standards of the board or 
of the community is not sufficient alone to justify dismissals of teach­
ers for being unwed and pregnant. 
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Sexual Misconduct with Students 
Sexual misconduct with students or other minors of school age has 
frequently led to the dismissal of teachers. As with other areas of 
sexual misconduct, teachers who have been dismissed for this type of 
conduct are petitioning the courts to challenge these dismissals. 
Again, the teachers frequently base their litigation on the claim that 
their constitutional guarantees have been violated in the dismissal 
process. 
The case Board of Trustees of the Compton Junior College District 
o r  
v. Stubblefield is often cited in the litigation of court cases which 
deal with sexual misconduct with students. Although it involved a 
teacher at a junior college, the findings in this case are applicable 
to public school teachers since Stubblefield1s position was one which 
required certification. 
The case stemmed from an incident that occurred on the night of 
January 28, 1969. Stubblefield drove a female student who was enrolled 
in his night class at Compton Junior College to a side street in the 
area of the college and parked there. A Los Angeles County deputy sheriff 
noticed the car and stopped to investigate since it appeared to be 
abandoned. Stubblefield sat up in the car as the deputy approached 
the vehicle. When the deputy il luminated the interior of the car with 
his flashlight, he saw that Stubblefield's pants were unzipped and 
lowered from the waist exposing his genitals. The student was nude 
from the waist up and her pants were also unzipped. 
85App., 94 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1971). 
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When Stubblefield realized that they had been discovered by a 
police officer, he threw open the door and yelled, "Get the hell away 
Q C  
from me, you dirty cop." Stubblefield then shifted the car into 
reverse and knocked the deputy to the pavement, resulting in minor 
injuries. The defendant drove away with the deputy in pursuit. The 
chase, which resulted in speeds as high as one hundred miles per hour, 
ended when the student grabbed the steering wheel and forced Stubble­
field to stop. 
On March 4, 1969, the board of trustees suspended Stubblefield 
from his employment based on charges of immoral conduct and evident 
unfitness for service. An informal hearing was held at which the defen­
dant and his counsel were present. Subsequently, the board fi led a 
complaint in superior court requesting that the court inquire into the 
charges and determine whether or not those charges were true. If it 
were determined that the charges were true, the board also requested 
the court to determine whether the charges constituted sufficient 
grounds for the dismissal. The court found that the charges were true 
and provided sufficient basis for the board's dismissal action. 
On appeal, Stubblefield contended that the trial court was in error 
in holding that his conduct constituted sufficient grounds for dismis­
sal. He based his appeal on the Morrison decision. The Court of 
Appeals did not agree with Stubblefield's broad interpretation that 
this decision prevented his dismissal because the board had not shown 
how his conduct rendered him unfit to teach. Further, the court stated 
that 
8 6 Ib id . ,  320 .  
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The clear import of that decision ... is that a teacher may be 
discharged or have his certificate revoked on evidence that either 
his conduct indicates a potential for misconduct with a student 
or that his conduct while not necessarily indicating such a poten­
tial, has gained sufficient notoriety so as to impair his on-
campus relationships. There is no requirement that both the 
potential and the notoriety be present in each case.87 
The court felt that while there was no evidence directly addressing 
notoriety of the conduct, the very fact that the defendant was easily 
discovered by a police officer demonstrated the dubious security pro­
vided by the front seat of an automobile. 
Addressing the fitness issue, the court also distinguished this 
case from Morrison and concluded: '"Unfitness to teach' in terms of 
an indication that defendant was 'more l ikely than the average adult 
male to engage in any untoward conduct with a student' can be inferred 
from the very conduct itself. Defendant's actions in this case speak 
88 louder than any words of a psychiatrist." The court felt that the 
conclusions of the trial court were amply supported by the evidence 
presented and affirmed its decision. However, to avoid any possible 
uncertainty in the record, the court made the specific finding that 
Stubblefield's conduct constituted immoral conduct which indicated an 
evident unfitness to teach. 
Another case, which involved the discovery of a teacher engaged 
in sexual misconduct with a student, was heard by the Appellate Court 
of Il l inois in 1973. Yang v. Special Charter School District No. 150, 
89 Peoria County was an appeal from a circuit court decision which upheld 
the board of education's dismissal of Stephen Yang. 
87Ibid., 322. 88Ibid., 323. 89296 N.E.2d 74 (1973). 
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On the night of December 7, 1971, Stephen Yang's automobile was 
parked near a bridge in East Peoria. A police officer discovered Yang 
and a female student under the age of eighteen in the automobile. Both 
were partially undressed. A criminal complaint resulted from this dis­
covery. 
Proceedings by the board of education to dismiss Yang began on 
December 20 with a resolution for his immediate suspension without pay 
and his dismissal which would become effective on February 25, 1972. 
A public hearing was requested and held on January 17. The hearing 
officer allowed thirteen witnesses to testify as to the character and 
reputation of Yang but refused to allow an additional eleven witnesses 
to testify. The officer also did not allow evidence to be entered con­
cerning Yang's acquittal on the criminal charges. The hearing officer 
concluded that Yang's dismissal was in the best interest of the school 
district. 
In this appeal, Yang contended that he was denied due process 
because the school board was not an impartial fact finder and because 
his dismissal preceded the hearing. He further argued that the hearing 
officer erred in denying the admission of the additional witnesses and 
the verdict of not guilty. The appellate court found that since Yang 
had admitted playing strip poker with the female student in his automo­
bile, he had no argument concerning the fact finding process. The court 
also denied his assertion that his dismissal preceded the hearing. 
He had received notice of the dismissal prior to the hearing but that 
notice set the date of dismissal in February. In addition, the court 
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ruled that limiting the number of witnesses was a matter left to the 
discretion of the hearing officer. Although the court indicated that 
the criminal verdict of not guilty should have been entered into evi­
dence at the hearing, it did not feel that this error was prejudicial 
in light of the teacher's own admissions concerning the incident in 
question. The court affirmed the decisions of the board of education 
and the circuit court to dismiss Yang from his teaching position. 
On January 29, 1970 , a Texas grand jury indicted H. L. Moore on 
four charges: two separate charges of aggravated assault and battery; 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor; assault with intent to rape; 
and indecent exposure. These charges arose from incidents involving 
two children. At the time of the indictments, Moore was an eighth grade 
teacher. School officials immediately removed Moore from his classroom 
duties when they learned of the charges against him. Subsequently, 
the school board decided, without conducting a hearing, to suspend 
Moore with pay from his teaching duties for the remainder of the 1969-70 
school term. Later, the board refused to consider renewal of his con­
tract for the following year. Again, this action was taken without 
conducting a hearing. 
Moore commenced legal action against the school board alleging 
that his due process rights had been violated by the board's failure 
to conduct proper hearings on both his suspension and the nonrenewal 
of his contract for the following year. The district court treated 
the board's removal of Moore from teaching duties and its subsequent 
suspension as a suspension with pay for the remainder of the school 
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year. After careful consideration of the issues involved, including 
the nature and seriousness of the charges, the court concluded that 
there had been no violation of due process in the board's actions 
involving the suspension. However, the court did find that the refusal 
of the board to consider renewal of Moore's contract for the 1970-71 
school year was a violation of due process and awarded Moore back pay 
for 1970-71 and attorney's fees. 
91 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 
Moore urged consideration of the Sinderman and Roth decisions. Moore 
argued that, under the Sinderman decision, he was entitled to a remand 
to afford him the opportunity to offer proof that he possessed a prop­
erty interest in his continued employment even though he lacked formal 
tenure. The court agreed and vacated the district court judgment of 
back pay and attorney's fees. It also remanded the case for further 
consideration under the new standards of the Sinderman decision. 
A second argument Moore set forth was that the board's decision 
not to rehire him deprived him of his liberty interest without due 
process. This argument was based on the Roth decision. The court, 
however, disagreed with his assertion: "We conclude that the action 
of the board in declining, without hearing, to consider renewal of 
Moore's contract, was not a violation of due process under Roth. . . . 
Moore had knowledge of the indictments and had notice of the board's 
92 reasons for refusing to act on his contract." The court did specify 
that the board would be obligated under Roth to offer Moore a hearing 
90333 F. Supp. 53 (1971). 91482 F.2d 1069 (1973). 92Ibid., 1073. 
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to provide him the opportunity to clear his name if Moore was acquitted 
of the charges against him. 
The Moore decision should serve as an important reminder to school 
officials that the teacher being dismissed is entitled to due process, 
regardless of the reason for dismissal. Failure to provide the oppor­
tunity for a hearing on the charges which lead to dismissal may result 
in the decision being reversed by the courts. 
Gary L. Denton, a teacher at Marcus Whitman Junior High School, 
became acquainted with a student at South Kitsap High School as a 
result of his friendship with her parents. She had attended Denton's 
school but had never been in one of his classes. In the summer of 1971, 
Denton and the girl began dating with her parents' permission. In early 
November of that year, school administrators were informed by a coun­
selor that the girl was pregnant and that a teacher was involved. 
On November 8, 1971, a conference was held by the principal and 
vice principal with Denton. Denton acknowledged both the relationship 
and the paternity of the child. On November 15, the board of directors 
of the school district directed a notice of probable cause for dismissal 
to Denton. The stated cause was "... that as a male person you 
carnally knew and abused a female child under the age of eighteen years, 
who was not your wife, namely, . .. a student of South Kitsap School 
go 
District No. 492." Denton requested a hearing which was held on 
December 8 and resulted in his dismissal. Denton and the student in 
question were married on November 12, 1971. 
^Denton v. South Kitsap School District No. 402, Wash. App., 516 
P.2d 1080 (1973). 
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On appeal to the Superior Court of Kitsap County, the dismissal 
was upheld. At both the hearing and the trial, Denton asserted the 
privilege against self-incrimination to all questions concerning his 
sexual involvement with the girl. 
Denton appealed to the Court of Appeals of Washington alleging 
that his sexual relations with a minor female did not constitute suffi­
cient cause for his dismissal absent a showing of adverse impact on 
his effectiveness as a classroom teacher. The court began its discus­
sion of the case with the following: "It is difficult to conceive of 
circumstances which would more clearly justify the action of the school 
board than the sexual misconduct of a teacher with a minor student in 
the district. 
Denton's appeal relied heavily on the Morrison decision which 
required a showing that the conduct adversely affected the teacher's 
fitness to teach. On this assertion, the court concluded: 
While the argument that "immorality" per se is not a ground for 
discharge without a showing of adverse effect upon "fitness to 
teach" or upon the school has merit . .. we decline to set such 
a requirement where the sexual misconduct complained of directly 
involves a teacher and a minor student. In our view, the school 
board may properly conclude in such a situation that the conduct 
is inherently harmful to the teacher-student relation, and thus 
to the school district.95 
The court affirmed the dismissal of Denton from his teaching position. 
Even though Denton dated the minor female with her parents' per­
mission, the dismissal was held to be for valid cause. The message 
from the court in this case is clear. Sexual misconduct with a minor 
in the school district implies adverse effect on a teacher's 
94Ibid., 1081. 95Ibid., 1082. 
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effectiveness without the board actually showing proof of that effect. 
The conduct alone is adequate support for a dismissal on grounds of 
immorality. The same judicial reasoning was also utilized in the next 
decision. 
Tomer!in v. Dade County School Board^ was heard by the District 
Court of Appeal of Florida in 1975. James Tomerlin appealed his dis­
missal by the Dade County school board for immoral conduct with his 
nine-year-old stepdaughter. Prior to his dismissal, Tomerlin had an 
unblemished record as an elementary school teacher. After school hours, 
Tomerlin performed cunnilingus on his stepdaughter at his home. Although 
expert testimony at the hearing indicated that this was an isolated 
act which probably would not happen again, the board proceeded with 
the dismissal. The dismissal was upheld by the state board of educa­
tion. 
Tomer!in's appeal was based on his contention that the Florida 
statute which authorized dismissal for immorality was void due to its 
vagueness. The court disagreed. Tomerlin also contended that the 
statute was unconstitutional unless it was interpreted to connect his 
immoral conduct with his job performance. The court concluded that 
although the act occurred at home after school hours, it was indirectly 
related to his job: "His conduct is an incident of a perverse personal­
ity which makes him a danger to school children and unfit to teach them. 
Mothers and fathers would question the safety of their children; chil­
dren would discuss Tomerlin's conduct and morals. All of these relate 
9 6 Fla .  App . ,  318  So .2d  159  (1975) .  
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97  to Tomerlin's job performance." In denying his writ of certiorari, 
the court's decision concluded with the following: 
A school teacher holds a position of great trust. We entrust the 
custody of our children to the teacher. We look to the teacher 
to educate and to prepare our children for their adult l ives. 
To fulfil l this trust, the teacher must be of good moral charac­
ter: to require less would jeopardize the future lives of our 
children.98 
Perry Weissman was a tenured teacher at Arvada Senior High School 
at the time of his dismissal. He had earned the reputation as an excel­
lent teacher and was noted for his exceptional rapport with students. 
This rapport, coupled with his use of innovative, nontraditional 
methods of teaching, caused friction between Weissman and his colleagues, 
including the administration of the school. He was assigned to a newly 
established program called School Within a School (SWS) which was pro­
jected to be a student-centered program. 
The SWS scheduled three field trips to Santa Fe and Taos, New 
Mexico, for students to study Indian and Spanish cultures and their 
influence on the Southwest United States. On the second of these field 
trips which began on October 6, 1972, Weissman was riding in the back 
seat of a Volkswagen van being driven by another adult chaperone, 
Mrs. Beck. During the journey, Weissman engaged in activities with 
several of the female students which included touching and tickling 
the girls on various parts of their bodies, including between the legs 
in proximity to the genital area. The girls also were involved in tick­
ling and touching Weissman. During the course of this conduct, the 
971bid., 160. 98Ibid. 
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conversation between Weissman and the girls was occasionally vulgar, 
suggestive in nature, and contained many sexual innuendoes. Similar 
behavior, although somewhat more subdued, occurred on the second day 
of the trip. The girls involved in the conduct in the van apologized 
to Mrs. Beck. Weissman expressed pride in his behavior and indicated 
that he would probably behave in the same way if tie were in a similar 
situation again. He referred to the behavior as good-natured horseplay 
which was a positive, educational experience. 
Several other incidents occurred on this field trip. Weissman 
and a female student spent some time alone in the van discussing her 
personal problems. On another occasion during the trip, he and one 
of the girls were seen lying on a bed watching television. 
When the group returned from the trip on October 9, Mrs. Beck and 
another female chaperone complained to the principal about Weissman's 
behavior. On October 17, the board of education decided to review the 
complaints. A hearing panel was convened to consider charges of neg­
lect of duty, insubordination, immorality, and other good and just 
cause. After extensive hearings, the panel members unanimously agreed 
that the charges of insubordination had not been proven. Two of the 
three members found that the physical touching combined with the vulgar 
language justified the charge of immorality. Similarly, these two mem­
bers also concluded that Weissman had neglected his duty to act morally 
and that the totality of his actions constituted other good and just 
cause for his dismissal. Although the third member dissented, he con­
ceded that Weissman lacked a sense of dignity and decorum in his 
behavior. 
135  
On February 6, 1973, the board of education heard further argument 
and statements from a number of individuals who urged the board to 
retain Weissman. The board concluded that the facts were sufficient 
to support the dismissal of Weissman on the grounds of neglect of duty, 
immorality, and other good and just cause. After the District Court 
of Jefferson County upheld the dismissal, Weissman appealed. 
Weissman v. Board of Education of Jefferson County School District 
99 No. R-9 was heard by the Supreme Court of Colorado. Weissman chal­
lenged the constitutionality of his dismissal for immorality on two 
basic issues: (1) that the term immorality was excessively vague, meant 
different things to different people, and subjected the teacher to the 
irrational and arbitrary whims of the school board members; and (2) 
the statute required no nexus between the conduct and the classroom 
teacher's effectiveness. 
The court began by addressing the nexus argument. In the opinion 
of the court, immorality, as used in the statutes, implied a standard 
that was directly related to the teacher's fitness for service. The 
opinion contained the following elaboration on this point: 
We do not believe that the legislature intended to potentially 
subject every teacher to discipline, even dismissal, for private 
peccadilloes or personal shortcomings that might come to the 
attention of the board of education, but yet have l ittle or no 
relation to the teacher's relationship with his students, his 
fellow teachers, or with the school community.100 
Although the court noted that the factors were not to be considered 
as exclusive given the wide variation of human conduct, i t utilized 
99547 P.2d 1267 (1976). 100Ibid., 1272. 
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the Morrison criteria to uphold Weissman's dismissal for immorality. 
The court further indicated: "In our view, whenever a male teacher 
engages in sexually provocative or exploitive conduct with his minor 
female students a strong presumption of unfitness arises against the 
teacher."101 
The vagueness argument was the next focus of the court's opinion. 
Having defined immorality as having a direct relation to the teacher's 
performance, the court ruled that the statute was not unduly vague and 
constituted a valid reason for dismissal. Finally, the court addressed 
Weissman's due process assertions which it found to be without merit. 
The final decision reversed the portion of the lower court's decision 
which required Weissman to pay a share of the costs of the panel hearing 
while it affirmed the decision which upheld Weissman's dismissal. 
Again, this court decision utilized the reasoning that there is 
the implication of unfitness inherent in provocative or sexually sug­
gestive conduct with students. Therefore, the board was not required 
to show that Weissman's conduct had had an adverse impact on his effec­
tiveness in the classroom. This case is also important because the 
statute which allowed dismissal for immorality was held to constitute 
a valid cause for dismissal of teachers charged with sexual misconduct 
with students. 
102 Carrao v. Board of Education, City of Chicago was the appeal 
of a circuit court decision which upheld the dismissal of Joseph Carrao 
for conduct unbecoming a teacher. The dismissal was based on charges 
101 Ibid., 1273. 102360 N.E.2d 536 (1977). 
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that Carrao had taken indecent liberties with a student from his school 
on June 30, 1974. The alleged incident took place on a trip to Min­
nesota . 
Joseph Carrao accompanied the Vandervieren family on a vacation. 
He drove a separate vehicle with a camp trailer attached. He resided 
in this camp trailer which was parked next to the cabin which the Vender-
vieren family had rented. On the night in question, eight-year-old 
Susan Vandervieren slept in Carrao's trailer. She stated that she 
awoke to find her sleeping bag unzipped, her pants down, and Carrao 
touching her private parts. Although she said that she was afraid to 
tell him to stop, she left the trailer and told her mother what had 
happened. Her mother told Carrao to leave the property. 
A week later, Ms. Vandervieren received a note from Carrao asking 
her to come to a local motel so that he could talk to her. She noti­
fied the sheriff who went to the motel, accused Carrao of child molesta­
tion, and told him to leave the county. The school board then learned 
of the incident and held a hearing to determine whether to dismiss 
Carrao. 
Although Carrao testified that the alleged misconduct had not 
occurred, Susan's mother testified at the hearing that she asked him 
how he could have done such a thing to her daughter. Carrao's response 
103 was: "I must have been dreaming." She also stated that she received 
a letter from Carrao which was mailed from Chicago immediately after 
the incident. The letter stated . . that he was sorry and that he 
1 0 3 Ib id . ,  539 .  
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hoped for the children's sake the whole thing was not a permanent 
104 scar." She continued her testimony to relate receiving the note 
asking her to meet him at the local motel. This note was accompanied 
by a bag of groceries and a carpet sweeper. The sheriff also testified 
that, when questioned about the accusations, Carrao responded: "I don't 
105 
know what got into me. I  know I should't have did [sic] it." 
Carrao testified on his own behalf and claimed that Susan was 
upset with him because he would not let her get into his sleeping bag. 
He had scolded her for attempting to do so and she left to return to 
the cabin. He denied taking indecent l iberties with Susan or any other 
child. Carrao also called several character witnesses. 
The hearing committee recommended Carrao's dismissal and the board 
concurred with this recommendation. Carrao appealed and the decision 
was affirmed by the trial court. 
Carrao appealed to the Appellate Court of Il l inois for review of 
the following issues: (1) whether he was denied due process; (2) whether 
the superintendent's attorney assisted and advised the hearing commit­
tee; (3) whether a member of that committee was biased and had prejudged 
the facts; (4) whether the committee submitted specific findings of 
fact; (5) whether the board's decision was against the weight of the 
evidence. The Cout found none of these contentions had merit and 
affirmed the circuit court's decision which upheld Carrao's dismissal. 
i  nfi 
Kilpatrick v. Wright was an action brought by Howard Kilpatrick 
under the civil rights statute of 1871 to challenge his dismissal on 
104Ibid. 105Ibid. 106437 F. Supp. 397 (1977). 
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the grounds that the Alabama statute allowing dismissal for immorality 
was unconstitutionally vague. Kilpatrick received a letter from the 
superintendent of the Montgomery County Board of Education on July 2, 
1976, which stated that he had been terminated effective immediately 
for immorality. 
A hearing was held at which the plaintiff was represented by coun­
sel. The board found that the evidence presented established that 
Kilpatrick was guilty of immorality during the 1975-76 school year. Fur­
ther, the board concluded: "That during the 1975-76 school year Mr. 
Kilparick [had] been guilty of highly unprofessional conduct in regard 
to his students, stemming from his actions, as proven by the oral testi­
mony presented to this Board and this furnishes good and just cause 
for his termination."^ 
Kilpatrick appealed to the Alabama Tenure Commission which upheld 
the dismissal based on the presence of sufficient evidence for his 
dismissal. He then filed this action to challenge the constitutional­
ity of the statute allowing his dismissal for immorality. 
On the issue of vagueness, the court found that the misconduct 
with which Kilparick was charged related to his fitness to discharge 
the duties required of him as a classroom teacher. Specifically, the 
Court concluded that ". . . the plaintiff 's activities are within the 
'hard core' of activities prohibited by section 358, thus making it 
unnecessary for the court to determine whether section 358 is unconsti-
108 tutionally vague at its outermost boundaries." 
1 0 7 Ib id . ,  398 .  1 0 8 Ib id . ,  400 .  
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The second prong of the plaintiff 's attack on the dismissal statute 
stemmed from the overbreadth doctrine which contends that . .a 
statute, which otherwise may be clear and precise, catches within its 
109 sweep conduct which is constitutionally protected." In its discussion 
of this issue, the court stated: 
It cannot be contended that the conduct for which plaintiff was 
discharged does not provide sufficient basis for his discharge. 
Making sexual advances towards female pupils, threatening a pupil 
with a loaded gun, and attempting to unzip a female pupil's pants 
in front of a class is conduct that not only cannot be condoned 
in the classroom setting, but also cannot be condoned in society 
in general. Instead, plaintiff contends that the unconstitutional­
ity of the act is found not in the act's relation to the activities 
of the plaintiff but in the activities which the act may reach. 
In other words, plaintiff is contending that the act is unconsti­
tutional on its face, not as applied. . . . This case is not one 
for application of the overbreadth doctrine.HO 
The court entered judgment for the defendant. 
The judgment in this case upheld the constitutionality of the 
state statute which allowed dismissal for immorality. Teachers who 
commit acts of misconduct which are clearly related to their fitness 
to perform their classroom duties may not prevail in a challenge of 
the statute for vagueness. Similarly, the overbreadth doctrine can not 
be util ized to provide protection for teachers who engage in miscon­
duct of this nature. 
I l l  Penn-Delco School District v. Urso was an appeal to the Common­
wealth Court of Pennsylvania to review the order of the Secretary of 
Education to reinstate Thomas Urso who was dismissed on grounds of 
immorality. The charges against Urso stemmed from two incidents that 
involved female students assigned to his classes. 
109Ibid. 110Ibid. niPa. Comwlth., 382 A.2d 162 (1978). 
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The first of these incidents occurred in March of 1975. Urso 
served as the faculty advisor to the school newspaper in addition to 
his teaching duties. He called the female student into the corridor 
and offered to spank her since it was her seventeenth birthday. The 
student assumed Urso was joking until she received a phone call later 
that same day from Urso in which he brought up the subject of spanking 
again. She became concerned that he was making a sexual overture and 
reported the incident to another teacher the following day. This teacher 
informed the principal who discussed the incident with the student. 
It was decided to ignore Urso's behavior and treat it as a joke. 
Over the next two weeks, Urso continued to seek out the student 
outside of the classroom and tried on two separate occasions to again 
discuss spanking with her. After the last of these two incidents, a 
conference was held with Urso, school administrators, and the student's 
parents. Urso claimed that his comments were intended to motivate the 
girl out of her shyness. He apologized to the parents and was warned 
by school administrators not to engage in similar conversations with 
students in the future. 
In December of 1976, a similar incident occurred which involved 
a fifteen-year-old female student in Urso's English Composition and 
Rhetoric class. The student was writing a note in class which Urso 
confiscated. She requested a conference after class for the purpose 
of getting the note returned. In the discussion on the appropriate 
punishment for her conduct, Urso suggested that she wear a dress to 
school as part of that punishment. He also brought up the subject of 
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spanking. Urso suggested that she come to his house after school so 
that this spanking could take place. He also had made a copy of the 
note which he said that he would send to the student's father if she 
did not comply with the punishment. The girl talked with her brother 
who urged her to report Urso's conduct to the school principal. 
As a result of her conference with the principal, a conference 
was held with Urso, school administrators, and the president of the 
school board. During this meeting, Urso admitted that he had had sexual 
fantasies about spanking girls for a number of years. 
On January 20, 1976, Urso was notified that he was being suspended 
with pay pending a hearing on charges of mental derangement and immo­
rality. At the hearing, evidence was presented to show that, prior 
to these two incidents, Urso had an exemplary record for all of his 
nine years of teaching in the district. At the conclusion of the hear­
ing, the charges of mental derangement were dropped. However, the 
school board voted to dismiss Urso on grounds of immorality. 
Urso appealed his dismissal to the Secretary of Education for the 
state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary defined immorality as "... a 
course of conduct that rises to the level of a grievous assault upon 
112  the mores of the community." This definition provided a more strin­
gent standard for judging immorality. The Secretary felt this was nec­
essary since Urso's conduct primarily involved speech which has consti­
tutional protection. After a hearing, the Secretary concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to support Urso's dismissal. 
1 1 2 Ib id . ,  167 .  
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The school district appealed this ruling. In its decision, the 
Commonwealth Court ruled that a more stringent standard for immorality 
was not called for since Urso's conduct was not protected by his First 
Amendment rights. Therefore, the use of that standard by the Secretary 
was improper. The court also found substantial evidence to support 
the board's finding of immorality. The court also concluded that the 
Secretary erred in holding that findings of fact and a statement of 
reasons must accompany a decision to dismiss a professional employee. 
The order of the Secretary of Education was vacated and the decision 
of the school board was reinstated. 
Although dismissals for immorality usually involve acts of miscon­
duct, this case clarifies that teachers may be dismissed for sexually 
provocative comments to students. Teachers do not have the right to 
make inappropriate comments to students and then invoke their constitu­
tionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech. Although in this case 
the speech was not followed by action, school officials can not afford 
to take the chance that inappropriate sexual conduct could occur. 
Marvin McKown was charged by the school board on June 28, 1977, 
with allegations that he had engaged in conduct of a sexual and romantic 
nature with two female students on nine separate occasions over a period 
of one year. Proper notice was provided and five separate hearings 
were conducted by the board. On September 13, 1977, the board voted 
individually and found that three of these charges involving Tracy had 
not been proved. The board voted that the other six charges involving 
Karyl had been proved and voted to dismiss McKown for immorality. 
144  
After reviewing the records of the hearings, the Secretary of 
Education concluded that Karyl's testimony was uncorroborated and 
appeared to have been influenced by Tracy's accusations. Karyl had 
testified at the hearing that on several occasions McKown had kissed 
and fondled her in the preparation room adjacent to the science class­
room. However, when initially questioned, she had denied any improper 
relationship with McKown. The same day she made allegations about the 
sexual intimacy with McKown. This pattern of denial and reversal hap­
pened again three days later. This inconsistency led the Secretary 
to the conclusion that the events alleged could not have occurred. 
McKown's dismissal was overturned and the Wissahickon School District 
113 appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. 
On the issue of Karyl's credibility, the court stated: "Because 
we conclude after a review of the entire testimony that a reasonable 
man acting reasonably might have relied on the student's testimony 
... vie must reverse the Secretary. Although the court agreed that 
review of the record could result in questions about Karyl's credibility, 
it was of the opinion that it was not within the Secretary's power to 
substitute her judgment for that of the board. Further, the court was 
at a loss to explain how the Secretary came to the conclusion that the 
alleged events could not have taken place. The court pointed out: 
"It is clear that only two individuals know what occurred on the dates 
in question and their testimony is in conflict. It was for the Board 
^Wissahickon School District v. McKown, Pa. Cmwlth., 400 A.2d 899 
(1979). 
1141bid., 900. 
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115 in weighing all the testimony to determine which version to accept." 
The court entered judgment in favor of the school district, vacated 
the order of the Secretary of Education, and reinstated the dismissal 
of McKown for immorality. 
When a school board conducts a hearing on charges leading to the 
dismissal of a teacher, it has the advantage of not only hearing 
the testimony of witnesses but also observing the demeanor of those 
individuals. Outside agencies or individuals do not have this advan­
tage and err when they seek to substitute their own judgment for that 
of the board. As this case shows, the courts will not uphold these 
decisions. 
When Richard Ricci's dismissal for immorality was upheld by the 
Arapahoe County District Court, he fi led suit against the members of 
116 the school board individually and as members of the board. On 
August 22, 1977, written charges were fi led against Ricci with the 
school board: "You, Richard Ricci, are charged with engaging in 
improper and/or unprofessional conduct with females who are or were, 
at the time of the incidents, students at Hinkley High School, which 
conduct constitutes immoralitiy or other good and just cause for your 
dismissal."1*'7 At the time the charges were fi led, the board had 
received signed, notarized statements from four female students who 
alleged that Ricci had engaged in acts of sexual misconduct with them, 
specifically hugging, kissing, and other inappropriate touching. 
115Ibid., 901. 116Ricci v.Davis, Colo., 627 P.2d 1111 (1981). 
1171b i  d., 114. 
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A teacher tenure hearing was held at Ricci's request on Septem­
ber 16-21. A f ifth female student testified at the hearing as to Ricci's 
misconduct with her. The panel issued findings of fact and recommended 
that Ricci be dismissed. 
After the dismissal was affirmed in district court, Ricci fi led 
this appeal. He challenged his dismissal on several grounds. He argued 
that the board's review of portions of the hearing transcript tainted 
its ultimate findings of fact and that the findings of fact by both 
the board and the teacher tenure panel were unsupported by substantial 
evidence. He also alleged that the statements of the four original 
students comprised extra-record evidence which the board could not con­
sider constitutionally before entering its order of dismissal. 
Finally, he argued that dismissal for other good and just cause was 
unconstitutionally vague and thus, since the panel denied his motions 
for a more definite statement and to permit discovery, he had been denied 
due process of law. The court did not consider the last two issues 
since it had ruled that there was sufficient evidence to dismiss for 
the charge of immorality alone. Therefore, the court affirmed the 
decision to dismiss Ricci. 
1 I Q 
Lang v. Lee involved alleged homosexual misconduct with minors 
by James Dean Lang. Lang received notice that he was charged with 
immoral conduct and that a hearing would be held to determine if he 
should be terminated as a permanent teacher with the South Callaway 
School District. The charges specified that in March and April of 
1 1 8 639  S .W.2d  111  (Mo.  App .1982) .  
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1980, Lang had taken "... indecent and immoral l iberties with a 
13-year-old male by showing him pornographic magazines and movies and 
119 by placing his hands on the boy's genital area." The charges also 
specified that Lang had taken liberties with at least four other minor 
males. 
At the beginning of the hearing on August 15, 1980, Lang's attorney 
requested a continuance of one week to allow the resolution of a pending 
criminal case against Lang. He stated that Lang could not testify 
before the board without that testimony being used against him in the 
criminal proceeding. When the board refused to allow the continuance, 
the attorney produced a letter from Lang. Although the attorney said 
that he was authorized to say that the letter was Lang's resignation, 
the letter did not actually state that Lang was resigning. The board 
refused to accept the resignation. 
During the hearing, testimony was heard from two police officers 
and their investigative report was entered into evidence. The evidence 
presented indicated that the alleged misconduct with the thirteen-
year-old boy had occurred on two separate occasions. In Lang's volun­
tary statement to the police which was part of the report, Lang admitted 
to the incidents with this young man as well as to incidents with four 
other boys, ages fourteen to eighteen, between 1971 and 1980. Each 
of these four relationships lasted for periods of several months. The 
board voted to terminate Lang's contract and this decision was upheld 
by the Circuit Court of Callaway County. 
1 1 9 Ib id . ,  112 .  
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On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Lang contended that 
the action of the board should be reversed because "... (1) the Board 
failed to grant a continuance because a criminal case was pending 
against him at that time; (2) the Board received hearsay evidence; and 
120 (3) the Board's attorney improperly influenced rulings by the Board." 
The Court disagreed with.the contention that the hearing should have been 
postponed due to the pending criminal proceeding: 
In this case the School Board was dealing with a teacher who 
obviously had contact daily with young people. The strong interest 
which the Board had in determining whether or not a teacher was 
guilty of immoral conduct naturally motivated the Board to try 
to dispose of Lang's case as expeditiously as possible.121 
In their consideration of Lang's contention that the board had 
considered hearsay evidence, the court ruled that since Lang had 
admitted to the conduct contained in the statement given by the thirteen-
year-old boy that it could not be considered as impermissible evidence. 
The court also ruled against Lang's contention that the board's attorney 
had improperly participated in the board's ruling since both attorneys 
had the opportunity to express their views at the hearing. Lang's dis­
missal was affirmed. 
Verl Potter, a fourth grade teacher at Kalama Elementary School, 
was discharged for inappropriate physical behavior toward female stu­
dents in his class. During the fall of 1978, Potter placed his hand 
on the knee of one of his female students in a caressing manner. This 
incident came to the attention of the principal who confronted Potter. 
The principal made it clear that this type of conduct was inappropriate. 
1 2 0 Ib id .  1 2 1  Ib id . ,  114 .  
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Potter indicated that he would try to be sure that it did not happen 
again. 
On June 6, 1979, Potter blew a kiss to another female student who 
reported the incident to her mother. When this incident was brought 
to the attention of the principal, Potter received a letter from the 
superintendent informing him that he had been placed on probation for 
the following year. The leter also contained the warning that any 
similar incidents could result in more severe disciplinary action includ­
ing discharge. 
On February 27, 1980, Potter l ifted the dress of another girl in 
his class allegedly to examine a bruise on her knee. When the incident 
was brought to the attention of the principal, he and the superintendent 
initiated an investigation and discovered that the teacher's inappropri­
ate conduct with the girls assigned to his class had occurred regularly. 
Potter was discharged. 
A hearing officer heard Potter's initial appeal. During the hear­
ing, it was revealed that the touching involved the teacher placing 
his hand on the girls' legs and rubbing them in a caressing manner. 
The girl, who was involved in the incident in which Potter l ifted her 
dress, indicated that the dress was only raised an inch or two because 
she had prevented it form being raised further. She also indicated 
that the bruise could have been examined without l ifting the dress at 
all. The principal and the superintendent provided testimony concern­
ing the reaction from both the parents of the students involved and 
the community in general. The hearing officer ruled that the teacher's 
conduct was sufficient cause for his discharge. 
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After this decision was affirmed by the Superior Court in Cowlitz 
122 County, Potter appealed to the Court of Appeals of Washington. 
Potter argued that his discharge was improper because his conduct fell 
within the statute which governed correction of remedial teaching defi­
ciencies. The court stated: 
. . . the undisputed facts here overwhelmingly suffice as cause 
for discharge. The fourth grade girls were justifiably bothered, 
their parents had reacted negatively and community sentiment was 
similar and strongly felt. The conduct was ongoing. The teacher 
was warned and later placed on probation but persisted in his 
behavior with no sign of improvement. We perceive no right of 
any teacher which may be chilled by discharge for conduct of this 
nature after the apparent failure of progressive discipl ine.123 
Ruling on Potter's assertion that his discharge was based on 
remediable teaching deficiencies, the court concluded: "There is an 
obvious distinction between conduct which is involved with the profes­
sional qualities of teaching . . . and conduct of the kind involved 
here. There was no legitimate professional purpose in this teacher's 
124 physical contact with his female students." The court held that 
the teacher's dismissal was for sufficient cause and that the statute 
governing dismissal for deficiencies that could be remediated did not 
apply. 
Inappropriate conduct with students cannot be considered as a 
remediable deficiency. The school board in this case had met with the 
teacher for the purpose of preventing further incidents with his stu­
dents. In spite of the warnings from his superiors, the behavior con­
tinued. School boards are justified in the dismissal of teachers who 
*^Potter v. Kalama Public School District, No. 402, 644 P.2d 1229 
(1982). 
1 2 3 Ib id . ,  1231 .  1 2 4 ib id .  
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engage in inappropriate conduct. The courts do not require a showing 
that attempts have been made to remediate the problem since it does 
not involve professional teaching responsibilities. 
Robert Ross was dismissed from his teaching position for immoral­
ity following a public hearing which was held on January 10 and 12, 1980. 
Seven charges were fi led against the teacher: (1) The teacher per­
mitted the only female student in his carpentry class to be harassed 
by male students with questions of how much money she would take for 
sexual favors. Out of exasperation, the girl responded that she would 
take one hundred and fifty dollars. The teacher pulled two one hundred 
dollar bills out of his pocket and placed them on the desk in front 
of the girl. (2) The teacher had grabbed the girl, hugged her, put 
his arm around her, and pinched her when they were alone on a job site. 
(3) The teacher permitted a nude centerfold from Playboy magazine to 
be posted on the classroom wall in full view of the students. (4) The 
teacher had permitted the male students to subject the female student 
to sexual harassment. (5) Male students had given the female student 
a plastic substance in the form of a phallus, which was also displayed 
in a sexually suggestive manner by one of the males. The teacher 
allegedly displayed the object to fellow teachers and joked about the 
incident. (6) The female student was interrogated by a male student 
about her sexual experience. The male student further refused to plug 
in a heater unless she performed a sexual act with him. This incident 
supposedly occurred while the teacher was within hearing range of the 
students. (7) The teacher did not reprimand students for bringing a 
152  
pornographic audiotape to the classroom and playing it in the presence 
125 of the female student. 
The Randolph County Circuit Court reinstated Ross and the school 
1 
board appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals. Although the court 
ruled that there was no question that the board's finding was supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, the case was transferred to the 
127 Supreme Court of Missouri because Ross had raised and preserved his 
constitutional attack on the validity of the statute allowing his dis­
missal for immorality. 
After a brief discussion of the facts of the case, the court turned 
its attention to Ross's constitutional challenge: ". . . that the 
phrase 'immoral conduct' is impermissibly vague and denies him due 
process. He argues that the phrase fails to provide a standard against 
which conduct can be judged and thus fails to give a person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what acts are prohib-
128 ited." Using the judicial definition provided in Thompson v. South-
log 
west School District of immoral conduct as "conduct rendering plain-
130 tiff unfit to teach," the court was persuaded to deny Ross's consti­
tutional challenge of the statute. It concluded: 
The Board was within its discretion in determining that Ross's 
conduct rendered him unfit to teach; tacit encouragement and demon­
strated tolerance of explicit and grotesque sexual harassment 
125Ross V. Robb, 651 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. App. 1983). 126Ibid., 680. 
127ROSS V. Robb, 662 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. banc 1983). 128Ibid., 259. 
129483 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D.Mo. 1980). 130Ibi'd., 1181. 
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constitutes statutorily proscribed "immoral conduct." The Board 
reached this determination after it afforded petitioner a fair 
trial.131 
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with the direction 
to reinstate the decision of the board of education dismissing Ross 
from his teaching position. 
Although Ross had engaged in limited inappropriate conduct himself, 
he had condoned inappropriate conduct on the part of the male students 
in his class. Therefore, Ross was considered unfit to teach. The court 
made it clear that tolerance of sexual harassment constituted immoral 
conduct on the part of the teacher. A teacher has the responsibility 
not only to exhibit appropriate conduct but also to enforce expectations 
of appropriate conduct in the classroom. Failure to do so can lead 
to dismissal for immorality which will be upheld in court. 
Lewis Rosenberg was dismissed from his teaching position for immo­
rality and other good and just cause for incidents involving a twelve-
year-old male student. The student, who had a history of chronic emo­
tional problems, was enrolled in Rosenberg's class for students with 
behavioral problems. 
On May 23, 1980, Rosenberg allowed this student to caress his face 
while Rosenberg engaged in a rocking motion. The student also embraced 
and kissed Rosenberg on the face and lips. Rosenberg then hugged and 
kissed the student whose face was flushed. 
On May 28, Rosenberg and the student left the field day activ­
ities, returned to the school building, entered Rosenberg's classroom 
1 3 1 Ross ,  260.  
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and locked the door. The student sat on Rosenberg's lap for approxi­
mately thirty minutes during which both engaged in short kisses and 
a slight rocking motion. The physical contact ended when the princi­
pal's assistant unlocked the door and entered the room. 
Following a hearing, charges were fi led against Rosenberg on 
June 13, 1980, alleging immorality and other good and just cause for 
dismissal. The hearing officer had concluded that this conduct repre­
sented an abuse of Rosenberg's position as a teacher and had a detrimen­
tal effect upon the student. 
132 Rosenberg appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals and then 
133 to the Supreme Court of Colorado. In both appeals, Rosenberg's conten­
tions were the same. He argued that the hearing officer had abused 
his discretion (1) by refusing to allow Rosenberg to take written depo­
sitions from twelve witnesses; (2) by refusing to allow Rosenberg to 
take a written deposition from the student involved in the incidents; 
and (3) by refusing to allow a continuance of the hearing pending the 
outcome of parallel criminal proceedings. Both courts affirmed the 
decision of the school board to dismiss Rosenberg. 
134 Shipley v. Salem School District was an appeal of an order from 
the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board which reversed the school district's 
dismissal of Richard Shipley. At issue was whether the notice Shipley 
132 Rosenberg v. Board of Education of School District No. 1, 
Denver Public Schools, 677 P.2d 348 (Colo. App. 1983). 
133 Rosenberg v. Board of Education of School Disrict No. 1, 
Denver Public Schools, 710 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1985). 
1 3 4 669 P.2d 1172 (Or.  App.  1983) ' .  
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received from the school board provided sufficient facts to substan­
tiate his dismissal as a middle school teacher. 
The decision to dismiss Shipley stemmed from a civil action filed 
against him. This complaint alleged that Shipley had assaulted and 
battered a twelve-year-old child on twelve occasions during a five 
month period in 1978. Eleven of these incidents involved Shipley's 
touching the boy's genitals or forcing the boy to touch Shipley's geni­
tals. In the remaining incident, Shipley allegedly placed his hands 
under the boy's clothing and rubbed his body. On October 2, 1981, 
Shipley was found guilty by a trial jury and was ordered to pay $3850 
in damages. 
Shipley then received a written notice informing him that the 
superintendent intended to recommend his dismissal on the grounds of 
immorality and gross unfitness. Attached to the notice was a copy of 
the civil complaint against Shipley. After a hearing, the board dis­
missed Shipley from his teaching position. 
Shipley appealed to the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board alleging that 
his dismissal should be reversed because the notice did not inform him 
of facts sufficient to support the statutory grounds cited by the school 
board for his dismissal. The board stated: "We take it a plain, concise 
statement means statements of charges with sufficient clarity as to 
give notice to the teacher of what he has been charged with and how 
those charges relate to his duties and responsibilities as a teacher 
135 in the district." Shipley's dismissal was reversed and he was to be 
reinstated to his teaching position. The school district filed an appeal. 
1351bid., 1173. 
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The Court of Appeals of Oregon concluded that the Fair Dismissal 
Appeals Board was in error in finding that the notice was insufficient 
under Oregon state statutes. It stated: 
We conclude that the notice is sufficient to inform respon­
dent of the allegations and charges so that he could prepare an 
adequate defense. The notice informed him of the acts consti­
tuting "gross unfitness" and "immorality": 12 instances of 
battery, 11 of which involved offensive sexual contact, with a 
student in the district where respondent taught, who was the same 
approximate age as respondent's students. Although the notice 
did not expressly set out the connection between respondent's acts 
and his teaching responsibilities, we conclude that the nexus may 
obviously be inferred.136 
The court concluded that the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board erred in 
reversing the dismissal and ordering Shipley's reinstatement. The case 
was reversed and remanded. 
Again, the court has upheld the dismissal of a teacher for sexual 
misconduct with a minor. Even though the boy was not a student of 
Shipley's, the court found the misconduct was indicative of unfitness 
to teach because the boy was of the same age as students in Shipley's 
classes. Therefore, a teacher's misconduct with any minor can lead 
to a dismissal for immorality which will be supported in the judicial 
system. 
Jerrell Clark was a drama teacher at Community High School, a non-
traditional school designed to provide an individualized educational 
program for each of its students. Emphasis was placed on developing 
close contact between teachers and students. However, in the opinion 
of the school board of the Ann Arbor School District, Miss Clark took 
this philosophy to the extreme. 
136Ibid., 1175. 
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In the spring of 1975, the principal had warned Miss Clark about 
inappropriate conduct with male students. Although she denied any impro­
priety, the principal advised her that such conduct could lead to her 
dismissal. In addition, he further cautioned her that she should avoid 
not only impropriety but also any appearance of impropriety. 
In the fall of 1977, her former principal, who was now the deputy 
superintendent of the school district, was made aware of further impro­
priety on the part of Miss Clark. A parent expressed his concern about 
Miss Clark's relationship with his seventeen-year-old son, Rob, who 
was a student in her class. 
Investigation of the complaint was begun immediately. Several 
incidents led to the decision to dismiss Miss Clark. In June of 1977, 
Rob's younger brother (Seth) and his friend (Willard) decided to sneak 
into Rob's room in the basement to see if . . they could catch him 
117 doing something." Seth testified that when he entered the room he 
saw Miss Clark and Rob kissing on Rob's mattress on the floor. Willard, 
who had entered Rob's room ahead of Seth, provided a more detailed 
account. He stated that Miss Clark was lying on top of Rob and that 
they were kissing. He also stated that although Rob was partly covered 
by his sleeping bag, his chest was bare. Rob later admitted in his 
testimony at the hearing that he was naked under the sleeping bag. 
However, he denied that they had been kissing. 
Also in June, a building contractor had gone to Rob's room to see 
if Rob wanted to do some work for him. When he arrived at 7:30 in the 
*^Clark v. Ann Arbor School District, 344 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. App. 
1983). 
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morning for that purpose, he saw Miss Clark leaning against Rob on the 
mattress on the floor. 
Miss Clark admitted that she had spent the night in Rob's room. 
According to her testimony, Rob and Polly, another student, had been 
at Miss Clark's home one evening to celebrate Polly's birthday. She 
had driven Polly home first and then took Rob to his home. Her car 
would not start when she was leaving Rob's house. Afraid to walk the 
two miles to her house because Rob's house was in a bad neighborhood, 
she went back to Rob's room. Rob gave her a back massage and she fell 
asleep. 
She also admitted that she had been in Rob's room on several occa­
sions during the summer of 1977. The couple had also taken a two week 
trip with another student during the summer. 
After reviewing all the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
school board voted to dismiss Miss Clark. On appeal, the tenure commis­
sion found that Miss Clark's actions dislayed a total disregard for her 
responsibilities even though it found no evidence to substantiate any 
sexual misconduct. Having found just and reasonable cause for the dis­
missal, the commission affirmed the board's decision. Miss Clark 
appealed to the Ingham Circuit Court which reversed the dismissal 
because school officials had not shown evidence of any adverse effects 
on Miss Clark's performance as a teacher. 
138 
The school district appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. 
After reviewing the Morrison and Stubblefield decisions, the court 
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quoted the Stubblefield court: "It would seem that, as a minimum, 
responsible conduct upon the part of a teacher, even at the college 
139 level, excludes meretricious relationships with his students." 
Based on this rationale, the court concluded that the tenure commission's 
determination that Miss Clark had participated in an unprofessional 
relationship with a student and its decision that these actions were 
just and reasonable cause for her dismissal were supported by substan­
tial evidence. Therefore, it reversed the circuit court decision, and 
affirmed the decision of the tenure commission which upheld the dismis­
sal of Miss Clark. 
Katz v. Ambach1^ was an appeal to the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York by Mark Katz. He sought review of the judg­
ment of the Supreme Court, Special Term in Albany County which dismissed 
his application to annul the order of the Commissioner of Education 
that terminated his employment with the Community School District No. 18 
in Brooklyn, New York. Katz's termination was the result of improper 
conduct with female students in his sixth grade classroom. Katz 
admitted that he had hugged and kissed girls in his class and had also 
given them a "pat on the behind. In addition, he admitted that 
he had allowed obscene jokes and profanity to be spoken in the class­
room. 
The Commissioner of Education had found Katz's conduct to be 
". . . intolerable behavior on the part of a teacher, unbecoming a 
142 teacher, and warranted a finding that he was unfit to teach." His 
139Stubblefield, 318. 140472 N.Y.S.2d 492 (A.D.3 Dept. 1984). 
141Ibid., 493. 142 ibid. 
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petition to annul was denied by Special Term, Supreme Court of New York. 
The court found that the Commissioner's order was supported by the 
record. Further, it did not agree with Katz's contention that the 
penalty of dismissal from his employment was disproportionate to the 
offense. 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed 
the decision of the lower court. The court concluded: 
Notwithstanding the fact that the testimony of four pupil 
witnesses who complained of sexual offenses might very well have 
been inconsistent and uncorroborated, those acts and patterns of 
classroom demeanor to which petitioner admitted, standing alone, 
constitute more than sufficient evidence to sustain the commis­
sioner's determination that petitioner was unfit to teach. . . . 
We do not find the penalty of dismissal to be "shocking to one's 
sense of fairness" or to the conscience of the court . .. in view 
of the potentially harmful effect upon the young minds entrusted 
to a teacher's care.143 
Finally, the court found Katz's claim that he was deprived of due process 
because of the lack of adequate notice of the charges against him to 
be without merit. 
An Iowa case, Libe v. Board of Education of Twin Cedars Community 
School District,challenged the use of polygraph results as evidence 
in the school board's hearing to terminate Frank Li be1s contract. The 
superintendent recommended Libe's termination for the following reasons: 
(1) engaging in a sexual relationship with a female student; (2) kissing and 
petting with the student in a parked car while giving her rides home 
from school events; (3) writing unprofessional and inappropriate let­
ters to the student and dropping them in her lap during class. Poly­
graph evidence which indicated that the student was truthful when she 
143Ibid., 494. 144350 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa App. 1984). 
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stated that she had sexual intercourse with Libe was entered into evi­
dence at the school board hearing. 
The introduction and consideration of this evidence provided the 
basis of Libe's subsequent appeal to the District Court of Marion County 
which affirmed the dismissal and to the Court of Appeals of Iowa which 
also upheld the termination of Libe's contract. Noting that school 
boards were not as restricted in receiving evidence as were the courts 
of law, the Court of Appeals found that Libe's hearing was not unduly 
prejudiced by the introduction of the polygraph evidence. 
Libe also alleged that his dismissal was not supported by competent, 
credible evidence. Stating that the school board was in a better posi­
tion to judge the question of credibility, the court denied this 
allegation: 
Plaintiff 's [Libe's] explanation of this theory as to complainant's 
[student's] motivation to l ie, though rather ingenious, is nothing 
more than sheer speculation. Plaintiff gives us no good reason 
for rejecting the board's conclusion that complainant testimony 
was credible and we find none.145 
Therefore, the court concluded that Libe's termination was supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence and affirmed the district court's 
decision to uphold the termination of his contract. 
Braddock v. School Board of Nassau County^ involved the dismissal 
of Donald Braddock, a tenured teacher and coach at Fernandina Beach High 
School. The decision to dismiss Braddock was based on three incidents 
of alleged misconduct. (1) On March 11, 1983, Braddock met and spent 
time with a minor female student at 2:00 a.m. 2) During the 1983 
145Ibid., 750. 146455 So.2d 394 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1984). 
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spring track season, Braddock left the same female student at a con­
venience store, transported other students to their homes, and returned 
alone to transport the female to her home. (3) On April 27, 1983, 
Braddock and the student spent the afternoon alone at Fernandina Beach. 
Although it was established at the hearing that the student was 
infatuated with Braddock, no evidence of sexual misconduct was pre­
sented. The school board decided to dismiss Braddock based on its 
finding that his conduct . . represented not only poor judgment 
. . . but such conduct and behavior was [sic] so serious as to impair 
147 his effectiveness as a teacher in the Nassau County School system." 
Braddock appealed the dismissal to the District Court of Appeal 
of Florida alleging that the dismissal was not supported by competent 
or substantial evidence. The court concluded: "While we must agree 
that this teacher's conduct demonstrated poor judgment on his part, 
the Board made no finding that Braddock's effectiveness with the school 
system had been impaired by virtue of the three incidents with which 
148 he was charged." Braddock's dismissal was reversed. 
Again, a court has held that, without direct evidence of sexual 
misconduct, the school officials are required to show that the teach­
er's inappropriate conduct had an adverse impact on his effectiveness 
to perform the duties of the job. Absent such a finding, the dismissal 
will not be upheld. 
On February 20, 1976, Prince Lewis placed one of his fifth grade 
female students in the hall to take a make-up test. While taking the 
1 4 7 Ibid. ,  395.  1 4 8 Ibid. ,  396.  
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test, the girl was approached by Lewis who placed his hand on the inner 
part of her upper thigh and made a rubbing motion. On the verge of 
hysteria, the child ran to the office and reported the incident. An 
investigation was begun immediately. During this investigation the 
superintendent received complaints from the parents of other female 
students in Lewis' class. In each complaint, Lewis was alleged to have 
placed his hands on or near the genital area of the child. During the 
tenure hearing which followed the investigation, testimony indicated 
that these young girls were either ashamed or scared to report the 
incidents to their mothers immediately after they happened. 
After the school board found Lewis guilty of the charges and voted 
to dismiss him from his position, Lewis appealed to district court which 
149 
upheld the dismissal. His appeal to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana 
resulted in the ruling that the teacher had not been denied his due 
process rights. However, the case was reversed and remanded to the 
district court to allow Lewis to present additional evidence. 
After hearing evidence from two psychologists and a polygraph 
examiner, the district court again upheld the dismissal. Lewis appealed 
150 once more to the Court of Appeal. After review of the additional 
evidence, the court held: " [T]he totality of evidence in this case 
does not merit that the decision of the School Board be reversed. That 
decision does not cease to be based on substantial evidence. It has 
151 not been found to be arbitrary, or capricious and is affirmed." 
1 4Q 
Lewis v. East Feliciana Parish School Baord, 372 So.2d 649 
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1979). 
^^Lewis v. East Feliciana Parish School Baord, 452 So.2d 1275 
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). 
151 Ibid., 1280. 
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Theodore Fisher, an elementary school principal in Minnesota, was 
dismissed on charges that he had sexually molested a male student 
twelve to sixteen years prior to that dismissal. Olson was in the 
second grade in 1967 when a pattern developed in which he was called 
to the office once or twice a month for visits that included sexual 
contact with Fish'.r. These visits continued until 1971 when Olson's 
family moved from the district. 
Olson mentioned these incidents to a counselor in 1983 who urged 
him to report the incidents to the local police department. He then 
met with the superintendent and provided a copy of the written state­
ment he had made to the police. 
After an investigation, the superintendent called Fisher to inform 
him of the charges for dismissal. Fisher met with the superintendent 
and offered to resign without admitting guilt. The superintendent pre­
sented the resignation to the school board which voted unanimously to 
reject the resignation. The board then adopted a resolution to dismiss 
Fisher from his position. 
Fisher requested a hearing. The two issues which were in dispute 
were whether the privacy required for such acts was physically possible 
and whether the frequency of the visits was possible without attracting 
the attention of others in the school. Testimony, including Olson's 
detailed description of Fisher's office, established that private visits 
were not impossible as Fisher claimed. On the second issue, witnesses 
generally admitted that recall was difficult due to the time which had 
elapsed since the alleged incidents. The hearing officer upheld the 
dismissal and Fisher appealed. 
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In Fisher v. Independent School District No. 622, the Court 
of Appeals of Minnesota was asked to rule on two questions: (1) Was 
the board's dismissal of Fisher for immoral conduct and conduct unbecom­
ing a teacher supported by substantial evidence? (2) Did the remoteness 
of the charges against Fisher result in a denial of due process? The 
court found that the record contained competent and substantial evidence 
to support the school board's decision to dismiss Fisher. 
In addressing the second question, the court relied on the Morrison 
decision. One of the factors used in that case to determine whether 
the conduct indicated unfitness to teach was the proximity or remote­
ness in time of the conduct. The court held: "In the terms employed 
in Morrison, the adverse effect upon students and the degree of that 
153 adverse effect easily outweigh the remoteness of the conduct charged." 
Further, the court stated: "By virtue of the nature of the offense 
. . .  i t  m a y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  d o u b t f u l  w h e t h e r  s u c h  c o n d u c t  c o u l d  e v e r  
154 be too remote in time." Although Fisher argued that he was preju­
diced by the remoteness of the incident because of the loss of relevant 
evidence when teachers who testified could not recall the frequency 
of Olson's visits to Fisher's office, the court did not find this to 
constitute a deprivation of due process. The court stated: "The 
sexual contact alleged here occurred in the private confines of the 
principal's office. It was not l ikely to produce any corroborating 
155 evidence nor is any required." Therefore, the court affirmed Fisher's 
dismissal. 
152357 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. App. 1984). 153Ibid., 156. 
154Ibid. 155Ibid. 
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This case should be of interest to school officials because this 
court has held that there is virtually no statute of limitations on 
this type of dismissal due to the seriousness of the charges of sexual 
misconduct. No other case in this study has addressed this issue. 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that other courts would use this case 
as a precedent. However, school officials should consider the serious­
ness of the offense as opposed to the time that has elapsed since the 
incident in dismissal decisions. 
Henry T. Mondragon was dismissed from his position as an elementary 
school teacher as a result of charges that he had engaged in sexual 
relations with a female student. In May, 1981, the student informed 
a church youth counselor that she had engaged in a sexual relationship 
with Mondragon from the summer of 1977 until October 31, 1979. Crim­
inal charges resulted from a police investigation but were subsequently 
dismissed due to the applicable statute of limitations. On November 9, 
1981, the school board voted to accept the superintendent's recommen­
dation to dismiss Mondragon on the grounds of immorality and neglect 
of duty. A hearing was held in April, 1982, after which the hearing 
officer presented his findings of fact and recommendations to the school 
board. On June 14, 1982, the board voted to adopt the recommendations 
and to dismiss Mondragon. 
Mondragon sought relief by appealing his dismissal to the Colorado 
156 Court of Appeals. The first issue argued involved the hypnosis of 
the student as part of the criminal investigation. Mondragon contended 
1E^Mondragon v. Poudre School Distrit R-l, 696 P.2d 831 (Colo. 
App. 1984). 
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that the hypnosis rendered the student incompetent to testify. Since 
only pre-hypnotic evidence was heard by the hearing officer, the court 
ruled that the student was competent to testify. The court also found 
Mondragon's contention that, as a result of the hypnosis, the student 
was not available for cross-examination to be without merit. 
Mondragon further contended that the evidence presented by a 
number of witnesses to corroborate the student's testimony was hearsay. 
At issue was the fact that the student had made the statements about 
the relationship to these individuals prior to the hypnosis. Mondragon 
claimed this evidence was hearsay and, therefore, not admissible. In 
disagreeing with this argument, the court stated: "In a hearing of 
this nature, the rules of evidence are somewhat relaxed and hearsay 
testimony may be allowed. Reversal is proper only if otherwise inad­
missible hearsay is the sole evidence relied on by the finder of 
fact."157 
Mondragon's final argument was that the hearing officer was 
required to report all the facts to the school board. Citing their 
Thompson15^ decision, the court disagreed: 
In Thompson, we held that the hearing officer's role is to 
make findings of basic or evidentiary facts upon which the school 
board is to base its findings of ultimate fact. The hearing 
officer has the power to receive and weigh conflicting evidence, 
assess credibility, and draw factual inferences. ... To require 
that the findings present all the evidence contained in the record 
would subvert the role of the hearing officer.*59 
157Ibid., 834. 
15®Thompson v. Board of Education, 668 P.2d 954 (1983). 
1 £>9 
Mondragon, 835. 
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The court concluded that the findings of fact in this case were sup­
ported by the evidence. 
Similarly, two other arguments offered by Mondragon were dismissed 
by the court. These arguments involved statements made by the school 
board attorney and a letter entered into evidence which contained a 
statement of the results of a polygraph examination conducted on Mon­
dragon as part of the criminal investigation. The court did not find 
either of these issues to be prejudicial to Mondragon's case. The order 
to dismiss Mondragon was affirmed. 
Two facts from this case are of interest to school officials: 
(1) Hearsay evidence may be utilized in dismissal hearings as long as 
the sole basis for dismissal does not rest on that evidence. (2) The 
role of the hearing officer was clarified to include weighing evidence 
and drawing factual conclusions without being required to present all 
the evidence in the record in his decision. 
Saxby v. Bibb County Boad of Education160 was the appeal of the 
dismissal of Robert Saxby who was employed as an athletic coach. Saxby 
was notified on March 22, 1983, that the superintendent was going to 
recommend disciplinary charges against him. The letter specified: 
The ground for my recommendation is that you have engaged in 
immoral conduct with [a 14-year-old female student]. The basis 
for this charge is that on January 25, 1983, you carried [the stu­
dent] to your apartment . . . where you had sexual relations with 
her. Also, on February 14, 1983, you made arrangements to again 
take [the student] to the . . . Apartments.1^1 
After a full hearing, the Bibb County Board of Education concluded 
that it did not find sufficient evidence to support the specific charge 
160327 S.E.2d 494 (Ga. App. 1985). 161Ibid., 495. 
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of sexual misconduct. Instead, the board voted to dismiss based on 
charges of willful neglect of duty, unspecified immoral conduct, and 
other good and sufficient cause. 
On appeal to the state board of education, Saxby asserted that 
he had received insufficient notice of the charges and that there was 
insufficient evidence to dismiss him on the grounds stated by the school 
board. The fi le was submitted to a hearing officer who examined the 
evidence in great detail. "The hearing officer concluded that the 
local board properly concluded that there was no sufficient evidence 
of sexual conduct as charged, but he also concluded there was no evi­
dence of willful neglect or other evidence of immorality other than 
1 Pi? 
ttvat that the local board found insufficient." Adopting the findings 
of its hearing officer, the state board reversed Saxby's dismissal. 
The school board appealed to the Superior Court of Bibb County 
which reversed the decision of the state board and reinstated Saxby's 
dismissal. When Saxby appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals 
of Georgia, i t ruled that (1) the teacher was given inadequate notice 
of the charges of willful neglect and other good and sufficient cause; 
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of immorality 
as grounds for Saxby's dismissal; and (3) by determining that the evi­
dence was insufficient to support the charges of sexual misconduct, 
the board of education precluded the consideration of that evidence to 
determine whether the evidence supported their finding of unspecified 
immoral conduct. 
162Ibid., 496. 1631bid., 494. 
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Board of Education of Tonica Community High School District No. 360 
v. Sickley1^ was another case in which the court ruled that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a counselor's dismissal for immoral­
ity. The charges against Sickley were based on the allegations by a ten-
year-old girl. 
Audrey had been referred to Sickley in October of 1981 because she 
was failing most of her subjects and her parents had failed to respond 
to notices from the school. During the counseling sessions, Sickley 
allowed Audrey to sit on his knee while they talked. When she began 
to cry on one occasion, he stroked her back and allowed her to put her 
arms around his neck. On another occasion, she complained about a lump 
on her hip which Sickley felt with his hand. 
Shortly after the last counseling session with Sickley, Audrey told 
her parents about her relationship with him. They contacted the police. 
Sickley was charged with taking indecent liberties with a child. Final 
disposition of these charges was not reported in the court decision 
1 
of the Appellate Court of Il l inois. 
Sickley was immediately suspended from his job. The Board of Edu­
cation subsequently voted to dismiss Sickley on three charges: (1) he 
acted immorally by taking indecent liberties with a student by lewdly 
fondling and touching her; (2) he had acted unprofessionally by util iz­
ing improper counseling techniques which were detrimental to the stu­
dents of the school; (3) he had acted in a manner which was not in 
the best interest of the school district in that his immoral and 
164479 N.E.2d 1142 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1985). 165Ibid. 
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unprofessional conduct resulted in the irreparable loss of confidence 
1 fifi 
in his ability to perform his job duties. 
Sickley appealed to the state board of education which appointed 
a hearing officer. Although Audrey testified that Sickley had placed 
his hands inside her clothing to touch her chest and also to examine 
the lump on her hip, the hearing officer . . was not impressed with 
1 
the credibility of Audrey." Numerous witnesses offered testimony 
as to Sickley's effectiveness as a counselor. Sickley emphatically 
denied any sexual misconduct. However, he admitted that he had become 
emotionally involved with Audrey in a parental fashion. The hearing 
officer submitted a lengthy report in which he concluded that the board 
of education had failed to substantiate each charge by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
The Circuit Court of LaSalle County reversed the decision of the 
hearing officer. Sickley appealed. The Appellate Court addressed the 
first and third charges together. Stating that the question was not 
whether the counselor's conduct was wise but whether it was immoral 
and unprofessional, the court concluded that the manifest weight of 
the evidence did not support the charges. 
Nothing in the record indicates that it is or should be considered 
immoral to hug or stroke a crying, distraught ten-year-old child. 
. . . Nothing in the record indicates that it is immoral to permit 
a ten-year-old child to sit on a man's knee while they discuss 
her school work and her family situation. Both the first and third 
charges of the Board require a finding of immoral conduct, and 
those charges simply were not proved.168 
The court also ruled that the second charge was not proven because there 
was no evidence in the record to show that Sickley's counseling 
166Ibid., 1145. 167Ibid., 1144. 168 lbid., 1146. 
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techniques had been detrimental to any of the students he had counseled. 
Accordingly, the court reversed Sickley's dismissal. 
On November 14, 1983, the superintendent of the Argo-Summit School 
District No. 104 and the principal of Walsh School met with William 
Hunt to inform him that allegations of immoral and unprofessional con­
duct had been made against him. Three female students in Hunt's second 
grade physical education class alleged that Hunt had pinched them on 
their buttocks on numerous occasions during class. On November 22, 
the school board voted to dismiss Hunt. 
In May, 1984, a hearing was held by a hearing officer of the Il l­
inois State Board of Education. In his testimony, Hunt admitted pinch­
ing the students but denied that he had done so in an effort to obtain 
sexual gratification. After hearing additional testimony from the stu­
dents, their mothers, child psychologists, and Hunt's teaching asso­
ciates, the hearing officer concluded: "(1) the testimony of the 
students was 'competent and credible'; and (2) the undisputed acts of 
169 
pinching the buttocks of the students were improper." However, he 
found insufficient evidence to show that Hunt's conduct was intended 
to be sexually provocative. Therefore, he ruled that Hunt's conduct 
was remediable and necessitated a warning prior to his dismissal. 
The board sought administrative review of this decision by the 
Circuit Court of Cook County. The court concluded that Hunt's conduct 
could not be considered remediable, reversed the decision of the hearing 
officer, and ordered Hunt's dismissal. 
169 Board of Education of Argo-Summit School District No. 104 v. 
Hunt, 487 N.E.2d 24 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1985). 
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Hunt appealed to the Appellate Court of Il l inois on the issue of 
whether the cause for his dismissal was remediable conduct. The court 
util ized the two-prong test for remediability set forth by the Ill inois 
Supreme Court in Gi11i1 and v. Board of Education: "The test in deter­
mining whether a cause for dismissal is irremediable is whether damage 
has been done to the students, faculty, or school, and whether the con­
duct resulting in that damage could have been corrected had the teacher's 
superiors warned [him]."*7® 
Applying the first prong of this test, the court concluded: 
Upon review of the record, we find that there is sufficient evi­
dence to indicate that Hunt's conduct had immediate adverse psycho­
logical effects on the three children. With respect to damage 
to the faculty and school, it is our view that conduct such as 
that exhibited by Hunt is not only inherently harmful to the indi­
vidual teacher-student relationship, but is equally harmful to 
the reputation of the faculty and the school district. ... We 
concur with the trial court that it is inconceivable that a situa­
tion would arise in which immoral conduct of any type between 
a teacher and student could be excused by reprimand. The breach 
of trust caused by such conduct violates the public trust not only 
in the teacher, but in the entire faculty and school system asso­
ciated with the teacher.*71 
The court then focused on the issue of warning raised by Sickley: 
. . . the more appropriate focus in cases alleging immoral conduct 
is not whether the conduct itself could have been corrected by 
a warning, but whether the effects of the conduct could have been 
corrected ... we are not persuaded that a warning could correct 
the psychological damage to the students or the damage to the repu­
tation of the faculty and school district that was precipitated 
by Hunt's immoral conduct. Moreover, even if we were to look at 
whether the conduct could have been corrected by a warning, our 
decision would be the same. There is unrefuted expert testimony 
that the type of conduct engaged in by Hunt has a high degree of 
170365 N.E.2d 322 (1977). 
*7*Board of Education of Argo Summit School District, 27. 
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recurrence. In our opinion, the possibility of the recurrence of 
such impermissible and intolerable behavior should be avo ided. 1 7 2 
In light of the remediability test, the trial court's decision was 
affirmed and Hunt's dismissal was ordered. 
The decision in this case reinforces the earlier Potter decision. 
Although the earlier court did not apply the remediability test, the 
conclusion was the same. In both cases, the court found that inappro­
priate conduct with students was not within the scope of remediable 
teaching deficiencies. 
173 Lile v. Hancock Place School District was an appeal to the 
Missouri Court of Appeals of a circuit court decision which affirmed 
the termination of Charles Lile. Lile was a fourth grade teacher in 
the school district when he was charged with sexually abusing two minor 
girls. The two girls, identified as A.H. and S.H., were nine and thir­
teen years old respectively at the time of this appeal. 
In 1980, S.H.was a student in Lile's fourth grade classroom. Lile 
met her mother and they began to date. Later in that year, the two 
girls and their mother began residing with Lile. They lived with him 
until April 1984, when the mother was hospitalized. After the girls 
moved in with their natural father, he fi led a complaint against Lile 
with the police department alleging sexual abuse. 
The board, in its findings of fact, found that Lile had made the 
following admissions to the police: (1) that he had walked into the 
bathroom on several occasions while the girls were bathing and that the 
girls were free to enter the bathroom while he was bathing; (2) that 
172Ibid., 28. 173701 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. App. 1985). 
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Li 1e had taken nude photographs of the girls when the girls asked him 
to after seeing one of their mother in the nude; (3) when the mother 
had been hospitalized, Li 1e had both girls sleep with him; (4) that 
he had walked around the house in the nude on numerous occasions 
because the medication he was taking "made him hot";174 (5) that he 
had taken baths with both girls when they were younger; (6) that on 
one occasion Lile had S.H. remove her bra so that he could examine sores 
on her body. 
In her testimony, S.H. alleged that while Lile was sleeping with 
her, he reached around her and fondled her breast. She further related 
that he would urinate at times when he entered the bathroom while she 
or her sister was bathing. Finally, she said that she and her sister 
did not consider the taking of the nude photographs to be a joke. They 
were both embarrassed. 
Ironically, the girls' mother testified for Lile. She stated that 
it was normal for all four to walk around the house in the nude and 
for any one of them to go into the bathroom while one of the others 
might be using it. She further testified that "Mr. Lile had a nickname 
175 
for S.H., 'blackie,' because that was the color of her pubic hair." 
When the superintendent of the school district learned of the 
charges in May, he interviewed both girls. In early June, the principal 
delivered a written report to the superintendent which summarized com­
ments made to him by students and parents concerning the charges against 
Lile. 
174Ibid., 502. 175Ibid., 503. 
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After making its findings of fact, the board concluded that the 
acts committed by Lile constituted immoral conduct which rendered him 
unfit to teach children. Utilizing the information in the report from 
t h e  p r i n c i p a l ,  t h e  b o a r d  f u r t h e r  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  " . . .  a  
cloud of uncertainty and suspicion surrounding Mr. Lile's future activ­
ities . . . which would adversely impact on his students, their parents 
and consequently on his ability to teach."17® The board voted to termi­
nate Lile's contract with the district. When his dismissal was upheld 
by the circuit court, Lile appealed. 
He alleged that the board had based its decision on incompetent 
and insubstantial evidence. Specifically, he challenged two of the 
board's findings of fact which, in his opinion, were supported only by 
hearsay evidence. One of these findings involved the allegation that 
he had fondled S.H.'s breast. The other challenged the finding that 
described the contents of the principal's summary of attitudes concern­
ing the charges against Lile. On both, the court ruled that . . an 
erroneous finding or conclusion by an administrative agency is not 
grounds for reversal of the agency's decision if other competent and 
substantial evidence supports that decision.1,177 The court found that 
there was substantial evidence to support the other findings of fact 
by the school board. 
The court rejected Lile's contention that his constitutional rights 
to procedural and substantive due process had been violated. On his 
final assertion that his right to privacy had also been violated, the 
1761bid., 504. 1771bid. 
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court concluded: "Having accepted the unique position and responsibil­
ity of a schoolteacher, appellant cannot invoke his right of privacy 
to prevent the Board from regulating conduct that threatens its vital 
178 interests." Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision to dismiss 
Li 1e for immoral conduct. 
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania heard Keating v. Board of 
1 79 
School Directors of Riverside School District in 1986. Harold Keat­
ing appealed an order by the Secretary of Education which affirmed his 
dismissal by the board of school directors based on alleged misconduct 
with a student. 
The facts found by the board and adopted by the Secretary presented 
the following scenario. Harold Keating had become enamored with a 
sixteen-year-old female who was a sophomore in the high school during 
the Spring of 1983. He attempted to initiate an emotional relationship 
with the young lady through a number of actions. He wrote a love note 
to the student on the blackboard of his classroom in which he professed 
his love for her. He attempted to establish a date with her during 
the summer. He also made phone calls to the student's mother in which 
he expressed his desire to date the girl for two years and then to marry 
her. In December, he sent a complete outfit of clothing to the young 
lady accompanied by another love note. Finally, he sent flowers to 
her as a Christmas gift. 
Evidence presented at the hearing for his dismissal showed that 
Keating's efforts to initiate a romantic relationship were in no way 
178Ibid., 508. 179513 A.2d 547 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). 
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encouraged by the student. In fact, the situation was the cause of 
considerable embarrassment for her. The evidence also showed that 
school administrators had made at least four attempts to dissuade Keat­
ing from his continued pursuit of the girl. 
Keating was dismissed on April 4, 1984, for immorality, incom­
petency, and willful violation of school laws. He appealed to the 
Secretary of Education on May 2, 1984. Although he gave notice of his 
intent to offer additional evidence, the Secretary denied his request 
and subsequently affirmed the dismissal. 
Keating's first contention in his appeal to the Commonwealth Court 
was that the Secretary had abused her discretion by refusing to hear 
additional testimony. Since Keating's request was delivered only ten 
days before the scheduled hearing date and contained no explanation 
of the purpose of this testimony, the court denied this contention. 
Keating also challenged the Secretary's determination that his 
dismissal was supported by sufficient evidence. The court concluded: 
"We have no hesitancy in concluding that Keating's continual public 
pressing of affections upon a sixteen-year-old student without any 
provocation or encouragement on her part and in blatant disregard of 
several requests to stop constituted substantial evidence to support 
180 
his dismissal on the basis of immorality." The court further ruled 
that Keating's disregard for the orders of the administration to stop 
pursuing this relationship constituted persistent and willful violation 
of school laws. 
180Ibid., 549. 
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Finally, Keating contended that his due process rights were vio­
lated because the board failed to provide him with the same due process 
provided for mentally incompetent defendants in criminal hearings. 
He argued that his inability to recognize that his conduct was wrong 
rendered him mentally incapacitated to stand trial. The court stated: 
Balancing Keating's interest in his employment against the com­
munity's substantial interest in the protection and welfare of 
its youth, and taking into account the minimal possibility of 
resultant error from the procedures used in this case, we decline 
to extend to Keating the due process safeguards afforded mentally 
incapacitated criminal defendants.181 
The court concluded: "Finding no error of substantive law or procedural 
process and being satisfied that there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Secretary's critical findings of fact and that 
none of Mr. keating's constitutional rights were violated, we are 
182 obliged to affirm the Secretary's order." Thus, Keating's dismissal 
from his teaching position was allowed to stand. 
Keating had committed no acts of sexual misconduct. However, his 
continued pursuit of a female student led school board members and the 
court to the conclusion that his behavior constituted immorality. 
Again, there are no other cases of this type to determine if this case 
has established a precedent in dealing with this type of behavior. 
Thomas Dietrich had taught in the Scott County School District 
No. 2 in Indiana for seventeen years prior to his dismissal. In the 
school year preceding his dismissal, he had been reprimanded for placing 
himself in a compromising situation with a female student. Later in 
that school year, parents expressed concerns that Dietrich was frequently 
181Ibid., 550. 182Ibid. 
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seen with the cheerleaders. The superintendent again talked with 
Dietrich about his conduct. 
Dietrich's dismissal on May 26, 1982, stemmed from these incidents 
in addition to allegations by a female student who was enrolled in one 
of Dietrich's high school classes. She alleged that he had (1) placed 
his hand on her leg on several occasions; (2) pinched her hip on 
St. Patrick's Day for not wearing green; (3) made several implicit 
sexual remarks while he was walking behind her; and (4) pressed papers 
against her chest while he was returning students' papers in class. 
She also alleged that Dietrich required her to occupy the desk directly 
in front of his desk. During class, he would sit on his desk and place 
his feet on her desk which resulted in the student looking between his 
legs. 
Dietrich refuted some of the accusations, explained some, and 
could not recall some of the incidents. Although he offered evidence 
concerning the girl 's reputation and reasons for her to seek vengeance 
against him, the school board voted to cancel his contract. 
On appeal, the trial court found for Dietrich. The school board 
183 appealed to the Court of Appeals of Indiana which remanded the case 
to the trial court because it had failed to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court made the necessary find­
ings and conclusions in favor of Dietrich. Again, the school board 
appealed.184 
^Scott County School District v. Dietrich, 496 N.E.2d 91 (Ind. 
App. 1 Dist. 1986). 
184Scott County School District v. Dietrich, 499 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 
App. 1 Dist. 1986). 
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At issue in the second appeal was whether the trial court had 
erred when it found no substantial evidence to support Dietrich's dis­
charge. In discrediting the student's testimony and choosing to believe 
Dietrich's testimony, the trial court had substituted its judgment for 
that of the school board. Stating that ". . . it was improper for the 
trial court to reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of wit-
1 
nesses," the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded 
the case for further proceedings. 
The decision in this case echoed the sentiments of the court in 
the McKown case reviewed earlier in this study. Although this case 
involved the reweighing of evidence and judging of the credibility of 
witnesses by a trial court rather than by a Secretary of Education, 
the court ruling was the same. Outside agencies or courts do not have 
the right to substitute their judgment for that of the school board 
unless there were obvious errors in the hearing of the case. 
The dismissal of Thomas Fadler was a result of allegations of 
immoral conduct based on two incidents. In the first of these incidents 
on October 23, 1984, Fadler placed his hand in the area of the buttocks 
inside the waistband of the jeans and undergarment worn by one of his 
students as she was leaning over her desk. The second incident on 
October 31 involved the fondling of the breasts of another of his 
female students in a hallway of the school building. 
An administrative hearing officer found the allegations to be sup­
ported by a preponderance of competent evidence and sustained Fadler's 
1 8 5 Ib id . ,  1173 .  
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dismissal. She further found that his conduct was irremediable and 
had caused damage to the students and the school as a whole. Fadler 
appealed to the local trial court which also sustained his dismissal. 
On appeal to the Appellate Court of 111 inoisFadler argued 
that the trial court had abused its discretion in sustaining the hearing 
officer's finding that his conduct was both immoral and irremediable. 
The court util ized the remediabi1ity test as set forth in the Gilli land 
decision. In its analysis of the first prong of this test which deals 
with the damage done to the students, the faculty, or the school by 
the conduct in question, the court stated: "The board is not required 
to wait until such conduct causes clinical adverse effects on the stu­
dents before finding the conduct immoral and irremediable while other 
students may be subject to future abuse. . . . True damage resulting 
187 from sexual abuse may take years to fully manifest iself." Address­
ing the second prong of the test which questions whether the conduct 
resulting in the damage could have been corrected with a warning, the 
court adopted the reasoning of Board of Education of Argo-Summit School 
District No. 104 v. State Board of Education: "The more appropriate 
focus is not whether the conduct itself could have been corrected but 
188 
whether the effects of the conduct could have been corrected." 
Using this standard, the court found that Fadler's conduct was irremedi­
able and, therefore, affirmed Fadler's dismissal. 
^Fadler v. Il l inois State Board of Education, 506 N.E.2d 640 
(111. App. 5 Dist. 1987). 
187Ibid., 644. 188487 N.E.2d 24 (1985). 
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The decision in this case mirrors that in the Hunt case in which 
that court also applied the remediability test to the conduct in ques­
tion. Both courts found the inappropriate conduct to be irremediable 
and allowed the dismissals for immorality to stand. 
189 
In a 1986 case from North Carolina, Crump v. Board of Education, 
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina was asked to review the dismis­
sal of Eddie Ray Crump from his position as a driver education instruc­
tor with the Hickory school system for immorality and insubordination. 
His dismissal had been upheld by the Superior Court of Catawba County. 
In this appeal, Crump alleged that the board of education's findings 
and conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence in the whole 
record. 
On April 9, 1981, Elizabeth Davis complained to Henry Williamson, 
principal of Hickory High School, about Crump's behavior during the 
first day of the road work phase of her driver's education class. Her 
written complaint alleged that Crump had asked personal questions about 
her dating activities, had made a comment about her crotch, and had 
190 called her "babe and honey." She further alleged he had touched 
her upper thigh and had played with her hair. 
As a result of this complaint, Mr. Williamson had issued written 
instructions in a letter to Crump. Crump was instructed to have a third 
person in the driver's education car when he was conducting road work 
with a female student. This directive was violated during the instruc­
tion of two students in the summer of 1982 and the fall of 1983. 
189339 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. App. 1986). 190Ibid., 486. 
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On March 16, 1984, the superintendent, Dr. Stuart Thompson, noti­
fied Crump of his intention to seek Crump's dismissal on the grounds 
of immorality and insubordination. After a hearing, which began on 
June 6, 1984, and lasted into the early hours of the following morning, 
the board voted to dismiss Crump. 
The Court of Appeals indicated that the purpose of its review was 
to determine whether the board's decision to dismiss Crump on the 
grounds of immorality and insubordination was based on substantial evi­
dence in light of the whole record. Further, the court noted that "It 
is not necessary that we find that al1 of the grounds for dismissal 
191 are supported by substantial evidence." After reviewing all the 
findings of fact, the court found substantial evidence to support the 
charges of insubordination. Having supported these charges, the court 
declined to address the charge of immorality. In July, 1986, the 
192 Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Crump's appeal of this ruling. 
In 1989, a second superior court decision which related to the 
dismissal of Eddie Crump was appealed to the Court of Appeals of North 
1QO 
Carolina. Crump had fi led a Section 1983 civil rights claim against 
the school board at the beginning of the judicial review of his dis­
missal. This action had been severed from the appeal of his dismissal. 
Crump's due process claim alleged that the board had denied him a fair 
and impartial hearing. The basis for his allegation was the disparity 
between alleged involvement in the case by board members prior to the 
191Ibid., 485. 192346 S.E.2d 137 (N.C. 1986). 
•^Crump v. Board of Education 378 S.E.2d 32 (N.C. App. 1989). 
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hearing and their disavowals of any significant knowledge of the case 
when questioned about it at the beginning of Crump's hearing. At the 
conclusion of the superior court hearing, Crump was awarded $78,000 
in damages by a jury. The Court of Appeals ruled that Crump had suf­
ficiently demonstrated that there was disqualifying personal bias on 
the part of board members and affirmed the superior court decision. 
The decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court of North 
194 Carolina which decided the case on June 13, 1990. Justice Mitchell 
opened his discussion of the case with the following summary of the 
issue before the court and the court's opinion on that issue: 
The issue before us is whether, at a teacher dismissal hearing, 
a single school board member's bias against the teacher taints 
the entire board's decision-making process, denying the teacher 
due process and entitling him to compensatory damages, regardless 
of whether the bias affected the correctness of the board's deci­
sion. We conclude that such bias makes the decision-making process 
inherently unfair and violates due process.195 
The court was careful to point out that this case did not involve 
Crump's dismissal. Since that case was severed and the dismissal was 
upheld, the court did not consider that verdict or the facts which led 
to the verdict in its deliberations. 
The court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals which 
affirmed the superior court decision concerning the violation of Crump's 
due process rights and his right to compensatory damages. However, 
the court found the portion of that decision which involved the assess­
ment of damages to be in error. 
*^Crump v. Board of Education 392 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1990). 
1 9 5 Ib id . ,  580 .  
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The plaintiff sought only punitive damages from the individual 
defendants. The jury having returned its verdict awarding only 
compensatory damages, but no punitive damages, the trial court's 
judgment should have ordered that the damages and costs be recov­
ered only from the defendant Board and not from the other defen­
dants individually. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals 
for its further remand to the Superior Court, Catawba County, with 
instructions that the judgment be modified and amended accord­
ingly. 196 
This case has been included in the discussion of teacher dismis­
sals for sexual misconduct with students because although the charges 
of immorality which led to Crump's dismissal were not addressed in the 
litigation, the charges of insubordination stemmed from the directive 
issued to address Crump's alleged immoral conduct with female students. 
This case emphasizes the right of teachers to a fair, impartial hearing 
prior to their dismissal regardless of the charges against them. Board 
members must exercise considerable care to insure that they are not 
unduly prejudiced by pre-hearing information. 
197 Strain v. Rapid City School Board was an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of South Dakota of a circuit court decision which affirmed the 
dismissal of David Strain. Strain was a highly regarded tenured 
teacher with the Rapid City school district prior to his dismissal. 
On May 8, 1986, a female sophomore student (A.S.) at Central High 
School met with a school counselor about her attendance problems. Later 
that day, she returned to the counselor's office to discuss another 
problem which she felt she could not handle alone. She told the coun­
selor that, beginning in November of 1985, Strain had engaged in 
improper conduct with her on several occasions. This conduct began 
196Ibid., 591. 197447 N.W.2d 332 (S.D. 1989). 
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with Strain placing his hand on her knee. Although she thought that 
Strain was being overly friendly, this conduct did not bother her. 
However, he soon progressed to touching her on other parts of her body 
including her breasts. On one occasion, Strain began to unbutton her 
top but was interrupted by the unexpected appearance of another teacher. 
A.S. further alleged that on another occasion Strain had exposed himself 
and placed her hand on his penis. The student asked the counselor 
". . .to confront Strain so he would know someone else knew and maybe 
he would stop."198 
Although the student had asked the counselor not to reveal this 
information to anyone else for fear that Strain would lose his job, 
the counselor reported the accusations to the school principal that 
evening. The following morning the principal met with A.S. and recorded 
her accusations. He then reported the incidents to the South Dakota 
Department of Social Services as required by law. The principal met 
with Strain and advised him to obtain the services of an attorney since 
serious allegations of sexual misconduct with a student had been made 
against him. 
The Pennington County Sheriff's office began an investigation 
after the principal reported the allegations to the department of social 
services. Although no criminal prosecution was initiated against 
Strain, transcripts of the statements from a number of individuals were 
furnished to the school board near the end of June, 1986. 
On August 27, 1986, Strain received written notification that the 
board was contemplating his dismissal. The letter informed Strain 
1 9 8 Ib id . ,  333 .  
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that he was suspended immediately (with pay) from his teaching respon­
sibilities. The reason given for this dismissal action was improper 
sexual contact with a student. 
Strain's hearing began on September 18, 1986. At the hearing, 
A.S. related the incidents of sexual contact and indecent exposure. 
Additionally, she testified about another occasion when she and Strain 
were alone in the computer room. A.S. alleged that Strain turned off 
the light, pushed her against the wall, unbuttoned her jeans, pulled 
them down, and had sexual intercourse with her. She acknowledged that 
she had not told the principal or the sheriff's department about this 
last incident. Her reasons for failure to disclose this information 
were that ". . . she was afraid of what they would think of her, and 
she was afraid no one would believe her because of Strain's posi­
tion.''199 
Strain claimed that A.S. was lying to avoid punishment for her 
unexplained absences. However, other testimony offered at the hearing 
established that A.S. had told friends about the incidents as early 
as December of 1985. This testimony negated Strain's assertion that 
A.S.'s story was a recent fabrication. Although Strain had told inves­
tigators from the sheriff's department that he and A.S. were never alone 
in the computer room, the testimony of another teacher established that 
the pair had been seen in the room alone on numerous occasions. 
Additional testimony from Paula Gregory, a former student, estab­
lished that Strain's behavior with A.S. was not an isolated incident. 
1 9 9 Ib id . ,  334 .  
189  
She related several incidents in which Strain had improperly touched 
her on her legs and breasts while she was a student in his class. Some 
of these incidents happened when she was called to Strain's desk. He 
placed his hands between her legs in the genital area and . . he 
would move his hands around as if he was trying to sexually excite me."^ 
She further testified that she had not reported Strain's behavior at 
the time it occurred because she was a friend of Strain's daughter. 
Having been troubled by these incidents since high school, she was 
encouraged by a friend to report the behavior to the South Dakota Child 
Protection Agency. She did so without knowing about A.S.'s allegations 
aginst Strain. 
After nine hours of testimony, the board went into executive 
session with the hearing officer. When the members emerged, they 
voted unanimously to dismiss Strain for grossly immoral conduct which 
rendered him incompetent to teach in the district. This dismissal was 
upheld in circuit court on March 8, 1988. 
Strain raised a number of issues in his appeal to the Supreme Court 
of South Dakota. First, he contended that the board had withheld 
exculpatory evidence which contradicted Gregory's testimony and, there­
fore, had violated his due process rights. However, the statements 
from two other students which Strain claimed would have cleared him 
of the charges would have actually corroborated the testimony of both 
A.S. and Paula Gregory. Both students had given statements to the 
sheriff's department during the investigation that related similar 
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incidents which had happened to them while they were in Strain's class. 
The court ruled: "Since the two statements in question are not excul­
patory, there is no due process requirement that the board provide the 
?m 
statements to Strain." 
Strain also alleged that the board's review of the sheriff's 
investigative file had created an unacceptable risk of actual bias, 
thus depriving him of his due process right to a fair hearing before 
a fair tribunal. The court found that Strain had not met his burden 
of overcoming the presumption that the board acted fairly and impar­
tially. The court stated: "In fact, the procedures used by this Board 
in hiring independent counsel to preside over the hearing and rule on 
objections, and hiring a court reporter to transcribe the hearing should 
202 serve as a model to other school boards." 
Strain's third contention on appeal was that the admission of 
evidence of prior misconduct had violated his due process rights. The 
court found that Gregory's testimony about prior incidents of improper 
conduct was used "... for the limited purpose of corroboration of 
the truth and veracity of the witness who is the complaining wit-
203 ness." The court further stated: "In criminal cases of sexual 
contact, this court has repeatedly held that 'prior bad acts' evidence 
is admissible."2^ Since the evidence of prior conduct was only 
offered as relevant evidence on the issues of intent and credibility 
(which were strongly contested), the court disagreed with Strain's 
201Ibid., 336. 202Ibid., 337. 
203Ibid. 204Ibid. 
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contention of a violation of his due process rights by the introduction 
of this evidence. 
The final two issues raised by Strain were found to be without 
merit. He had alleged that the board's decision was clearly erroneous 
based upon a review of all the evidence. The court found that the 
record did not support this claim. His final argument was that the 
school board was required by due process to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Since the circuit court had conducted an indepen­
dent inquiry into the facts which formed the basis for the board's 
decision to determine the legality of that decision, the court found 
that . .a meaningful review of the issues can be conducted without 
205 findings of fact and conclusions of law." 
The procedures used in this case should be utilized by all school 
boards who are conducting dismissal hearings. Hiring an impartial 
attorney to preside over the case and rule on any objections that arise 
insures that the hearing is conducted in a manner which protects the 
rights of the teacher involved in the hearing. Also, the use of a court 
reporter to record the testimony presented at the hearing provides an 
accurate record which can be utilized to defend the dismissal decision 
if it is appealed to the courts. 
On March 24, 1987, Kathleen Stoneking brought a Section 1983 civil 
rights action against the Bradford Area School District; Frederick 
Smith, principal of the Bradford Area High School; Richard Miller, 
assistant principal of the school; and Frederick Shuey, superintendent 
2 0 5 Ib id . ,  339 .  
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of the school district. On May 22, 1987, this case was consolidated 
for trial with similar actions brought by Kim Harbaugh and Lisa Rovito. 
The combined action was heard as Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dis-
This complaint alleged that 
. . . the individual defendants knew or recklessly failed to dis­
cover that Edward Wright, the band director at the High School, 
was sexually assaulting female members of the band. Additionally, 
it is alleged that the School District had a practice or custom 
of failing to appropriately respond to complaints by female stu­
dents of sexual abuse or harassment perpetrated by male 
teachers.207 
The defendants fi led a motion for summary judgment on the follow­
ing grounds: the plaintiff failed to fi le her complaint in a timely 
fashion; the plaintiff failed to identify a constitutional right which 
had been violated; there was no Section 1983 claim because there was 
no individual l iability nor was there a policy or practice which impli­
cated the school district; the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity; and the complaint failed to set forth a violation of state 
law. 
Edward Wright was hired in August of 1975 to serve as the band 
director at the high school. Under his direction, the band became very 
successful in competitions and, therefore, a source of pride for the 
school and the community. 
In 1979, Judy Grove, a student in the school band, informed Dr. 
Smith, the school principal, and Mr. Miller, the assistant principal, 
that Wright had sexually assaulted her. Further details of this case 
206667 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 207Ibid., 1090. 
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208 will be discussed in Sowers v. Bradford Area School District since 
Judy Grove Sowers brought similar action one year after this action 
was originally heard. However, i t is important to note that Dr. Miller 
addressed the entire band and attempted to force Judy to apologize to 
the group for her accusations against Wright. 
Wright's sexual abuse and harassment of Kathleen Stoneking began 
in the fall of 1980 when he forcibly kissed her. As time progressed, 
the abuse accelerated both in frequency and intrusiveness. The abuse 
continued on an almost weekly basis until Kathleen's graduation in 1983. 
Isolated incidents of abuse continued as late as May, 1985. 
In March 1986, Dr. Smith's son informed him that Wright was sex­
ually assaulting female band members. The school district began an 
immediate investigation which included meetings with students who had 
allegedly been assaulted and their parents. Wright was suspended on 
March 10, 1986, and later resigned. On November 6, 1986, he entered 
a plea of guilty to a ten count criminal indictment which included four 
counts of indecent assault. 
In addressing the defendants' claim that Kathleen had not fi led 
her complaint within the statute of limitations, the court ruled that 
the discovery rule applied and that, therefore, the statute of limita­
tions did not start to run until the plaintiff actually discovered the 
injury and the cause of that injury. As Kathleen had effectively 
argued, she did not discover that the individual defendants were the 
cause of her injuries until the school district took action against 
208694 F. Supp. 125 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
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Wright in March, 1986. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations 
should have run from that date. Concurring with this argument, the 
court denied the motion for summary judgment pertaining to the statute 
of limitations defense. 
The court then addressed the constitutional claims: 
. . . the plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of her l iberty 
interest which entitled her to be free from constant threats, 
intimidation, sexual abuse, and sexual harassment perpetrated by 
Edward Wright. Although the plaintiff does not expressly link 
her claim to the substantive due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, identification of the liberty interest serves that 
purpose.209 
After a lengthy review of pertinent case law, the court stated: 
The acts of sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation 
inflicted by Edward Wright on Kathleen Stoneking, l iterally shocks 
the conscience of this Court. As evidenced by case law, abuse 
of this type is not tolerated when the victim is a prison inmate 
or a patient in a state hospital. . . . Clearly then, the consti­
tution must offer school children similar protection.210 
Based on this reasoning, the court rejected the defendants' assertion 
that the facts in this case failed to support a violation of Kathleen 
Stoneking's constitutional rights. 
The court then examined whether the defendants owed a specific 
duty to the plaintiff. Although Kathleen was not in the custody of 
the defendants, she spent a large part of her day in an environment 
where the defendants had ultimate control. Therefore, the court con­
cluded: "These defendants were charged with the duty of ensuring that 
the school environment was a safe one for students. Therefore, this 
Court concludes that a special relationship exists between the plaintiff 
211 and the individual defendants." Having concluded that this special 
209Stoneking, 1093. 210Ibid., 1095. 211Ibid., 1097. 
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relationship existed, the court then had to determine whether the 
defendants had breached their duty to the plaintiff: "Based on the 
affidavit of Dr. Kent [Superintendent of Keystone Oaks School District 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania], this Court concludes that there are gen­
uine issues of material fact pertaining to the question of defendants' 
compliance with 'accepted professional judgment, practice, or 
standards.1 
Addressing the final issue by the individual defendants which 
pertained to their l iability, the court had to determine the applicable 
standard. The court stated: 
In addition to the affidavit of Dr. Kent, there is evidence by 
which a jury could conclude that: (1) the defendants were reck­
less in their handling of the 1979 incident involving Judy Grove 
Sowers; (2) the defendants were reckless in their failure to inves­
tigate other reported incidents involving Mr. Wright and female 
students; and (3) the defendants were reckless in their attempts 
to remedy and/or rectify the problems involving Mr. Wright. In 
light of this evidence this Court holds that the issue of l iabil­
i t y  i s  one  f o r  a  j u r y  t o  d e c i d e .  
The next issue addressed in this decision was Kathleen's allega­
tion that the school district had a practice of failing to take appro­
priate action when allegations of sexual abuse were made against 
teachers. She alleged that the district had failed to investigate 
reports of sexual abuse and had permitted the teachers to remain in 
charge of extracurricular activities even though they posed a danger 
to female students. 
In support of this allegation, a deposition by Theresa Rodgers 
was entered into evidence. She had been sexually assaulted by her 
212Ibid., 1098. 213Ibid. 
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social studies teacher, Richard DeMarte, during her senior year at the 
Bradford Area High School. When she reported the incident to Dr. Smith 
and Mr. Miller, she was told . . that it was going to be her word 
against Mr. DeMarte's and that she should not go home and tell her par-
214 ents about the assault." Dr. Smith did suggest that she stay away 
from DeMarte if at all possible. Although he assured her that he would 
take care of the problem, Theresa was never informed of any action taken 
by the administration against DeMarte. Further, there was no record 
of any disciplinary action in DeMarte's personnel f i le. It is inter­
esting to note that Dr. Smith had given DeMarte a perfect score on his 
teaching evaluation which included assessments of his emotional sta­
bility, professional conduct, and judgment. 
In addition to Theresa's allegations, four other female students 
had informed Dr. Smith and Mr. Miller of problems with DeMarte during 
the time period of January, 1981, through October, 1985. None of these 
incidents appeared in DeMarte's personnel f i le either. It is signif­
icant that, in spite of these allegations, DeMarte continued to coach 
the girls' tennis team at the high school. 
The court also considered the Judy Grove incident in its discus­
sion of the liability of the school district. After reviewing the 
facts of that incident, the court concluded: 
The episode of the forced apology has special significance in 
light of the assaultive conduct that occurred between Edward 
Wright and Katahleen Stoneking. Apparently, the "forced apology" 
served as a trump card in the hands of Edward Wright. When a stu­
dent would threaten to disclose the abuse, Wright quickly reminded 
2 1 4 Ib id . ,  1100 .  
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his victim about the "Judy Grove incident." His message was clear 
and convincing: "No one believed Judy Grove, why would anyone 
believe you." His tactical threat proved to be quite effective 
at least for a period of time.215 
After consideration of all the evidence, the court concluded: 
. . . there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer 
the existence of a practice or custom. Additionally, it could 
be inferred from the evidence that the School District was respon­
sible for the practice or custom and that the practice or custom 
caused the plaintiff 's injuries. Thus, the defendants' motion, 
as it pertains to the liability of the School District, must be 
denied.^16 
In support of its conclusion that the defendants were not entitled 
217 to qualified immunity, the court quoted Hall v. Tawney which involved 
the corporal punishment of a student at school: 
. . . the existence of this right to ultimate bodily security--
the most fundamental aspect of personal privacy—is unmistakably 
established in our constitutional decisions as an attribute of 
the ordered liberty that is the concern of substantive due process. 
Numerous cases in a variety of contexts recognize it as the last 
line of defense against those literally outrageous abuses of offi­
cial power whose very variety make formulation of a more precise 
standard impossible. Clearly recognized in persons charged with 
or suspected of crime and in the custody of police officers, we 
simply do not see how we can fail also to recognize it in public 
school teachers. 218 
On the final issue, the court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants. Kathleen's complaint did not identify a specific state 
law as the cause of action. 
The defendants appealed the decision to the Third Circuit of the 
219 United States Court of Appeals. The court was asked to review the 
issue of qualified immunity. The basis for the defendants' claim of 
215Ibid., 1101. 216Ibid., 1102. 
217621 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 218Ibid. 
2^Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594 
(3rd Cir. 1988). 
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immunity was that "Stoneking did not have a clearly established right 
to be free from the sexual abuse of Wright, . . . that they were under 
no clearly established duty to protect her, and that, in any event, 
they could not have reasonably known that their conduct might violate 
220 any of Stoneking's constitutional rights." 
The court began its discussion of this issue by providing an expla­
nation of qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity 
entitles government officials performing discretionary functions to 
immunity from liability for civil damages when their conduct 'does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 
221 a reasonable person would have known.1" After a lengthy discussion 
of this doctrine as applied in case law, the court then turned its 
attention back to the case at hand. 
The court noted that school officials knew, or should have known, 
as eary as 1979 of Wright's sexual misconduct. Further, they knew, 
or should have known, that female band students were in a particularly 
vulnerable position. The court continued: 
In these circumstances, defendant school officials had a constitu­
tional duty to investigate and take reasonable steps to protect 
the students. Defendants stated at oral argument that they had 
a duty to investigate the complaints but not a duty to protect 
the students. The distinction is meaningless, because the duty 
to investigate must also encompass some duty to act based on the 
results of the investigation ... it is implausible that by 1979 
reasonable school officials would not have known that there was 
a duty to take some affirmative action to investigate and protect 
students from a teacher's sexual abuse of which they were made aware, 
and to take steps to eliminate rather than condone an atmosphere in 
which teachers could sexually harass students with impunity.222 
220Ibid., 598. 221Ibid. 222Ibid., 603 
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Therefore, the court affirmed the district court order which denied 
the defendants summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. 
223 The defendants' appeal to the United States Supreme Court 
resulted in this latest decision being vacated and remanded to the 
224 Third Circuit for further consideration in light of the recent 
225 DeShaney decision. In this decision, the Supreme Court had ruled 
that a minor could not maintain an action against the county, its 
department of social services, or its individual employees for injuries 
the boy had received at the hand of his father. The basis for this 
action was the decision to return the boy to his father's custody even 
though the caseworker was aware of the risk of violence to the boy. 
In light of the discussion1 in the DeShaney case, the Court of 
Appeals stated: . . we can no longer rely on the statutory and 
common law duties imposed in Pennsylvania on school officials as the 
basis of a duty to protect students from harm occurring as a result 
ooc 
of a third person." However, the court found that Kathleen Stoneking 
stil l maintained a viable civil rights claim due to her allegation that 
the defendants had established a practice or custom which directly caused 
her constitutional harm. The court summarized the evidence which sup­
ported her claim: 
^^Smith v. Stoneking, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989). 
^Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd 
Cir. 1989). 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). 
^Stoneking, 723. 
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. . . there is evidence in the record that between 1978 and 1982 
Smith and Miller received at least five complaints about sexual 
assaults of female students by teachers and staff members; that 
Shuey was told about some of these complaints; that Smith recorded 
these and other allegations in a secret fi le at home rather than 
in the teachers' personnel fi les, which a jury could view as active 
concealment; that the defendants gave such teachers excellent 
performance evaluations, which a jury could view as communication 
by the defendants to the teachers that the conduct of which they 
were accused would not be considered to reflect negatively on them; 
and that Smith and Miller discouraged and/or intimidated students 
and parents from pursuing complaints, on one occasion by forcing 
a student to publicly recant her allegation.227 
In conclusion, the court found that Kathleen Stoneking's claim 
against Shuey, the superintendent, was not proven by any acts which 
could be construed as condoning sexual harassment by the teachers in 
the district. However, the claims against Smith and Miller were upheld. 
The court ended its discussion with the following: 
. . . trial of this case has been pending in the district court 
for a substantial period of time while the qualified immunity issue 
has been litigated. Our conclusion that Smith and Miller are not 
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law in their indi­
vidual capacity is not in any way suggestive of any view on the 
merits of Stoneking's claim against them personally or against 
all of the defendants in their official capacities as to which 
no qualified immunity can be asserted. Thus, we are hopeful that 
upon remand this case can proceed to an expeditious conclusion.228 
Unfortunately, at the time of this study, there has been no decision 
in the district court case. 
This case has major implications for practicing education offi­
cials. Sexual harassment of students by teachers is inexcusable. Even 
more inexcusable is the fact that school officials did not take action 
in this case. As a result of Kathleen Stoneking's successful l it iga­
tion, school officials are now liable for damages if they know of such 
227Ibid., 728. 228Ibid., 731. 
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harassment arid take no action to stop the incidents or to discipline 
the teacher. 
229 Sowers v. Bradford Area School District, mentioned in the dis­
cussion of Stoneking, resulted from the sexual assault on Judy Grove 
Sowers by the band director, Edgar Wright. Mrs. Sowers, l ike Kathleen 
Stoneking, fi led a civil rights complaint against the school district, 
Mr. Frederick Shuey, Dr. Frederick Smith, and Mr. Richard Miller. 
Mrs. Sowers alleged that the school district maintained a policy or 
practice of reckless indifference to and/or active concealment of inci­
dents involving known or suspected sexual abuse of students. She fur­
ther alleged that this practice was the cause of her deprivation of 
her constitutional rights to freedom from sexual abuse and free access 
to the courts unimpeded by threats, intimidation, embarrassment, and 
mental anguish. The plaintiff also alleged that the individual defen­
dants were part of a conspiracy to conceal sexual abuse of students 
by several teachers. 
Judy Sowers was a member of the band while she was a student in 
high school. On the evening of June 16, 1979, she went to Wright's 
house to get a tape of marching music. She was a section leader and 
had to learn the music in preparation for summer band practice. Since 
she was going to be out of town for two weeks, she needed the tape to 
familiarize herself with the music so she would be prepared for practice 
when she returned. While at Wright's home, she was sexually assaulted. 
?? Q 
Sowers v. Bradford Area School District, 694 F. Supp. 125 
(W.D. Pa. 1988). 
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She reported the assault to a youth counselor who informed Dr. 
Smith and Mr. Miller. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Sowers met with Dr. 
Smith and Mr. Miller to inform them of the assault. She alleged that 
both of the men actively discouraged her from pursuing the matter in 
court. They indicated that they did not believe her accusations. Dr. 
Smith even implied that the assault was her fault since she had been 
drinking prior to going to Wright's house. After both men had threat­
ened her with public disclosure and personal humiliation, Judy retracted 
her allegation in a flippant manner. 
Judy's father requested a meeting with Dr. Smith and Mr. Miller. 
He testified that both men made an effort to convince him that no 
teacher would behave in the manner alleged by his daughter. 
Both Judy and her father were given the impression that, in order 
for her to continue to participate in the band, she would have to apol­
ogize and deny her allegations in front of the entire band. Dr. Smith 
and Mr. Miller dispute this version of the events. However, Dr. Smith 
assembled the band members. He acknowledged that there were rumors cir­
culating and indicated that a certain student would address those 
rumors. Dr. Smith then turned to Judy who ran from the room in tears. 
The impact of this forced apology has been discussed in the preceding 
discussion of the Stoneking case. 
The plaintiff 's complaint also listed numerous other instances 
of sexual abuse by Wright and other male teachers. It was also pointed 
out that no disciplinary action beyond warning the teachers about being 
alone with female students was ever taken against any of the teachers 
involved in the sexual misconduct. 
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This case raised many of the same issues that were raised in the 
previous case. In this case, however, the defendants argued that since 
this assault took place off school grounds at the beginning of summer 
vacation, no special relationship with the plaintiff existed. The court 
disagreed: 
The increased threat to female students created by the defendants' 
alleged tolerance for sexual abuse was not the sort of danger that 
disappeared when those students packed up their instruments and 
walked out of the band room. Because Wright conducted marching 
band practices during the summer months, his opportunity to abuse 
his female band students . . . did not disappear when the school 
bell sounded the end of the day or the beginning of vacation.230 
The court stood by its earlier decision in the Stoneking case and 
refused to uphold the defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of 
qualified immunity. "This Court held that the defendants were not 
entitled to qualified immunity, concluding that a reasonable person 
would have been aware that the plaintiff had a substantive due process 
right to be free from intrusions into her personal privacy and bodily 
integrity." 
The judicial system has been consistent in upholding the dismissal 
of teachers for acts of sexual misconduct with students or other minors. 
In general, the very nature of the conduct has been found to infer 
unfitness to teach. The courts have also held that inappropriate or 
provocative language, sexual harassment, and condoning sexual harass­
ment constitute grounds for dismissal on charges of immorality. School 
officials, however, must safeguard the constitutional right to due 
process for the teacher regardless of the cause for dismissal in order 
for the dismissal to pass judicial muster. 
230Ibid., 132. 231Ibid., 140. 
204  
Unorthodox Conduct 
Three cases from the early 19701s deserve mention to complete this 
study of the dismissal of teachers for sexual misconduct. Since they 
do not clearly fit into any of the previous categories of misconduct, 
they have been grouped together as representative of unorthodox sexual 
behavior. 
232 The first of these cases, Pettit v. State Board of Education, was 
heard by the Supreme Court of California in 1973. The State Board of 
Education's order to revoke Elizabeth Pettit 's teaching credentials for 
sexual misconduct which evidenced her unfitness to teach was at issue 
in this case. 
On the evening of December 2, 1967, an undercover police officer 
attended a party which was sponsored by the Swinger's Club at a private 
residence. Elizabeth Pettit and her husband were members of this club. 
Throughout the evening, the officer observed several couples engaging 
in sexual intercourse in open bedrooms with other guests observing the 
activity. 
During a one hour period, the officer observed Mrs. Pettit engage 
in three separate acts of oral copulation with three different men. 
Both participants in each act were undressed and were observed by other 
guests. Mrs. Pettit was subsequently arrested and charged with commit­
ting oral copulation. She ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge 
of outraging public decency. She was fined and placed on probation. 
In February of 1970, proceedings were begun to revoke Mrs. Pettit 's 
teaching credentials on the grounds that ". . . her conduct involved 
232513 P.2d 889 (1973). 
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233  moral turpitude and demonstrated her unfitness to teach." During 
the hearing, Mr. Pettit testified that he and his wife knew in advance 
that sexual activities would occur at the party. He further testified 
that he had observed while his wife had engaged in both sexual inter­
course and oral copulation with other men. Additionally, he testified 
that he and his wife had appeared on two television shows in 1966 to 
take part in the discussion of ". . . nonconventional sexual l ife 
?34 styles." Although the couple had attempted to disguise their appear­
ance, testimony was offered to show that they were recognized by at 
least one other teacher in the school district. 
Following additional testimony by a number of witnesses, including 
a clinical psychologist, the hearing officer concluded: 
. . . that the plaintiff has engaged in acts of sexual intercourse 
and oral copulation with men other than her husband; that plain­
tiff appeared on television programs while facially disguised and 
discussed nonconventional sexual behavior, including wife swap­
ping; that although plaintiff 's services as a teacher have been 
"satisfactory," and although she is unlikely to repeat the sexual 
misconduct, nevertheless she has engaged in immoral and unprofes­
sional conduct, in acts involving moral turpitude, and in acts 
evidencing her unfitness for service.235 
The hearing officer concluded that there was ample evidence to support 
the revocation of her teaching credentials. The board concurred and 
adopted the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer. 
After the superior court denied mandate, this appeal followed. 
Mrs. Pettit contended that the Morrison case was applicable since there 
was no substantial evidence to support the finding that she was unfit 
for service as a teacher. The court disagreed, finding several impor­
tant distinctions between the cases. In Morrison, the conduct in 
233Ibid., 890. 234 ibid. 235Ibid., 891. 
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question was both private and noncriminal in nature. Also, the board 
had acted without sufficient evidence that Morrison was rendered unfit 
to teach by that conduct. In this case, the hearing officer had heard 
three expert witnesses express concern about Pettit 's continued effec­
tiveness as a classroom teacher in light of her professed sexual moral­
ity. The court stated: "Even without expert testimony, the board was 
entitled to conclude that plaintiff 's flagrant display indicated a 
serious defect of moral character, normal prudence and good common 
sense."236 
The court found that "... the board and the trial court were 
entitled to conclude, on the basis of the expert testimony set forth 
. . . and the very nature of the misconduct involved, that Mrs. Pettit 's-
i l l icit and indiscreet actions disclosed her unfitness to teach in public 
237 elementary schools." 
In the second case, D. Franklin Wishart sought relief in United 
238 States District Court following his dismissal by the Easton Public 
Schools in June, 1973. On March 8, 1973, Wishart met with Paul 
McDonald, the superintendent of schools in Easton, who informed him 
both orally and in writing that he had been observed engaging in conduct 
unbecoming a teacher. Wishart was also informed that he was being 
removed from his teaching position with pay immediately. He was also 
advised of his procedural rights and of the hearings that would be held 
regarding his suspension and dismissal. Attempts made to resolve the 
matter were fruitless and a hearing was held on June 18. 
236Ibid., 893. 237Ibid., 894. 
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At the hearing and at the trial which resulted from Wishart's 
appeal, testimony was heard from the superintendent, a police officer, 
and three of Wishart's neighbors. All had witnessed Wishart's behavior 
on separate occasions and offered similar versions of his behavior. 
Wishart was observed in various parts of his yard with what was 
described by the witnesses as a female dress mannequin. He would move 
the mannequin from place to place, including placing it on top of his 
car on one occasion. Although the witnesses disagreed as to how the 
mannequin was clothed (either in a dress or a nightgown), all agreed 
that he had caressed the breast area of the object. He would frequently 
rearrange the clothing and would l ift the hem of the garment occasion­
ally. Two of the witnesses testified they had seen Wishart engaging 
in what they interpreted to be a form of masturbation. At least one 
neighbor testified that Wishart's yard was well l ighted. 
Wishart testified that he did engage in unusual conduct. However, 
he denied touching the figure in any way other than moving it about 
in his yard and arranging its clothing. He described the object as 
". . . a camera tripod with a pillow tied around it and a dress placed 
239 over it." He admitted that the behavior had occurred on a weekly 
basis when his wife was attending an evening class. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board voted to dismiss 
Wishart and agreed to pay his full salary for the 1972-73 school year. 
Wishart appealed this decision alleging violation of his constitutional 
rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti­
tution. Also at issue was that the phrase "conduct unbecoming a 
2 3 9 Ib id . ,  532 .  
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teacher" was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He further asked 
that the court order his reinstatement to his full-time teaching posi­
tion. 
The court began with an examination of whether the school board's 
reasons for dismissing Wishart were arbitrary or capricious. Citing 
Drown v. Portsmouth School District,24^ the court summarized the three 
ways set forth in that decision in which dismissal decisions could be 
found to be arbitrary or capricious: "First, if the reason is unrelated 
to the educational process or to working relationships within the educa­
tional process; second, if the reason is trivial; and third, if the 
reason is wholly unsupported by a basis in uncontested fact either in 
241 the statement of reasons itself or in the teacher's fi le." 
The court found the second and third issues easy to resolve since 
the reason for Wishart's dismissal was neither trivial nor unsupported 
by facts. The first issue presented the most difficulty. Wishart 
offered testimony by his psychiatrist. He had diagnosed Wishart's prob­
lem as ". . . a personality disorder which probably developed during 
adolescence and is manifested by plaintiff displacing his sexual inter-
242 ests into a dress." He continued by pointing out that Wishart had 
been successful in controlling his conduct until the death of his first 
child three years prior to his dismissal. He further testified that 
he felt that Wishart's prognosis was good and that this disorder would 
not affect his ability to perform his classroom duties. 
240451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971). 241Wishart, 533. 
2 4 2 Ib id . ,  534 .  
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In spite of this testimony, the court found that McDonald was 
justified in his concern that Wishart's conduct would become known in 
the small town in which he lived and taught. Therefore, the court could 
substitute its judgment for that of the school board since the evidence 
did not support a finding that the dismissal was arbitrary nor 
capricious. 
Addressing Wishart's contention that his dismissal violated his 
constitutional right to privacy, the court was not impressed with his 
reasoning: 
However convincing his argument may be that private sexual conduct 
is protected from governmental intrusion, the evidence in this 
case is ample that on various occasions the conduct was public 
in nature or at least was carried on with such reckless disregard 
of whether or not he was observed that it lost whatever private 
character it might have had.243 
The final issue addressed in this decision was the argument that 
"conduct unbecoming a teacher" was unconstitutionally vague. The court 
refused to address this argument and offered the opinion that a state 
court would interpret the phrase as including only conduct which was 
job related. 
The court concluded by denying Wishart's requests for relief. 
Therefore, his dismissal was upheld. 
The final case in this section is one which most school adminis­
trators will never have to face. The principal issue in this novel 
case is whether a male tenured teacher who underwent sex reassignment 
surgery to change his external anatomy to that of a female can be dis­
missed from a public school system on the sole ground that his 
2 4 3 Ibid. ,  535.  
210 
continued employment could result in emotional harm to the students. 
244 In Re Grossman resulted from this dismissal. 
Paul Monroe Grossman had had a gender identity problem for many 
years although he had married and fathered three children. This prob­
lem worsened after his fiftieth birthday and he sought medical advice. 
He was diagnosed as a transsexual. In March, 1971, he had sex reassign­
ment surgery performed. Although he had notified his superiors of his 
impending absence for the surgical procedure, he neglected to disclose 
the nature of the surgery. When he returned in May, he contacted the 
superintendent of the school system and informed him of his intention 
to return to his teaching position. He completed the academic year 
in male attire. At the end of the year, he assumed the name Paula 
Miriam Grossman and began to live openly as a woman. 
During that summer, the matter of Ms. Grossman's continued employ­
ment was under active and continuous consideration by the school board. 
A series of meetings was held to attempt to resolve the situation. 
A proposal was made to engage Ms. Grossman on a one year contract at 
the same pay to teach elective music courses in the high school. Also 
included in the proposal was the provision that Ms. Grossman would 
resign from the tenured position Paul Grossman had held and would secure 
a new teaching certificate in her female name. Ms. Grossman rejected 
the proposal. 
On August 19, 1971, the board filed written charges against Ms. 
Grossman and suspended her without pay. The charges included: (1) Ms. 
244316 A.2d 39 (1974). 
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Grossman's presence in the schools would create a degree of notoriety 
within the system which would impair the efficient and orderly opera­
tion of the school system; (2) Ms. Grossman's failure to disclose the 
sexual condition and the nature of the surgery constituted conduct 
unbecoming a teacher; (3) Ms. Grossman underwent a fundamental and com­
plete change in her role and identification which rendered her incapable 
of continuing in a teaching position; (4) Ms. Grossman exhibited con­
duct and behavior which was deviant from the accepted standards of the 
community; and (5) she exhibited abnormality. 
The charges were forwarded to the state Commissioner of Education. 
After heaing lengthy testimony, the Commissioner found that only the 
third charge was substantiated by adequate evidence. However, he 
amended this third charge, which involved the change in Grossman's role 
and identity, to include: 
. . . thereby rendering himself incapable to teach children in 
Barnards Township because of the potential her (Grossman's) 
presence in the classroom presents for psychological harm to the 
students. . . . Therefore, Paula a/k/a/ Paul Grossman should be 
dismissed by the system by reason of just cause due to incapacity.245 
He therefore directed that Ms. Grossman be dismissed. He further 
directed the board to apply for disability on behalf of Ms. Grossman 
and ordered the payment of her back salary from the time of her suspen­
sion. 
Both parties appealed this decision to the state board of educa­
tion which affirmed the directives ordering the dismissal and the appli­
cation for disability. The order to pay Ms. Grossman's back salary 
2 4 5 Ibid. ,  42.  
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was reversed. Ms. Grossman appealed this decision to the Superior 
Court of New Jersey. The local board also appealed the rejection of 
its other four charges. 
Testimony before the court included a number of medical witnesses 
for both parties in the case. Two psychiatrists, one experienced in 
sexual disorders and the other experienced in the treatment of chil­
dren, offered testimony on behalf of the local board. Both expressed 
concern that Ms. Grossman's continued presence in the classroom would 
be detrimental to mental health of the children. Ms. Grossman coun­
tered with expert medical witnesses who disagreed with this contention. 
The court concluded that the evidence . . sustained as reasonably 
probable the board's hypothesis that there would be emotional harm to 
246 the students if Ms. Grossman were retained in the school system." 
Therefore, the court declined to reverse the Commissioner's finding. 
The court then addressed the issue of incapacity. Following a 
review of pertinent case law, the court stated: 
We are convinced that where ... a teacher's presence in the 
classroom would create potential for psychological harm to the 
students, the teacher is unable to properly fulfill his or her 
role and his or her incapacity has been established within the 
purview of the statute. In fairness to Ms. Grossman, we emphasize 
that the Commissioner's conclusions relate only to her fitness 
to continue teaching in the Barnards Township school system. We 
express no opinion with respect to her fitness to teach elsewhere 
and under circumstances different from those revealed in the present 
case.247 
After addressing various other issues presented in this appeal, the 
court decided that only the directive by the Commissioner of Education 
concerning back salary was to be reversed. The directives that 
2 4 6 Ibid. ,  46.  2 4 7 Ibid. ,  49.  
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Ms. Grossman be dismissed and that the local board apply for disability 
on her behalf were affirmed. 
Although it is doubtful that school officials will encounter sim­
ilar dismissal cases, the discussion of teacher dismissal for immorality 
on grounds of sexual misconduct would not have been complete without 
including these three cases. Public behavior such as this automatically 
leads to the conclusion that the individual's fitness to teach is 
impaired. In the event that school officials have to deal with similar 
unorthodox behaviors, the courts will uphold the dismissals if the con­
stitutional rights of the teachers have been safeguarded. 
Summary 
Decisions in the area of teacher dismissal for immorality on 
grounds of sexual misconduct are consistent in all areas except when 
the misconduct involves homosexuality. The United States Supreme Court 
has failed to grant certiorari and rule on the pertinent issues involv­
ing the dismissal of homosexual teachers. As a reuslt, there have 
been contradictory opinions from lower courts especially when the case 
involves the individual's status as a homosexual rather than actual 
homosexual acts. Further, private acts of homosexual conduct have been 
treated more leniently by the courts than public acts. School officials 
have been required to show that the conduct has had an adverse impact 
on the teacher's effectiveness. 
The common element in all the cases is the courts' insistence 
that the due process rights and other constitutional rights of the 
teacher involved be preserved regardless of the type of misconduct 
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involved. At a minimum, the teacher must receive written notice of 
the charges leading to the dismissal and the opportunity for a hearing 
before a fair and impartial panel. The individual's right to privacy 
may be violated only when there is a compelling state interest which 
overrides this right. Caution must be exercised when dismissing a 
teacher for his exercise of the right to freedom of speech. 
School officials must take a number of factors into consideration 
when dismissing a teacher for immorality based on sexual misconduct. 
Except in extreme cases, these officials must now argue convincingly 
that the behavior in question has had an adverse impact on the effec­
tiveness of the teacher's classroom performance and/or the reputation 
and effectiveness of the school in general. 
Misconduct which involves students or other minors will result 
in the teacher's dismissal, and the courts have been consistent in 
upholding these decisions. The judicial system has frequently inferred 
unfitness to teach from the very nature of the acts involving students. 
Unless there has been a violation of the constitutional rights of the 
teacher, these dismissals are affirmed on appeal to the courts of 
America. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Summary 
Throughout the history of American education, the character and 
conduct of public school teachers have been of great concern to parents 
and the general public. Teachers work in a very sensitive area which 
leads to the expectation of exemplary conduct on their part. The daily 
contact with impressionable young people has led to this expectation 
since children learn from example as much as from what is actually 
taught in the classroom. For this reason, the American public expects 
teachers to abide by a strict moral code of conduct despite the lib­
eralization of sexual mores that has occurred during the last two 
decades. 
This expectation of exemplary conduct has led to the dismissal 
of teachers for immorality on the grounds of sexual misconduct. Fur­
ther problems arise from these dismissals because of the variability 
of expectations. The factors used to decide such dismissals differ 
widely from one district to another, as well as from one state to 
another. What is considered reprehensible conduct in one location may 
be condoned in another. Often one finds that a wider range of sexual 
behavior is tolerated in a cosmopolitan area than in the more provincial 
localities. American society in general has no uniformly consistent 
view of morality. This has led many teachers who have been dismissed 
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for immoral conduct on grounds of sexual misconduct to challenge their 
dismissals in the judicial system of America. Until the state statutes 
reflect the liberalization of sexual values, cases involving dismissals 
of teachers for immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct will continue 
to be heard in the nation's courts. 
Answers to the Research Questions 
In Chapter I, five questions were posed for this study to answer. 
The following answers are the result of a careful review of the current 
literature on the dismissal of teachers for immorality on grounds of 
sexual misconduct, the analysis of state statutes, and the analysis 
of pertinent case law from both state and federal courts. 
Question one: What is revealed in the current literature concern­
ing the dismissal of teachers for immoral conduct? Many of the authors 
have addressed the issue of dismissal for immorality in general. Of 
those who have addressed specific areas of sexual misconduct which led 
to dismissal for immorality, more have addressed the issues of homo­
sexuality and unwed pregnancy than the other areas investigated in this 
study. 
After review of the historical aspect of the public's concern about 
the character and conduct of public school teachers, it is clear that 
this concern was well-founded. The topic has continued to be of inter­
est to authors of both legal and educational literature. The current 
l iterature, in general, defends the actions taken by the courts in these 
cases. 
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In the past, teachers charged with sexual misconduct would simply 
resign and often disappear from the area. With the current emphasis 
on constitutional rights, especially those involving privacy and due 
process, many of these teachers are challenging their dismissals in 
the courts. 
The literature tends to support the nexus requirement used by many 
courts in decisions concerning heterosexual misconduct with other con­
senting adults and unwed pregnancy. The consensus is that the right 
to privacy enjoyed by all citizens prevents school boards from dismiss­
ing these teachers unless there is a compelling state interest in doing 
so. School district officials must establish a clear relationship 
between the behavior in question and the effective operation of the 
school system. 
Contradictory opinions in the literature reflect the conflicting 
opinions from the courts when dealing with the dismissal of teachers 
for homosexual conduct. The majority of the authors on this topic seem 
to favor protection for these individuals under the right to privacy 
as long as the conduct is private and involves two consenting adults. 
When a homosexual goes public thorugh flagrant conduct, such as public 
homosexual acts or advocating the homosexual lifestyle, the right to 
privacy no longer applies, and the conduct should, and usually does, 
result in dismissal. The question of how to deal with homosexuals in 
the public schools will continue to be of interest even after the 
Supreme Court grants certiorari and addresses the pertinent legal issues 
involved in the dismissal of teachers for immorality on grounds of 
homosexual conduct. 
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The current literature reviewed for this study reflects substantial 
agreement in the area of sexual misconduct with students or other 
minors. The consensus is that sexual misconduct with students or other 
minors is prima facie evidence of immorality and the dismissal should 
be upheld. Most authors expressed the opinion that conduct of this 
nature is excluded from all constitutional guarantees with the excep­
tion of the right to due process. 
Question two: What is the status of immorality as a cause for 
dismissal as outlined in state statutes of all fifty states? Since 
statutes do not distinguish charges of immorality on grounds of sexual 
misconduct from charges based on other immoral conduct such as drug 
and alcohol abuse and illegal conduct, this review focused on immoral­
ity in general as a cause for dismissal. 
Of the forty-two states in the United States which list specific 
causes for the dismissal of tenured teachers in their state statutes, 
thirty-three states allow the dismissal of tenured teachers for 
immorality. When other related causes, such as conduct unbecoming a 
teacher, unprofessional conduct, and other good and just cause, which 
can be used to dismiss a teacher for sexual misconduct are included 
in the analysis, the number of states allowing dismissal of teachers 
for immoral conduct rises to forty-two. Three states which do not list 
specific causes for dismissal do allow revocation of teaching certif­
icates for immorality or moral turpitude. The revocation would result 
in the subsequent dismissal of the teacher. Therefore, there are forty-
five states with statutory authority to dismiss teachers on grounds 
of immoral conduct. Additionally, of the thirty states which list 
219 
specific causes for revocation of teaching certificates, twenty-three 
states provide statutory permission for the revocation of certification 
for teachers charged with immorality. Although societal attitudes have 
become more lenient concerning sexual conduct, state statutes do not 
reflect this attitude in the provisions for the dismissal of tenured 
teachers. 
The third and fourth questions can be treated together since both 
involve the analysis of case law involving teacher dismissal for 
immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct. What is the status of 
dismissal for immorality as revealed in analysis of case law? Are there 
discernible patterns and trends that can be identified in judicial 
decisions? 
Seventy-five cases which have been heard by state and federal courts 
within the last two decades were reviewed and analyzed for this study. 
Although the number of cases involving heterosexual misconduct and 
unwed pregnancy has shown a gradual decline, the number of cases involv­
ing homosexual conduct has remained fairly constant. There has been 
an increase in the number of cases heard which involved dismissal for 
sexual misconduct with students in the 1980's. 
Analysis of pertinent case law has revealed that immorality con­
tinues to be a valid cause for dismissal of teachers. Cases in which 
the school officials have shown that the conduct has had a detrimental 
impact on the performance of the teacher involved and in which the 
school officials have followed due process guidelines are upheld by 
the courts regardless of the type of misconduct. Dismissal for sexual 
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misconduct with students will be legally defensible as long as the due 
process rights of the teacher were protected during the dismissal 
process. 
Question five: What legal guidelines can be set forth as a result 
of this research to aid administrators and school board members? The 
guidelines which have been developed during the course of this study 
will be presented later in this chapter. 
Conclusions 
Even when legal issues appear to be similar and/or the same as 
those in cases already decided by the courts, a different set of cir­
cumstances can produce an entirely different decision. Therefore, 
drawing specific conclusions from legal research is difficult. However, 
based on the analysis of pertinent case law, the following general 
conclusions concerning the legal aspects of teacher dismissal for 
immorality on grounds of sexual misconduct can be made: 
(1) Private sexual conduct can result in dismissal if the school 
board has successfully established the nexus between the 
sexual misconduct and the teacher's classroom effectiveness 
that is required by the courts. 
(2) The administrator should consider the nature of the act when 
dismissing a teacher because of sexual preference. Teacher 
dismissals for public acts of homosexual conduct are more 
easily defended as the cause for dismissal than those that 
occur in the privacy of the home. 
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(3) Dismissal based on a teacher's admission of homosexual pref­
erence will generally not be upheld by the courts unless the 
school system can show that the teacher's life style has an 
adverse impact on his classroom performance or on the reputa­
tion of the school in general. 
(4) In order for dismissals of teachers for heterosexual miscon­
duct to be upheld when challenged, there must be substantial 
evidence that the conduct has had an adverse impact on the 
performance of the duties required by the teacher's contract. 
(5) Unwed pregnancy is no longer considered to be prima facie 
evidence of immorality; there must be a showing of adverse 
impact on teaching performance for the dismissal to be upheld. 
(6) Dismissal of a teacher for sexual misconduct with students 
generally results in a legally defensible dismissal if the 
teacher's constitutional rights are protected during the 
process. 
(7) The recent Stoneking decision may result in successful civil 
rights actions against school districts when teachers engage 
in sexual abuse or harassment of students and when there is 
a pattern of failure by school officials to address student 
complaints. 
(8) Given the complexity of individuals and the openness of sexual 
conduct in today's society, school officials must be ready 
to deal with any type of sexual misconduct as evidenced by 
the cases in this study which involved unorthodox conduct. 
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Guidelines for School Officials to Use in Dismissal 
of Teachers for Immorality on Grounds 
of Sexual Misconduct 
The following guidelines will be of help to school officials in 
the decision to dismiss a teacher for immorality on grounds of sexual 
misconduct. Although these guidelines do not guarantee a legally 
defensible dismissal, they will assist the practicing school adminis­
trator or school board member toward that purpose. 
The constitutional guarantees afforded to all citizens require 
that teachers being dismissed must be given written notice of the 
charges against them. School officials must also hold a hearing prior 
to voting to dismiss the teacher. Care must be exercised to insure 
that this hearing is held before an impartial group. School board mem­
bers must refrain from becoming involved in the case prior to this 
hearing. 
It is recommended that the school board employ an independent 
legal counsel or another individual knowledgeable in school law to 
conduct the hearing and rule on objections and other matters of law. 
It is further recommended that a court reporter or other independent 
individual be used to record the testimony and proceedings of the hear­
ing. Both of these recommendations are intended to provide a more 
legally defensible dismissal process. 
In most situations involving dismissals for immorality on grounds 
of sexual misconduct, the courts require that the nexus between the 
teacher's behavior and his teaching effectiveness be established by 
a preponderance of the evidence. The Morrison criteria have been 
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relied on in most cases involving sexual misconduct to establish this 
relationship. The factors in this precedent are: 
(1) the likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected 
students or fellow teachers; 
(2) the degree of that adverse impact anticipated as a result 
of the conduct; 
(3) the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct; 
(4) the type of teaching certificate and position held by the 
individual; 
(5) the extenuating or aggravating circumstances surrounding the 
behavior; 
(6) the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives 
resulting in the conduct; 
(7) the extent to which the disciplinary action taken against the 
teacher will have a chilling effect on the constitutional 
rights of the teacher involved or of teachers in general. 
Legal authorities also suggest the following determinative factors 
to be considered in the dismissal of teachers for immoral conduct: 
(1) The status of the participants in the sexual activity must 
be taken into consideration. This consideration should 
include the age of the individuals involved, the age level 
of the students taught by the teacher, and the position held 
by the teacher who was involved in the misconduct. 
(2) The proximity of time is also an important consideration in 
the dismissal decision. The period of time which has elapsed 
between the misconduct and the dismissal action is an 
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important element in the decision by the school board as well 
as in the decision by a judge who may be asked to review the 
dismissal. Isolated incidents of misconduct several years 
prior to the dismissal have less chance of being upheld as 
the cause for dismissal than conduct which occurred in prox­
imity to the dismissal decision. 
(3) Courts are interested in the likelihood that the conduct may 
re-occur. This can be determined from an examination of the 
number of times that the misconduct has occurred as well as 
the length of time over which the conduct has occurred. 
(4) The degree of notoriety which the teacher's conduct has 
attracted must be determined. If the conduct is well known 
and has attracted negative attention from the community, the 
chances are greater that the disapproval of the community 
could cause pupils to lose their respect for the teacher and 
their desire to continue in the class. Resentment and antag­
onistic attitudes on the part of colleagues toward this indi­
vidual would adversely affect the performance of assigned 
duties. School officials must also consider the source of 
the notoriety that surrounds the conduct. Did it arise from 
the conduct itself or was it the result of the dismissal 
process? 
(5) The nature of the offense is a final consideration which 
should be taken into account in the dismissal decision. If 
the teacher has been convicted of a criminal offense or if 
there are criminal charges pending, the dismissal has a 
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greater likelihood of being upheld by the judiciary. It is 
important to note that acquittal on criminal charges does 
not preclude dismissal of the individual from his teaching 
position. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
Applicable precedents for the dismissals for immorality on grounds 
of sexual misconduct have been established for all areas of misconduct 
with the exception of homosexuality. Until the Supreme Court of the 
United States addresses the pertinent constitutional issues involved 
in teacher dismissals for homosexuality, conflicting opinions will con­
tinue to be handed down in these cases. Therefore, this area deserves 
further investigation at a later date. 
Final disposition of the Stoneking case may also cause major reper­
cussions in the educational community. If Ms. Stoneking does prevail 
in her action which seeks monetary damages against the school district, 
the case will need to be followed to determine if it establishes a 
precedent for future civil rights cases based on the sexual abuse and 
harassment of students by teachers. 
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